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Preface
Studies on democracy development and peace-building in post-conflict areas in 
Indonesia have been conducted with consideration that beside halting conflicts 
and reaching peace deals, maintaining peace by preserving political dynamics 
and development is very important and challenging. Beside that, many recent 
studies were conducted with more focus on the dynamics of conflicts and vio-
lence during the conflict and post-conflict periods. There are few studies that 
focus on how post-conflict democratization is sustained to preserve develop-
mental process and maintain peace. The study is expected to fill in such gap. 
The study is conducted as part of the National Violence Monitoring Sys-
tem (NVMS/SNPK) program, in cooperation with The Habibie Center and 
the Deputy I Office for Environmental and Social Vulnerability Coordina-
tion, Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture, and with 
support from The World Bank. The program is funded by Korean grant of 
Trust Fund for Economic and Peacebuilding Transitions. The publication of the 
book is also supported by DFAT-TAF Partnership.
NVMS Research team of The Habibie Center obtained huge support from var-
ious parties during the development and execution of the study. For this, the team 
would like to extend its gratitude particularly to Aryos Nivada (Aceh Institut), 
Muhajir Juli, and Joko Sutranto (Provinsi Aceh); Franklin Nikijuluw, Jamal Riry, 
Hilda Rolobessy, Dominggus Jacob Loury Sipasulta (Maluku Province’s ITDM). 
The team would feel thankful for critical and constructive inputs from Badrus 
Sholeh (Islamic State University (UIN) of Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta), Cahyo 
Pamungkas (LIPI), Philips Vermonte (CSIS), Dr. Marwan Syaukani, Nelwan 
Harap, and Mafud Salatunlayl (Kemenko PMK), as well as Adrian Morel and Wa-
hyu Handoyo (World Bank). The NVMS research team would also like to thank 
all the informants/respondents for providing information during the research; the 
executive body and staff of The Habibie Center that have supported the research 
completely, especially Ms. Ima, Mr. Ghazali, Mr. Kun, Vivi, and Tasha.
All of the views in this publication are those from the Habibie Center’s 
NVMS research team and do not reflect the view of other program partner 
institutions. 
Finally, we hope this research would be useful and contribute to the dis-
course of democracy development and peace-building. 
Peace,
NVMS-THC Team
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Executive Summary
Nowadays conflicts and violence have been one of the most crucial global 
agenda and received deep attention from the world leaders, especially after 
the colonialism and the Cold War. In the context of Indonesia, after the fall 
of the New Order in late 1990s, conflicts took place consecutively in Central 
Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, East Timor, Maluku and Central Sulawesi, start-
ing in December 1996. All the conflicts experienced de-escalation, if not 
significantly settled, at the end of 2002, except for the Aceh conflict that was 
settled through Helsinki Peace Agreement in August 2005. The post-conflict 
election was then considered a strategic instrument for conflict settlement and 
peace-building (peace-settlement) in the post-conflict regions. 
In the academic horizon, post-conflict direct elections for local leaders are 
a creative innovation taken by the second generation of peace-keeping opera-
tions and expand after the end of the Cold War. Various studies on elections 
and post conflicts have been taken. However, few initiatives or studies focus 
on the interaction between post-conflict election and peace-building and the 
generated effects in a deep and systematic manner, especially in Indonesia. 
Theoretically and technically speaking, some important factors/issues related 
to the study of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders are governance, 
institutional infrastructure of the implementation of post-conflict direct elec-
tions for local leaders, and potential violence/conflict. 
Based on such issues, some questions are formulated as follows. 1. In which 
level post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Aceh and Maluku can 
help build democracy and strengthen peace (peace-settlement) or on the con-
trary? 2. How does post-conflict governance help build democracy in Aceh 
and Maluku? 3. To what extent is the institutional and social preparedness in 
the implementation of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Aceh 
and Maluku? 4. How do conflicts and violence occur in the post-conflict 
direct elections for local leaders in Aceh and Maluku? Such questions above 
provide an explicit and brief picture of the study’s goal, namely to explain and 
describe the condition and dynamics and challenges of post-conflict direct 
elections for local leaders; post-conflict governance which is the product of 
post-conflict direct elections for local leaders; institutional infrastructure of 
implementation of post-conflict direct elections for local leaders; potential 
for and threats of conflicts and violence that often accompany post-conflict 
direct elections for local leaders. 
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Methodologically, based on the NVMS data on the incents and impacts 
related to direct elections for local leaders in Indonesia (2005-2013), the study 
decided to carry out comparative analysis on two different cases namely post-
conflict direct elections for local leaders in Aceh and Maluku. The NVMS 
data has become a kind of pathway to the establishment of the thematic study. 
The study’s in-depth qualitative approach serves as basic rationale for adopting 
interviews as the primary method of data collection. Beside the primary data, 
the study also uses secondary data, including the data stored in general data 
archive, special collection, publishing company, public report and documents 
as well as academic publication. Based on the strategy of purposive sampling 
strategy and in-depth consideration of distribution of various informant di-
mensions, the study has collected a total number of 68 informants (Aceh=34 
people and Maluku=34 people) during two phase field activities between June 
and November 2014.
In summary, the findings of the research show that the implementation 
of the post-conflict direct elections for local leaders in Maluku is in general 
relatively better than in Aceh, with various dynamics and unique challenges 
in each region. This condition is considered to be a reflection from different 
conflict characters in both regions. From the technical/procedural aspects of 
implementation, both ran smoothly according to the general standard for the 
implementation of direct elections for local leaders. However, many criticisms 
were addressed to the implementers of the direct elections for local leaders in 
Aceh that were regarded being not neutral. Such condition was much caused 
by the KIP Aceh selection done by DPRA. Then, in at a particular level, the 
implementation of direct elections for local leaders can be regarded as rela-
tively helpful for consolidating and building peace in both regions. However, 
criticisms were addressed to the level of peace in Aceh which is considered 
not to have touched the substantial issues of peace. An important factor that 
is considered as support to build peace and Aceh and maintain the stability 
is the victory of Aceh Party (PA) which then places many of its cadres in 
various centers of power in Aceh, both in legislative and executive ones, and 
specially in the position of Aceh Governor. Meanwhile, in Maluku the issue 
refers to power sharing which is the local creative initiative, cultural entity 
“Pela Gandong”, and post-conflict increasingly strengthened public awareness. 
Some criticisms related to the post-conflict development of democracy in 
Aceh cover 1. many threats and intimidation; 2. Unfairness and partiality of 
organizers of direct elections for local leaders, including KPU, Panwas, PPK, 
PPS, KPPS; 3. Increased money politics; 4. Intervention by those in power on 
the elections results. In Maluku, the issue refers specifically to the increasingly 
strong money politics. Money politics is considered to gain more strength after 
the conflicts. Besides that, in Maluku there is still partiality among some or-
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ganizers of the direct elections for local leaders, as seen in some certain cases. 
The threat of instability in the execution of direct election for local leaders 
in Aceh tends to take the form of inter-civilians conflicts and violence, both 
between Aceh Party supporters and non-Aceh Party supporter and between 
the supporters or between Aceh Party elites. In another hand, the threat and 
potential of disability in Maluku tend to refer to political provocations during 
the elections by using religious variables, both via SMS or leaflets. From the 
aspect of actors, the threat of disability may come from individuals or groups 
or particular community organizations. 
In the governance context, accountability in Aceh is still considered poor. 
Even, the growing public opinion says that there is no difference between the 
non-GAM leaders and former GAM. The assessment was caused by several 
factors. The elected authorities (1) are considered to lie much and not to keep 
their promises; 2. tend more to enrich themselves than to think about the 
people and make the people prosperous; 3. do not want and cannot listen to 
public aspiration and voices; 4. do not make much changes; 5. apply lots of 
violent methods. Comparatively speaking, accountability in Maluku tends to 
be better. In relation to corruption issues, both regions are relatively similar, 
in which law enforcement related to corruption is relatively weak. Then, 
public transparency is still an issue and an object of many criticisms in Aceh 
and Maluku, both transparency related to recruitment of public officials and 
projects’ tenders as well as local governments’ finance. Related to public par-
ticipation in the post-conflict local election both provinces almost shared the 
score and reduced dynamics. Overall, public participation in the post-conflict 
local election in both regions is relatively good. Lastly, the law enforcement 
in Aceh is considered to be poorer than in Maluku, especially in relation to 
violent issues and violations in the post-conflict local election implementation. 
With regard to the institutional infrastructure readiness for post-con-
flict local election, KIP Aceh and the Maluku Local Election Commission 
(KPUD) have similar issues related to the human resource capacity and in-
tegrity at the grass root level. Another issue is related to the neutrality of the 
organizers. However, Maluku is considered to be better in responding to the 
problem. The issue in Aceh rather moves to the mechanism of KIP selection 
by DPRA. Especially for Maluku, limited physical infrastructures become 
a significant obstacle for post-conflict local election organizing institution. 
Maluku’s archipelagic condition has made it difficult for KPUD and General 
Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) to do mobilization because of limited 
sea transport. The limitation has impacted the distribution of ballot boxes. 
Less adequate communications infrastructure has become an obstacle for 
them to foster inter-area coordination. The mobilization and communications 
difficulties are also experienced by the Police as their role is important in 
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order to maintain the conducive implementation of post-conflict local elec-
tion. Related to the role of political parties, Aceh and Maluku share the same 
problem. There are three functions of parties that need improving. They are 
less sustainable reorganization capacity, internalization of democratic values 
in getting powers and ability to handle conflicts. 
In the dimension of security and violent occurrence, the post-conflict lo-
cal election in Maluku is relatively safer and stable compared to that in Aceh 
which are filled with violence, intimidation as well as horizontal conflicts. 
Even the violence and intimidation tend to rise and almost spread evenly, 
instead of reduction, in the post-conflict local election in 2012. Therefore, 
there is some degraded implementation of pemilukada in Aceh. In Maluku, 
sporadic violence can only be spotted in Southeast Maluku, Tual City, and 
SBT (Eastern Seram). Competition among former GAM personnel is consid-
ered to have made the intensity of post-conflict local election-related violence 
in Aceh higher both in term of quantity and impacts. The supporting factor 
for the occurrence of violence in Aceh is the wide circulation of arms. In 
Maluku, even though there is no information on the circulation of arms, the 
violence that uses arms in post-conflict local election does not occur at all. 
The most incidents are torture and fight between the success team and sup-
porters of different candidates. At the grass root level, the bitter experiences of 
the Acehnese and Maluku people have motivated them to prioritize peaceful 
environment and stability rather than conflict and violence. 
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C H A P T E R  I
Introduction
I .  B A C K G R O U N D
Nowadays phenomena of conflicts and violence have been one of the most 
crucial global agenda and received deep attention from the world leaders, 
especially after the colonialism and the Cold War (e.g. Connor 2004; Bak-
wesegha 2004; Hechter 2004; Hale 2008; Horowitz 1985). Such attention 
is obvious from various efforts from scientific disciplines to explain conflict 
issues (e.g. Dahrendorf 1967; Coser 1967; Collins 2008; Oberschall 1978; 
Rex 1981; Bernard 1950; Robinson 2001; Schulze 2004, 1997; Aspinall 2009, 
2008, 2005; Fearon & Laitin 1996; Miller 2009; Cramer 2007; Mancini 
2008; Stewart 2008), dan menyelesaikan konflik (e.g. Jeong 1999; Isenhart 
& Spangle 2000; Moore 2003; Mayer 2000; Fisher, et al. 1991; Schellenberg 
1996; Fisher, et al. 1994; Ury 2000). 
Conflict analysts regard Indonesia, Thailand, The Philippines, and Myan-
mar as countries of a long history of conflicts and violence in Southeast Asia. 
In particular, Indonesia having more than 250 million of people and more 
than 300 ethnical groups is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the 
world (Mancini 2008, p. 112; Malley 2002, p. 172; Ross 2005, p. 36). This 
heterogeneity is then reflected in a current national model of Indonesia that is 
often perceived as a product of negation of various interests, both ethnicity and 
religion (Bertrand 2004, h. 4). However, various forms of large-scale violent 
conflicts emerged drastically in the archipelagic country in the fall of the New 
Order in late 1990’s. Conflicts took place consecutively in Central Kalimantan, 
Aceh, Papua, East Timor, Maluku and Central Sulawesi, starting in December 
1996 (Bertrand 2008, p. 425). All the conflicts experienced de-escalation, if not 
significantly settled, at the end of 2002, except for the Aceh conflict that was 
settled through Helsinki Peace Agreement in August 2005 (Bertrand 2008).
One of the conflict settlement forms including post-conflict peace-build-
ing (peace-settlement) is the execution of post-conflict election. Elections and 
democracy are regarded as one of the conflict management forms on the 
assumption that the benefit of this democratic competition will become a 
strategic instrument to manage tension and conflicts in the society including 
post-conflict society. (Przeworski 1991, in Reilly 2008). With various reasons, 
post-conflict elections are widely regarded as an integral part of the main 
process and method for peaceful end to violence/war and state-nation building 
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(Reilly 2008; Korth, 2011). In other words, post-conflict elections become 
validation for peace-building (peace-settlement) by the society and simulta-
neously become the foundation of the democratization process (Oliva 2011).
Democratic intervention in simultaneous violence/conflict settlement and 
peace-building started to become stronger at the end of the Cold War and 
fall of Soviet Union in early 1990s that brought about a huge impact on the 
victory of liberal democratic ideology and spread the wind of democratiza-
tion across the world. Besides that, contextually the end of the Cold War was 
then followed by an eruption of various wars and conflicts countries. Jarstad 
and Sisk (2008) even emphasized that no post-Cold War civil wars that were 
settled by peace agreements had followed regional partition process (regional 
proliferation). It must be admitted that new states that emerged after the 
Cold War were not products of peace agreement negotiation. Timor Leste, 
for instance, is a negotiation result between Indonesia and Portugal, instead 
of peace agreement result between Indonesia and Fretilin.
Contextually speaking, the term of post-conflict election is a creative in-
novation taken by the second generation of the peace keeping operations and 
then expands after the halt of the Cold War. Jarstad and Sisk (2008, p. 2) 
emphasized that since 1990’s democracy has been an integral part of interna-
tional peace-building missions during the widespread eruption of civil wars. 
Namibia and El Salvador are the first states that applied the method (Oliva 
2011). Besides those two states, the states that have applied post-conflict elec-
tions were Afghanistan, Kosovo, Nepal, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Irak, etc. Even Kuhne (2010) further added between 2010 and early 2011 
there were more than ten post-conflict elections conducted in various coun-
tries. In the Indonesian context, Aceh is the post-conflict region in which 
the execution of post-conflict election was an integral part of the contents of 
the Helsinki Peace Agreement (see Reilly 2008; Awaluddin 2009; Kingsbury 
2006). In other post-conflict regions like Maluku, the execution of post-con-
flict elections was more an effect of decentralization policy implementation. 
The core behind the execution of the post-conflict elections is two process-
es that are actually different but mutually linked (interacting twin processes), 
namely democratization through elections and peace-building. Democrati-
zation refers to the open process of political space, including improvements 
in contestation, participation and human rights. Democracy is considered a 
system in which various different interests are managed through continuous 
negotiation and accommodated through legitimate agencies. Even though 
various conflicts are sometimes fully settled, democracy is assumed to be 
able to settle them in a peaceful manner. At this level, democracy and peace 
support one another. Democracy can be consolidated when peaceful con-
flict-managing ways are acceptable. Similarly, sustainable peace requires good 
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governance, in which various interests, complaints, and disappointment are 
accommodated through negotiation and compromise (e.g. Jarstad 2008, h. 
18-19; Lyons 2002, h. 5; Reilly 2008). 
Besides that, decentralization which is essentially devolution of power, is 
often regarded as one of the key instruments in handling conflicts and im-
proving peace in Asian countries (Larsen & Selim 2009, p. 1). Specifically, 
Indonesia has applied it since 1999 through Law No. 22 Year 1999 which was 
reviewed into Law No. 32 Year 2004 on Regional Government. In general, 
regional autonomy is expected to be able to strengthen political representation 
of marginalized groups or stakeholders. However, all still depends on how 
the regional autonomy is managed. If devolution mechanism is no more than 
replicating forms of exclusion and imbalance, peace-building through regional 
autonomy will fail (Larsen & Selim 2009, p. 2).
A general assumption emphasizes that democracy implies peace and vice 
versa (mutually beneficial processes). However, in reality there are many para-
doxes/contradictions or dilemma in the implementation process in the field. 
Democracy as a political system is identical to peaceful management of con-
flicts, both conflicts in a country or between countries. The post-conflict 
democracy path is often steep and accompanied by various conflicts and vio-
lence (Jarstad 2008, p. 19). In a simple way, post-conflict election process can 
contribute to the promotion of sustainable peace, but it can create an entry to 
emergence of conflicts and violence and generate new post-conflict tensions 
(Ansori 2012). The condition is much shaped by competitive situation that 
contains dichotomic elements of win and lose. Furthermore, this instability 
may harm the sustainable peace promoting process (Korth 2011, h. 9; Reilly 
2008; Ansori 2012, 2010; Kuhne 2010).
The dynamics of conflict resolution and democratic transition is clearly 
different. Meanwhile behind the post-conflict election the spirit is the strong 
expectation of the realization of the two goals. It must be admitted that the 
burden to be carried by the post-conflict elections is so heavy. As part of the 
peace agreement, post –conflict elections are considered as the main instru-
ment of agreement implementation. Simultaneously, the election is expected 
to strengthen democratization process and becomes a way-out which will 
then generate a series of rules, institutions and new multi-political parties. 
Therefore, success in reaching one goal, let’s say the halt of conflicts/absence 
of violence and/or peace building, are not automatically successful in democ-
ratization process (Lyons 2004, in Reilly 2008, p. 158).
One of the domino effects of the inherent contradiction in post-conflict 
elections is the emergence of violence or new conflict forms. The implementa-
tion of democracy in post-conflict regions, which are generally considered as 
still vulnerable to conflicts and violence, often triggers conflicts and violence 
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(Reilly 2008; Kuhne 2010; Lyons 2008; Korth 2011; Larsen & Selim 2009). 
Meanwhile, non-violent conflicts are the main condition that is necessary for 
democracy; violent conflicts will harm the function of democracy. Electoral 
violence and of course other types of violence will become real threats to 
political order, civilian safety and Human Rights (Jarstad 2008, p. 19). In a 
simple form, Korth (2011) emphasized that election accompanied by violence 
will not unify but will divide instead. In the Indonesian context violence in 
elections is more dominant in post-conflict areas rather than non-post conflict 
areas, of course except for Papua that is still considered unfinished. This is 
shown by SNPK data (2005-2013) below (Graph 1).
Various studies on election and post-conflict conflicts have been done; 
with a focus on post-conflict elections and international community engage-
ment (Kumar 1998; Wallensteen 2008; Sivapathasundaram 2004); autonomy 
and post-conflict solutions (Wirsing 2004); post-conflict election and electoral 
polarization (Moreno 2004; Ansori 2012); post-conflict elections and violence 
(Guelke 2004; Larsen & Selim 2009; Cederman, et al. 2009; Hoglund 2008; 
Brancati & Snyder 2011); post-conflict election, challenges and institutional 
readiness (Zenenga 2011; Oberschall 2007; Nelson 1998; Kumar 1998; Tomsa 
2009; Clark & Palmer 2008; Kuhne 2010; Barnes 2001); post-conflict elec-
tion and dynamics of voters behaviors (Oliva 2011; Cyllah 2011; Harris 2002; 
Gallagher & Schowengerdt 1998; Jarstad 2008; Kovacs 2008; Clark & Palmer 
2008); post-conflict elections and the role of media and civil society (Frere 
2011; Belloni 2008). Besides that, some researchers are involved in the assess-
ment and discourse on post-conflict elections and peace-building (e.g. Call 
& Cook 2003; Flores & Nooruddin 2011; Lyons 1998, 2002; Jarstad 2008; 
Reilly 2008; Sisk & Risley 2005).
However, few efforts have been done to see deeply and systematically how 
far is the interaction between post-conflict elections and peace building and 
the generated effects, especially in Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, some 
studies/researches on post-conflict elections have been done. However, the 
studies have focused more on institutional readiness and dynamics of voting 
behaviors (e.g. Tomsa 2009; Clark & Blair 2008; Aspinall 2008). Besides that, 
the completed studies are related to the dynamics of conflicts and violence 
occurring during conflicts and after conflicts. Not many studies have been 
conducted with focus on how post-conflict democratization exists to maintain 
developmental process and preserve peace as initiated by the study. By con-
sidering various aspects, as explained in the methodology section, the study 
takes Aceh and Maluku, in which post-conflict duration in both regions has 
reached approximately one decade, as case studies. In this context, Scwartz 
(1991) emphasizes that one decade is period of time required to see and evalu-
ate how change has taken place after conflicts. 
5I N T R O D U C T I O N
Graph 1: Incidents and Impacts of Violence in Local Election (Pemilukada) in All 
SNPK-Monitored Areas (2005-2013)
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I I .  G O A L  O F  R E S E A R C H
Related to the above issues, the National Violence Monitoring System 
(NVMS/SNPK) team of The Habibie Center conducted the research to an-
swer some questions which can generally be formulated as follows.
1. To what extent do post-conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku 
help build democracy and strengthen peace (peace-settlement) or vice 
versa?
2. How does post-conflict-governance help build democracy and peace 
in Aceh and Maluku?
3. How do conflict and violence emerge in the post-conflict local election 
processes in Aceh and Maluku?
4. To what extent is the institutional and social readiness in the imple-
mentation of post-conflict local election in Aceh and Maluku?
Thus, the research intends to (1) describe and explain the strategic position 
of post-conflict local election implementation in relation to peace building 
and democracy development in post-conflict regions and the challenges; (2) 
to describe and explain the condition of post-conflict governance and its role 
in consolidating peace and democracy; (3) describe and explain the emergence 
of phenomena and potential of violence in the post-conflict local election 
implementation process; (4) describe and explain institutional readiness or 
social infrastructure for post-conflict local election implementation.
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I I I .  C O N C E P T U A L  F R A M E W O R K
a .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  E l e c t i o n s :  B e t w e e n 
D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n  a n d  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g
Post-conflict elections are a central concept in this study. For this study 
purpose, post-conflict elections are defined as elections are organized/take 
place after peace agreements or during the stopping period of a conflict, both 
vertical and horizontal one (e.g. Harris 2002; Garber 1998; Kumar 1998; 
Flores & Nooruddin 2011). Post-conflict elections are a unique concept and 
phenomenon that cannot be treated the same as elections organized in normal 
condition. Post-conflict elections are usually designed to facilitate conflict 
settlements (Garber 1998) and/or as efforts to rehabilitate areas that are de-
stroyed due to civil wars (Flores & Nooruddin 2011, p. 1), although many 
decision makers and analysts debate the effectiveness and efficacy of elections 
that are organized after conflicts (Garber 1998, p. 1). 
At this level, it can be concluded that there are in general two goals of 
the post-conflict elections, namely as instruments for conflict resolution cum 
peace-building and simultaneously to build democracy and legitimate gov-
ernment (democratization), although both may not always walk abreast (e.g. 
Kumar 1998; Garber 1998: Lyons 2002; Korth 2011; Sisk & Jarstad 2008; 
Fogg 2005). In this relation, elections are regarded as strategic instruments of 
conflict resolution and peace-building because the essence behind elections 
and democracy is the distribution of power, rare resources, status, etc. in a 
fair and elegant manner. On the other hand, the conflict itself is a disagree-
ment between two or more people or groups on status, power or rare resources 
(Coser 1967, p. 26).
When researched in academic horizon, studies on post-conflict elections 
are an effort to fill in the gaps in various academic researches. In one hand, 
many of the researchers only focus on democratization issues, while the other 
researchers focus on peace-building issues. Behind both issues is an assump-
tion that democracy assumes peace and vice versa (Jarstad 2008, p. 20-21; 
Call & Cook 2003). Therefore, this study can be said to be relatively new.
It must be admitted that the hope for successful post-conflict elections is so 
high. Unfortunately, often times the condition is not supported by the neces-
sary pre-condition. Post-conflict societies are generally known as those still 
being vulnerable to conflicts and violence (war-torn societies). Such societies 
are still very easily fragmented and polarized. Issues in the societies are often 
related to political, social, and economic stability as well as institutional and 
social infrastructures (voters’ behaviors), especially in the context of political 
will as winner or loser. Particularly, election’s institutional infrastructures are 
often not ready or still vulnerable (extreme fragile). Even, electoral competi-
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tion can be an extended polarization in the previous conflicts (Kumar 1998, 
h. 6-8).
There are some characteristics of post-conflict elections: firstly, most of 
the elections occur after peace agreement negotiation; secondly, post-conflict 
elections always involve the role of external actors; thirdly, the elections occur 
in the initial reconstruction process, in which many displaced people have not 
returned to their hometown (Garber 1998). 
b .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  E l e c t i o n s :  G o a l  a n d  R e a l i z a t i o n 
In general, as emphasized by previous analysts, the goal of post-conflict 
elections is not only for democracy development in post-conflict areas, but 
also peace-building in post-conflict areas. Both are assumed to have consti-
tutive/mutually beneficial relations. In this context, debates are often raised 
by the analysts on to what extent post-conflict elections meet the expected 
goals. Korth (2011) clarifies some goals included in the frame of the two major 
goals of post-conflict elections above, namely (1) to validate sustainable peace 
promotion (peace settlements); (2) to generate new sovereign authority; (3) to 
legitimize new constitutional rules; (4) to generate symbolic cut-off from the 
past to a new life; (5) to improve civil society development; (6) to support 
public participation in various political processes; (7) to stimulate people to 
generate various initiatives. 
Then the question is how far a post-conflict election is considered to be 
successful or to fail, and even further than that, on what factor/dimension 
the election is considered to be successful or to fail. In this connection, the 
fundamental thing is what it means by being successful in that context. If 
post-conflict elections have various goals, the evaluation must be based on 
each of the relevant goals. There are several post-conflict elections that are 
regarded a failure including that in Angola in 1992. There are also some elec-
tions that are considered (more or less) successful including those in El Sal-
vador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, etc. (Kuhne 2010). 
Apart from that, many post-conflict elections lie in between the two ex-
tremes. In other words, the elections have reached some of sustainable peace 
promotion and peace. Besides that, in some cases, elections have resulted in 
stability and peace without democratic legitimacy such as in Cambodia in 
1993, or grown democracy with a little stability, or several combination of 
both (Korth 2011, p. 13-14) (Picture 1). Then, how about the post-conflict 
elections in Indonesia?
Jarstad (1998) adds that often times the two goals of post-conflict elec-
tions, namely democratization and peace-building, collide one another or 
experience dilemma. The failure to manage the dilemma or contradiction can 
cause destructive impacts and harm long-term process of democratization and 
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peace-building. Therefore, for him, if the option is between the promotion of 
sustainable peace or improving democracy, the promotion of sustainable peace 
must be prioritized. If both goals have contradictory impacts, four kinds of 
dilemmas will show up. 
Picture 1: Post-Conflict Elections: Successful or Failed
•	Do not support democracy 
development nor 
democratization
•	Generate many violence
•	Example: Angola in 1992
•	Generate peace building 
stability and grow 
democracy
•	Example: Namibia,  
El Salvador
•	 Generate stability/peace but 
without democracy legitimacy; 
grow democracy but disturb 
peace stability, etc. 
•	 Some other combinations
•	 Examples: Cambodia, Irak, 
Timor Leste, etc.
Failed Successful
Partially 
Succesful/Failed
The first is the horizontal dilemma relating to the group issue that must be 
represented in the peace and democratization processes. For instance, rebels 
or particular groups will feel that peace is too expensive if they have to be 
marginalized from the future government. The next is the vertical dilemma 
(generally between elites and mass) relating to a hard option between effec-
tiveness and legitimacy. Legitimacy is hoped to strengthen when the people 
are involved in every phase of peace processes, while elites tends to non-public 
processes which are considered more effective. The third is systematic dilem-
ma that refers to ownership issue, namely between local control and national/
international control in the democratization and peace building processes. 
The last is temporal dilemma which deals with negotiation between long-term 
and short-term impacts in the democratization and peace building processes. 
Democratization initiative in the short time period will increase the risk of 
violence. Similarly, peace-building may be involving some freedom limits such 
as freedoms of the press and demonstration (Jarstad 1998, p. 21-25). 
c .  Po s t  C o n f l i c t  E l e c t i o n s  a n d  V i o l e n c e
In the study conducted by Brancati & Snyder (2011), the link between the 
implementation time of post-conflict elections and the risks of re-emergence 
of violence must be thoroughly considered. A direct election after peace is 
reached has high possibility of the re-emergence of violence especially be-
cause the election infrastructure is still relatively weak. At the same time, 
the election is generally dominated by former combatants who are not fully 
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demobilized and politicians that often raise the sectarian/group aspects by 
claiming pro-democracy (Reilly 2002; Mansfield & Snyder 2007). Tension 
and violence will be more obvious especially if former combatants suffer from 
defeats in elections (Brancati & Snyder 2011). 
In line with Brancati & Snyder (2011), Jarstad (1998) adds that post-
conflict election vulnerability to the emergence of violence is related to the 
legacy of the previously-impacting conflicts (legacy of conflict). Usually weap-
ons still scatter. Trauma of violence and fear of the return of violence has 
enabled mobilization of mass of people based on extreme ideological lines 
which contain exclusion-inclusion. Flores & Nooruddin (2011) in particular 
highlight the roles of politicians/elites in connection to the emergence of vio-
lence in post-conflict elections. Both emphasize that inability of politicians 
to credibly respect peace and democracy can intensify tension and violence. 
The assumption is that democracy and peace should be mutually sup-
portive. Democracy can only be consolidated if conflicts are managed in 
peaceful ways. Similarly, sustainable peace can only be realized in democratic 
governance. However, various studies on democracy and democratization 
show that the path towards democracy is often steep and full of conflicts, 
even violence. Electoral violence will become a particular threat to the peace-
building process (Jarstad 1998, p. 29; Hoglund 1998; Kuhne 2010). Korth 
(2011) believes that post-conflict elections can help build peace, but also can 
be an entry point to violence because the competitive character of elections 
is “win-lose” dichotomy. 
I V .  R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y  
a .  R e s e a r c h  P r o p o s i t i o n
Propositions of the research are taken from a broad knowledge on post-
conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku as well as general theoretical studies 
(theoretical framework) on post-conflict elections. The propositions men-
tioned here are generally defined as a series of statements or sentences on 
what the research expect to show from the collected data. In this context, 
proposition statements are understood as truth bearers (Shapiro 2009), 
which will show relation dynamics between post-conflict elections, peace-
building, democratization, and potential for emerging violence, which can 
be true or false. 
The study is specifically built from a series of propositions as follows. 
•	 Proposition I: Post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku help build 
sustainable peace (sustainable peace-settlement) in both post-conflict 
regions.
•	 Proposition II: Post-conflict elections in Aceh and Maluku help build 
and strengthen democracy in both post-conflict regions.
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•	 Proposition III: Implementation of post-conflict elections in Aceh and 
Maluku is followed by emergence of various forms of violence.
There will definitely be implications/consequences for the theory of post-
conflict elections if such propositions are true or false. 
b .  R e s e a r c h  A p p r o a c h  a n d  C a s e  S t u d y
Qualitative approach is selected for this study because the characteristic 
of the analyzed problems require qualitative approach rather than quantita-
tive-extensive one. The characteristic of qualitative approach is believed to 
be helpful and reliable (adequate) in understanding and explaining issues of 
post-conflict elections and peace building in Indonesia given the fact that 
qualitative approach is considered very suitable for exploring such complex 
issues in an intensive manner (e.g. Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Marshal & Ross-
man 1989, p. 43; Creswell 1994, p. 21; Kvale 1996, p. 179; Charmaz 2006; 
Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 1).
A qualitative approach simply means a non-numerical data collection 
(Denzin & Lincoln 2005). According to Marshal & Rossman (1989, h. 43), 
qualitative approach also applicable for locating important processes and 
relations. In general, qualitative research strives to collect data intensively 
and deeply to understand social behaviors and principles as well as law that 
regulate those diverse behaviors. Qualitative research generally deals with the 
questions of ‘why and how’ according to the research character, and not only 
the questions of what, where and when, which are generally in accordance 
with quantitative research (Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Kvale 1996, h. 179).
Furthermore, the selected case studies are believed by SNPK-THC team to 
provide good opportunity for understanding and explaining the characteristics 
and complexity of post-conflict elections and peace-building. An in-depth in-
vestigation on a particular phenomenon is regarded as the main goal of a case 
study. In reality, a case study is generally aimed to explore a case in order to 
find principles or assumptions operating behind the phenomenon (Yin 1994). 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 221), a case study has two roles in under-
standing human behaviors, namely to produce the type of knowledge that 
is dependent on the context and, as the consequence of the knowledge that 
is dependent on the context, possibilities that can emerge from theoretical-
epistemic construction. 
However, nowadays debates among scientists often refer to scientific gen-
eralization issues. Qualitative investigations are much criticized due to its 
inability to make generalization. However, Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 221) thinks 
that such criticisms are no more than one of the five misunderstandings or 
over-simplification on the essence of case studies (see also Kvale & Brink-
mann 2009). First, theoretical knowledge (context-independent) is more valu-
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able than concrete and practical knowledge (context-dependent). Secondly, 
someone cannot make generalization based on one case study. Thirdly, various 
case studies are only useful to withdraw several hypotheses, or only in the 
initial phase from the entire research process. Fourthly, case studies contain 
biases through verification. Fifthly, often time it is difficult to summarize 
and develop general propositions and theories based on case studies. Such 
misunderstandings are generally found among natural science’s epistemology 
adorers within social science. 
Therefore, it is a mistake to emphasize that someone cannot make gen-
eralization. This is based on the selected case studies and how the case 
studies are selected. Different from Flyvbjerg (2006), Kvale & Brinkmann 
(2009, p. 261) question more on the urgency and relevance of generaliza-
tion in case studies. For them, pragmatic, constructive, and discoursive 
approaches are more acceptable in social science, which is also a mode of 
understanding and action that are contextualized socio-historically in a so-
cial world. In other words, at a certain level, this goes into post-modernism 
perspective. Amidst the classical debates between the objectivist-positivist 
and subjectivist-interpretative, Bourdieu (1984, p. 5), for instance, who 
showed up in the rise of Marxism and shared some particular views with 
Giddens (1976), constructed his knowledge by criticizing Cartesian social 
ontology that divides subject and object, intention and cause, materiality 
and symbolic representation. Eventually, such study findings will later be 
able or unable to apply in post-conflict regions in Indonesia and generally 
outside Indonesia. More than that, the characteristic of the study does not 
require any prediction as macro-level studies generally make, or positivist 
perspective and natural sciences do. 
c .  R e s e a r c h  S t r a t e g y :  C o m p a r a t i v e  M e t h o d
Various studies on post-conflict elections have so far focused more on or 
been identical with post-conflict regions which are more caused by vertical 
conflicts (state–rebels) or between states (inter-states) (see Call & Cook 2003; 
Flores & Nooruddin 2011; Lyons 1998, 2002; Jarstad 2008; Reilly 2008, 
2002; Sisk & Risley 2005; Brancati & Snyder 2011). Hardly none of post-
conflict studies that tries to look at this issue in the context of post-conflict 
regions caused by horizontal conflicts. Therefore, the study tries to use a 
comparative strategy by taking two cases of post-conflict regions that have 
different characters, namely the Aceh Province (vertical conflict) and Maluku 
Province (horizontal conflict).
In general, the strategy will focus on two different post-conflict regions 
(spatial comparison) to later look at various differences and similarities in 
relation to some research questions (see Przeworski & Teune 1970; Heiden-
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heimer, et al. 1983). In this study context, two post-conflict regions, Aceh and 
Maluku, were selected as comparative cases with some reasons. First, Aceh 
and Maluku have the biggest incidents and impacts of violence in pemilukada 
compared to other post-conflict regions, as shown by the SNPK data (2005-
2012) below (Graph 2).
Graph 2: Incidents and Impacts of Violence in Pemilukada  
in Post-Conflict Regions (2005-2013)
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Graph 3: Incidents and Impacts of Violence in Pemilukada in Aceh and Maluku 
(2005-2013)
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Even though violence occurred more dominantly in both provinces com-
pared to other post-conflict provinces, there are variations of incidents and 
impacts in both provinces as shown in SNPK data (Graph 3). The data 
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generally shows that from the aspect of death impact, violence in pemilukada 
in Aceh is more deadly (7 deaths) than that in Maluku (1 death). However, 
the impact of building destruction in Maluku (76 damaged buildings) can 
be regarded worse than in Aceh (159 damaged buildings) by taking into 
consideration the number of violent incidents in each province. Secondly, 
pemilukada in Aceh were organized twice, while in Maluku three times. 
Furthermore, both post-conflict regions have different conflict character 
backgrounds. The Aceh conflicts are more vertical, while the Maluku con-
flicts have horizontal character. Besides that, even though both conflicts are 
settled by peace agreements- Aceh was settled by Helsinki Peace Agreement 
in 2005 and Ambon by Malino II Peace Agreement in 2002- the background 
of post-conflict elections in Aceh is an integral part of MoU of 2005 Hel-
sinki Agreement, while post-conflict elections in Maluku more constitute the 
implementation of national policy on decentralization. The following table 
shows a comparative dimension of the two post-conflict regions (Table 1):
Table 1: Aceh and Maluku: Comparative Dimension
Dimension Aceh Maluku
Scale of Violence in 
Pemilukada (2005-2013)
First Third
Character of Conflict Vertical (Aceh vs 
Government of Indonesia)
Horizontal (Islam vs 
Christianity)
Instrument for Settlement Helsinki Peace Agreement Malino II Peace Agreement
Status of Post-Conflict 
Elections
Integral part of Helsinki 
Peace Agreement
Part of national policy on 
decentralization
Frequency of Pemilukada 
Implementation
2 times (2006 and 2012) 3 times (2003, 2008, and 
2013)
Lastly, the NVMS data on the incidents and impacts of violence in post-
conflict local election in post-conflict regions in Indonesia (period 2005-
2013) (see Graph 2) really shows that North Maluku is in the second rank. 
However, NVMS-THC team decided to choose Maluku as one of the case 
studies in this research, rather than North Maluku, with a consideration that 
the Maluku Province has stronger friction dynamics between Christianity and 
Islam, as well as power sharing issue (power-sharing) between Moslem and 
Christian communities, in relation to post-conflict local election compared to 
North Maluku. Electoral contestation in North Maluku stands more on the 
aspects of governance, corruption, improvement in people’s living standard, 
etc. (NVMS-THC 2014; Tomsa 2009; Jones 2010). In this context, frictions 
in post-conflict local election in Maluku tend to be a strong extension of the 
previous conflict legacies. 
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d .  D a t a  C o l l e c t i o n  M e t h o d
Qualitative approach becomes the basic rationale for adopting interviews 
as primary method of data collection. Charmaz (2006) emphasizes that in-
terviews have been long and much used for collecting data in various types of 
qualitative researches. Interview itself is an effort to understand the world or 
a phenomenon from a point of view of research’s subject, to open the mean-
ing of their experiences (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 1). In this context, an 
interview is held to find understanding at the factual and meaning levels even 
though it is sometimes harder to find them at the meaning level. An interview 
is very useful to get access to stories or information behind the experiences of 
participants, both with direct focus on the issue (funneling) and storytelling 
(story telling) strategies (Minichiello et al. 1995). A deep interview generates 
special benefits useful to improve interpretation of the research’s subject on 
the experiences (Charmaz 2006). The relation between interviewer and in-
terview’s subject can be described as mutual relations (inter-view) (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009, p. 2).
Then, the semi-structured data collection method, instead of the struc-
tured one, is adopted in the research. A structured interview generally has a 
series of formal and limited questions, or previously-structured ones. Semi-
structured interviews, however, tend to be more flexible and extensive. In 
other words, it can open new questions raised during an interview as a result 
of what is told by an interview’s subject (Lindlof & Taylor 2002). Traditional 
perspective of semi-structured interviews will particularly provide an oppor-
tunity for getting rich information on direct experiences and perspectives 
of the Acehnese and Maluku people related to the dynamics and process of 
post-conflict elections, peace-building, violence that occur in post-conflict 
local election, and social-institutional readiness. 
Actually an interview is something that is contextual and negotiation, 
which means that the story or explanation in an interview does not reproduce 
previous reality. However, the story or description gives an explanation with 
a particular point of view that has particular purposes. Therefore, the result 
takes the form of construction or reconstruction of a reality (Charmaz 2006, 
p. 27). In other words, interview result is a construction o reality, and not 
the reality itself. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009, p. 82) add knowledge is con-
structed through interaction through an interaction between an interviewer 
and interview’s subject. Therefore, interview is a social product of knowledge; 
in this study context, it is a social production of knowledge on post-conflict 
elections and peace-building in Indonesia.
Another important thing that needs to be known is that an interviewer 
must have awareness on power issue and status of the interviewed subject. 
This often has an important influence during an interview period. In this 
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relation, Charmaz (2006, p. 27) emphasizes that professionals and people 
who have power (leaders and elites) will probably control and direct the in-
terview condition, both by changing interview questions in order to suit their 
purpose or by scheduling time and venue as well as duration of the interview. 
Another issue is that leaders/elites probably tend to make rhetoric and public 
statements rather than conveying their genuine personal points of view. This 
is relevant because the study will also involve many interviews with elites/
leaders, professionals, and academicians. Another issue is related to distrust 
and suspicion of research’s subject, especially in the study like this, namely the 
study that talks about conflicts and peace. In this regard, Charmaz (2006, p. 
27) emphasizes that such suspicion is often related to the sponsor institution, 
research’s purpose as well as the use of research’s results. The suspicion can 
make the study’s prospective subject refuse or less enthusiastic to answer the 
raised questions.
In the interview process, NVMS-THC team digitally recorded all the 
interviews. Each interview would last for around one hour. The use of digital 
recorder during an interview gives benefit, namely an opportunity to get more 
detailed data and keep eye-contact, concentration, as well as focus (see Kvale 
& Brinkmann 2009, p. 179; Charmaz 2006). However, SNPK-THC team 
consistently continues to write down important points and reflection as long 
as this does not disturb interview process and flow.
Besides the primary data of the interview result, NVMS-THC team also 
used secondary data, including data stored in general data archive, special 
collection, publishing companies, reports and public documents as well as 
academic publications (Heaton 2004, p. 5). Beside that, SNPK-THC team 
would explore other information or data concerning process and dynamics of 
post-conflict elections and peace-building, etc, by exploring local and national 
newspapers and magazines both printed and online. Secondary data can be 
used as cross validation to support primary data analysis. Mixed analysis 
taken from interviews and documents specially intended to avoid vulnerability 
to mistake that is connected to a particular method (Thorne 1994; Patton 
2002, p. 248). Besides that, secondary data significantly contribute to what 
we can learn directly from the data. More importantly, secondary data gives 
us stimulus to further explore other issues concerning post-conflict elections 
and peace-building as well as emergence of violence in Indonesia.
e .  S a m p l i n g  S t r a t e g y 
NVMS-THC team carried out interviews with various types of different 
subjects to get character of various information and/or points of view. To get 
the research subject, in line with the research approach, NVMS-THC team 
used qualitative sample selection strategy, or non-probability sample election 
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strategy. Purposive sample selection strategy is considered to give the team a 
space to get an expected research subject. The point of this sample selection 
strategy is to choose informants that can give the best answers to the research 
questions. Therefore, an effort to choose research subjects randomly is not 
necessary (Creswell 1994, p. 148). With such goal, then the team selects in-
formants based on their characteristics and the study’s requirement (Patton 
2002, p. 45; Ritchie & Lewis 2003, p. 77). Thereby, informants of this study 
were selected with a consideration that they are considered to have particular 
characteristics and information that meet the research’s goal.
Besides that, in the informant selection process, NVMS-THC team tied 
to pay good attention to the distribution of informants, with special consider-
ation on dimensions of their religion, tribe, gender, location, and social status. 
The following is the list of potential informants chosen based on various 
consideration above (Table 2):
Table 2: List of Research Questions and Prospective Informants 
No Research Ques-
tions
Type of Informants 
(Priority/Non)
Expected Output
1 In what level 
do post-conflict 
elections in 
Aceh and Ma-
luku help build 
democracy and 
strengthen peace 
(peace-settle-
ment)?
Local academi-
cians; NGO activ-
ists related to issues 
of elections and 
peace-building; 
community leaders 
(traditional or reli-
gious); politicians; 
local journalists; 
bureaucrats; former 
combatants; security 
elements (Indone-
sian military/police); 
general public
•	 Identification of various contributions 
of elections to peace building and local 
democracy.
•	 Includes (1) validating the promotion of 
sustainable peace (peace settlements); (2) 
generating new sovereign authorities; (3) 
legitimize new constitutional rules; (4) 
generating cut-off from the past to a new 
life; (5) improving civil society develop-
ment; (6) supporting public participa-
tion in various political processes; (7) 
stimulating people to generate various 
initiatives. 
•	Evaluation on post-conflict election poli-
cies.
2 In what level 
do post-conflict 
elections in Aceh 
and Maluku 
harm or worsen 
the peace build-
ing prospect 
(peace-settlement) 
and democracy 
stability?
Local academi-
cians; NGO activ-
ists related to issues 
of elections and 
peace-building; 
community leaders 
(traditional or reli-
gious); politicians; 
local journalists; 
bureaucrats; former 
combatants; security 
elements (Indone-
sian military/police); 
general public
•	 Identification of various negative impacts 
of elections on peace building and local 
democracy processes.
•	 Includes (1) validating promotion of 
sustainable peace (peace settlements); (2) 
generating new sovereign authorities; (3) 
legitimize new constitutional rules; (4) 
generating cut-off from the past to a new 
life; (5) improving civil society develop-
ment; (6) supporting public participa-
tion in various political processes; (7) 
stimulating people to generate various 
initiatives. 
•	Evaluation on post-conflict election poli-
cies.
•	Problem-solving
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No Research Ques-
tions
Type of Informants 
(Priority/Non)
Expected Output
3 How do con-
flicts and vio-
lence emerge in 
post-conflict 
election process-
es in Aceh and 
Ambon?
Local academicians; 
NGO activists re-
lated to pemilukada’s 
issues of violence; 
community lead-
ers (traditional or 
religious; politi-
cians; local journal-
ists; bureaucrats; 
KIP/KPU; former 
combatants; security 
elements (Indone-
sian Military/police); 
general public
•	Problem analysis on violence in post-
conflict elections.
•	Problem-solving
4 How far is the 
institutional and 
social readiness 
for the imple-
mentation of 
post-conflict 
elections in Aceh 
and Maluku?
Local academicians; 
NGO activists related 
to elections imple-
mentation; local jour-
nalists; community 
leaders (traditional 
or religious; politi-
cians; bureaucrats; 
KIP/KPU; general 
public
•	 Identification and evaluation on institu-
tional readiness (election’s organizers and 
political parties).
•	 Identification and evaluation on society 
(voting behavior) (participation, transpar-
ency, willing to accept defeats, etc.).
Based on the above sample selection strategy and deep consideration on the 
distribution of various dimensions of informants, SNPK-THC team chose/
obtained 68 informants during two phase of field visits to Aceh and Maluku, 
as summarized in Table 3 as follows:
Table 3: Recapitulation of Informants and Phases of Field Visits
Province Phase 1 Phase 2
Aceh 24 people (19-27 June 2014) 10 people (26 October-1 November 2014)
Maluku 21 people (21-28 August 2014) 13 people (16-21 November 2014)

C H A P T E R  I I
Conditions of Democracy 
Development and Peace-
Building in Aceh and Maluku
I .  A C E H
a .  B r i e f  D e s c r i p t i o n  o n  D e m o g r a p h y  o f  A c e h  P r o v i n c e
Aceh Province is a province with a special autonomy regulated by Law 
No. 18 Year 2001 and Law No. 11 Year 2006. Aceh Province is located on 
the tip of Sumatra Island, exactly in 01 ̊̊  58’ 37,2”–06 ̊ 04’ 33,6” North and 
94 ̊57’ 57,6”–98 ̊17’ 12,2” East (2014 Aceh Province BPS). The province has 
a total area of 57.948,94 square km; 39.9% of the area is forested. The Aceh 
Province is bordered on the south by North Sumatra, The Indian Ocean on 
the west, as well as the Malacca Strait on the north and east. The capital city 
of the province is Banda Aceh. 
Aceh Province has 18 districts and 5 cities. The number of sub-districts 
reaches 289, with 761 mukim and 6.464 gampong (village). In term of people’s 
territorial administration, Aceh has a slightly different structure compared to 
that in other provinces. In this province, there is an administrative territory 
that has some gampongs under it, called mukim; Some mukims are under one 
sub-district. Mukim is one of Aceh’s specialties, including the addressing of 
village as gampong.
Based on the 2010 population census, the population in Aceh Province is 
at 4,494,410. The 2013 population projection by the Aceh Province Central 
Bureau of Statistics (BPS) reached 4,791,924, with population density of 84 
people per km2 (2014 Aceh Province BPS). But, the population distribution 
in the province is uneven. Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, and Langsa are the 
three cities with the highest population density; each has 4,451 people per 
km2, 1,189 people per km2, and 773 people per km2 respectively. In total there 
are 13 cities/districts that have population density under 100 people per km2.
b .  C o n f l i c t  a n d  Pe a c e  i n  A c e h :  A  B r i e f  D e s c r i p t i o n 
In general, the history of conflicts in Aceh can be seen in three major peri-
ods. The first period is the resistance to the Dutch colonialism in 1873–1903 
(Aspinall 2004). The second period is the resistance to Japan in 1942 (Reid 
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2006). The third period is the resistance to the Indonesian government started 
from 1953 as manifested in rebellion. The conflicts with the Indonesian gov-
ernment can be categorized as vertical conflicts. During the conflict with the 
Indonesian government, the conflict period can be seen based on the political 
regimes ruling in Indonesia namely the Old Order (1953–1956), The New 
Order (1976–1998), and The Reformed Period (1999–2006) (Susan 2009).
In the Old Period, the actor of the conflicts in Aceh was Darul Islam. 
From the Indonesian government’s point of view, this conflict can be called 
“Darul Islam rebellion”. The conflicts were triggered by revocation of the 
special autonomy by the Indonesian government from Aceh. This incident 
generated firm attitude from the Acehnese people against the Indonesian gov-
ernment that did not enforce the Islamic Sharia (Aisyah et al. 2008). Darul 
Islam Aceh was led by Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureu’eh, a prominent 
Ulama in Aceh. The conflict was settled through a negotiation initiated by 
Aceh students and community leaders in 1956.
In the New Order, conflicts reoccurred as a reaction to imbalanced 
development implemented by the Indonesian government. The New Order 
government exploited Acehnese resources without giving significant devel-
opmental results to Acehnese society. The resources were utilized more for 
developmental activities at the central level. Aceh only got 20% of their 
exploited natural resources. The number was still deemed less; coupled by 
intensified corruption that made the development in Aceh even worse. As a 
result, many Acehnese communities lived below the poverty line and were 
low-educated; the local identity of Aceh was shattered (Susan 2009). This 
condition made Hasan Tiro who claimed being descendant of old Islamic 
Aceh Kingdom declare the resistance to the Indonesian government by 
forming the Aceh Free Movement (GAM). According to them, Aceh was 
not part of Indonesia. Indonesia was the former Dutch colonized territory 
while Aceh was legitimately never a part of the Dutch colony. On the other 
hand, the New Order government with its coercive politics regarded GAM 
as the national development stability spoilers. Military approach taken by 
the New Order government in order to maintain stability caused escalated 
and prolonged conflicts (Table 4).
Table 4: GAM Life-Cycle1
Phase Operating Year Active Member Victims
Establishment 1976–1979 25–200 >100
Revival I 1989–1991 200–750 2.000–10.000
Revival II 1999–2002 15.000–27.000 4.364
1 Rose (2005).
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After the fall of the New Order regime, the discourse of the Indonesian 
democracy increased. Military approach was not so dominant in settling con-
flicts in Aceh. The Indonesian government started to mobilize democratic 
developmental strategy for conflict resolution in Aceh (Miller 2004). New 
actors started to show up and provide conflict resolution discourse through 
democratic way, one of them was SIRA (Aceh Referendum Information Cen-
ter). During the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Aceh 
conflict resolution through democratic way started to be implemented. Presi-
dent Yudhoyono took one political strategy as a conflict resolution measure in 
Aceh (Sujatmiko 2012). The 2004 tsunami disaster which caused both groups 
to lose their resources for maintaining conflicts increasingly supported the 
path towards peace. Then, On August 15, 2005 both parties agreed to sign 
the Helsinki Peace Agreement in Finland.
The Helsinki Agreement grants some special entitlements to Aceh. There 
are six main points regulated in the agreement, namely2 (1) Aceh govern-
ment, including laws on Aceh government, political participation, economy 
and law enforcement, (2) Human Rights, (3) amnesty and reintegration, (4) 
social security, (5) formation of Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), and (6) 
fights settlement. Some among the points explain that Aceh is entitled to 
have 70% of all the hydrocarbon reserve and other natural resources.3 All 
the people involved in GAM will be given amnesty and regarded as citizens 
of the Republic of Indonesia.4 Besides that, the agreement also regulates the 
formation of local political parties in Aceh.5 These local political parties in 
the developments are dominated by former combatants. It was the local po-
litical parties that became the main actors in the post-conflict local election 
dynamics in Aceh.
c .  A c e h  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  i n  Nu m b e r s
Post-conflict local elections in Aceh were conducted in two periods. Es-
pecially for post-conflict local election of governor and vice governor were 
organized in 2006 and 2012. A local political party dominated by former 
GAM combatants is Aceh Party that officially made its contribution in the 
2012 post-conflict local election. In this period, elected candidates were those 
nominated by Aceh Party. In details, the description of Aceh post-conflict 
local election implementation can be seen in Table 5 as follows:
2 See 2005 Helsinki MoU.
3 2005 Helsinki Agreement, Points 1.3.4.
4 2005 Helsinki Agreement, Points 3.1.1 and 3.2.1.
5 2005 Helsinki Agreement, Points 1.2.1.
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Table 5: Post-Conflict Local Election of Aceh Province of Governor and  
Vice Governor in 2006 and 20126
2006 2012
Number of round 1 round 1 round
Number of voters in DPT 
(Permanent Voters List)
2,632,935 people 3,453,703 people
Number of voters that 
exercised their voting right
2,104,739 people 2,453,703 orang
Number of candidates 
running for election
8 pairs 5 pairs
Name of winners Irwandi Yusuf and  
M. Nazar (independent)
Zaini Abudullah and 
Muzaki Manaf (Aceh Party)
Number of winners’ votes 768,745 1,327,695 
Table 6: Gained Votes in 2006 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and  
Vice Governor By Names of Candidate Pairs7
No Name of Pairs Gained Votes
1 Iskandar Hoesin dan M. Saleh Manaf 5,54%
2 Tamlicha Ali dan Tgk. Harmen Nuriqmar 3,99%
3 A. Malik Raden dan Sayed Fuad Zakaria 13,97%
4 A. Humam Hamid dan Hasbi Abdullah 16,62%
5 M. Djali Yusuf dan R. A. Syauqas Rahmatillah 3,26%
6 Irwandi Yusuf dan Muhammad Nazar 38,20%
7 Azwar Abubakar dan M. Nasir Djamil 10,61%
8 Ghazali Abbas Adan dan Salahuddin Alfata 7,80%
Table 7: Gained Votes in 2006 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and  
Vice Governor By Names of Candidate Pairs8
No Name of Pairs Gained Votes
1 Tgk. H. Ahmad Tajuddin Abs dan Teuku Suriansyah 3,33%
2 Irwandi Yusuf dan Muhyan Yunan 29,18%
3 H. Darni M. Daud dan Tgk. Ahmad Fauzi 4,07%
4 Muhammad Nazar dan Nova Iriansyah 7,65%
5 Zaini Abdullah dan Muzakir Manaf 55,78%
In 2006, there were eight pairs of candidates running for post-conflict 
local election of governor and vice governor. In this period, former GAM 
combatants did not have an established political organization yet. Candidates 
from former combatants group were represented by two pairs, namely Irwandi 
Yusuf–Muhammad Nazar as independent candidates, and A. Humam Ha-
mid–Hasbi Abdullah supported by PPP. In this period, the competition was 
won by Irwandi Yusuf–Muhammad Nazar. In 2012 former GAM combatants 
6 Processed from Aceh KIP and 2014 Political Statistics (BPS 2014).
7 Processed from Aceh Province KIP data.
8 Processed from Aceh Province KIP data.
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managed to win the post-conflict local election. From five candidate pairs 
in the election, Zaini Abudullah and Muzakir Manaf won the election. In 
Table 6 and 7 we can see the names of the candidate pairs in 2006 and 2012 
post-conflict local election.
d .  C o n d i t i o n  o f  E c o n o m i c ,  S o c i a l  a n d 
C u l t u r a l  D e v e l o p m e n t s
In 2013 Aceh Gross Regional Domestic Product (PDRB) oil and gas 
reached IDR.103.05 trillion. The PDRB value was higher than in the previ-
ous years, namely IDR 96.16 trillion in 2012 and IDR 87.99 trillion in 2011 
(Aceh Province BPS 2014). In general the biggest contributors to the Aceh 
economy are the agricultural sector (22.7%), followed by trade, hotel and 
restaurant sector (17.66%), then construction sector (11.67%). In general, the 
Aceh revenue increased in the last three years. However, if seen from the 
economic growth rate in 2013, Aceh growth performance was not so high as 
the previous years. This is described in Graph 4.
Graph 4: PDRB Growth Rate based on Constant Price with Oil and Gas Aceh 
Province, Years 2010–2013 (Percentage)9
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The above graph shows that from 2010 to 2012, the trend of Aceh eco-
nomic growth rate rose. But in 2013 the number was not as high as those in 
the previous two years. The number of poor people in Aceh was at 17.72%, 
with poverty line of IDR 348,172,- per capita per month (Aceh Province BPS 
2014). From the people’s economic gap, Gini coefficient rate in Aceh was 
0.32 in 2012 (Bappenas 2013). If compared to other provinces, the Aceh Gini 
coefficient rate sat in the 32nd position or ranked the third from the bottom 
among all provinces in Indonesia (Bappenas 2013). This shows that the level 
9 Cited from http://bps.go.id.
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of Acehnese people’s economic gap is not so high compared to most of the 
other provinces in Indonesia, as seen explicitly in Graph 5.
Graph 5: Aceh Province’s Human Development Index Year 2010–2013 (Percentage)10
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In the social development aspect, the Aceh Province’s human develop-
ment index increased since 2010 up to 2013. The genuine rate of educational 
participation in Aceh was 81.03% (Elementary School, Junior High School, 
Senior High School, and the equivalent level) (bps.go.id). Related to the re-
gional image, coffee is the mascot of the Acehnese people. If generally seen, 
coffee shops are the most popular venue for social interaction. This venue 
becomes the most influential public sphere in Aceh. 
Aceh is known as the “Veranda of Mecca”. The tight Islamic values mixed 
with the local culture have made Aceh known by that name. Islam is the 
religion embraced by the majority of the Acehnese population. There are 
eight local tribes which we can identify in this province. They are tribes 
of Aceh, Gayo, Alas, Aneuk Jamee, Simeulu, Kluet, Singkil, and Tamiang. 
The majority of them are Moslems. There are also some migrating tribes 
such as Batak, Nias, Chinese, Java that are Christian, Buddhist, or Confu-
cian but the number is minor. The dominant Islam is closely related to the 
strong historical influence of Islamic Aceh kingdoms in the past. The strong 
Islamic values can be seen in the application of Sharia, which becomes one 
of the Acehnese specialties. The law application is supplemented by some 
supporting institutions such as Sharia police and Sharia court. The Aceh 
Sharia court functions as Islamic law justice institution that is regulated 
through local regulations. 
10 Cited from http://bps.go.id.
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I I .  M A L U K U
a .  B r i e f  D e s c r i p t i o n  o n  D e m o g r a p h y 
o f  M a l u k u  P r o v i n c e
Maluku Province is an archipelagic province located in the eastern part 
of Indonesia. The province has 559 islands. Based on the astronomical posi-
tion, Maluku Province is located in the coordinate of 2 ̊ 30’–9 ̊ South and 
124 ̊–136 ̊ East (Maluku Province BPS 2014). The province borders Seram 
Sea on the north, Indonesia Seas and Arafuru Sea on the south, Islands on 
the east, and Sulawesi Island on the west. The Maluku’s area is at 581,376 
square km (Ministry of Forestry). Most of the region is sea (90.7%), while 
the width of land is only around 54,185 square km (Ministry of Forestry tt). 
Therefore, sea transportation becomes the most important aspect needed for 
inter-area mobilization in Maluku. The capital city of the Maluku Province 
is Ambon city. 
Maluku province consists of 11 districts/cities, 118 sub-districts, and 1,169 
villages (Maluku Province BPS 2014). People’s settlement pattern in Maluku is 
very much segregated by religious communities (NVMS-THC 2014). Moslem 
and Christian communities tend to live in different neighborhoods. Some 
customary communities which are called negri tend to live in their own areas, 
and generally each customary community is identical to a particular religion. 
In urban areas, especially in Ambon City, segregation pattern is increasingly 
formed after conflict period. Many displaced people tend to live in the areas 
with the same religion they embrace. For instance, Batu Merah and Jazirah 
Leihitu are identical to Moslem communities, while Passo and Kudamati are 
identical to Christian communities. However, there are also areas that are 
open to both religions such as Waringin area, even though social interaction 
between Moslems and Christians in that area is less solid compared to the 
period before the conflict. 
The 2010 population census recorded that the number of Maluku popula-
tion was 1,533,506. The 2013 projected Maluku population was 1,628,413 with 
population density of 30 people per square km (Maluku Province BPS 2014). 
Maluku can be said as a province that has a low number of population. Most 
of the people are concentrated in Ambon city with population density of 1,007 
people per square km. Tual city is the second most densely populated city after 
Ambon with population density of 252 people per square km. The other nine 
districts/cities only have population density of under 50 people per square km. 
b .  C o n f l i c t  a n d  Pe a c e  i n  M a l u k u :  A  B r i e f  D e s c r i p t i o n 
The outbreak of conflict in Maluku is closely related to the context of the 
end of the New Order regime. The New Order’s coercive politics made latent 
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conflicts between the two groups, Moslems and Christians, which did not 
break when the regime was in power. (see Bauchler 2009). The conflict was 
caused by gaps of opportunities owned by each group so that this generated 
jealousy and negative sentiment between the two groups. Historically, the gap 
had been formed during the Dutch colonialism. The Maluku people who de-
cided to embrace Christianity were given wider opportunity to education and 
government affairs rather than Moslem communities. Moslem people lived in 
suburbs of Ambon city and were poor, while most of Christian people lived in 
the center of Ambon City which served as the government center at that time. 
In the independence time, the emergence of many Islamic movements in 
Indonesia resulted in negative perception among the Maluku Christian com-
munities. Besides that, Moslem community’s progress in education level made 
the community’s bargaining power increase. The high influx of migrants 
from outside regions, who mostly were Moslems, also caused changes in the 
population composition in Maluku especially in Ambon. Besides that, an 
increased number of Moslem people who assumed positions in government 
intensified negative sentiment among the Christian communities in Maluku 
who thought that their positions in the government were threatened. The 
strategic position of the majority of Moslem groups made Christian groups 
feel marginalized in the politics during the New Order. 
The emergence of issue on South Maluku Republic (RMS-Republik Ma-
luku Selatan) separatist movement which was connected to the Christian 
community set up a particular negative perception in the Moslem communi-
ties against the Christian communities. The Moslem communities’ negative 
sentiment against the Christian communities also rose because the history of 
colonialism on proselytization. The latent conflicts eventually broke out into 
open conflicts at the end of the New Order. Weakened role of the military 
after the New Order caused sentiments between the two groups to break out 
into violence in 1999. 
Riots occurring in Maluku started from fights in Dobo, Aru Islands,11 
and Batu Merah, Ambon, between Moslem and Christian young people. The 
riot eventually developed into retaliatory actions until the initial goal of the 
conflict faded. The retaliatory actions made the conflict prolong and last for 
at least four years. The riots eventually spread quickly to some islands around 
Ambon such as Haruku, Seram, and Saparua. Based on the National Violence 
Monitoring System (NVMS/SNPK) data, the riot that lasted for almost four 
years has claimed 2,793 lives, injured 5,054 people and destroyed 13,843 
buildings (NVMS-THC 2014).
11 There was an incident of clashes in Dobo at the end of 1999 so that security personnel, es-
pecially the Maluku police’s mobile brigade was deployed to the area. At that time riots broke 
out in Batu Merah.
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On February 12, 2002 peace started to materialize between the two con-
flicting groups, marked by the signing of Malino II Peace Agreement in 
Sulawesi. The signing of the agreement made violent actions reduce signifi-
cantly, in which 87 were reportedly killed between March and December 
2002 (Barron et al. 2012, p. 10-11; see also Goss 2000, p. 8; Schulze 2002, 
p. 57; Tomsa 2009, p. 2-4). The Malino II Agreement contains 11 points on 
the termination of any potential violent conflicts and inclusive access for both 
groups. In details, the Malino II agreement is explained in Table 8.
Table 8: Points of Malino II Agreement12
1. Ending all forms of conflicts and disputes.
2. Uphold the supremacy of law in a equal and impartial manner. Therefore, 
security personnel must act professionally at duty.
3. Refuse all kinds of separatist movements such as South Maluku Republic 
(RMS). 
4. As part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), all people 
are entitled to live and earn a living in Maluku, by considering local culture. 
5. All forms of armed organizations, groups, or militias with no permits in 
Maluku are prohibited and must surrender their weapons or will be disarmed 
and be processed according to the prevailing laws. Outsiders who cause trouble 
in Maluku must leave Maluku. 
6. To carry out all the legal provisions, it is necessary to set up a national 
independent investigating team to thoroughly investigate the January 19, 
Maluku Sovereignty Front, RMS Christians, Jihad Militia Force, Christ 
Militia Force, and forced shift towards another religion.
7. To return displaced people in phases to their pre-conflict places of origin. 
8. The government will help the people to rehabilitate economic and public 
facilities, such as educational, health and religious facilities, as well as people’s 
housing so that the future of all Maluku people can move onward and get out 
from hardship. Along with that, all forms of limitation of people’s movement 
should be lifted so that the economic and social life may run well.
9. In the effort to maintain order and security of all areas and people, the 
cohesiveness and firmness of Indonesian Military and Indonesian Police 
according to their functions and duties are required. Along with that, all 
Indonesian Military facilities will immediately be rebuilt and return to its 
functions. 
10. To maintain relations and harmony of all people, Moslems and Christians, all 
efforts and missionary work must uphold laws and other provisions without 
any force. 
11. To support rehabilitation especially University of Pattimura, under the 
principle of shared progress. Therefore recruitment and other policies should 
be implemented transparently in equality principle and meet the equality 
requirement. 
12 Centre for Human Dialogue Switzerland (2011).
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At that time, the implementation of peace process was led by the central 
government. The central figure was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the Coor-
dinating Minister for Political and Justice and Jusuf Kalla as the Coordinating 
Minister for People’s Welfare. The agreement was attended by each representa-
tive from Moslem and Christian communities, totaling 69 people (Centre for 
Human Dialogue Switzerland 2011, p. 25). The Malino II Agreement became 
the foundation for peace-building in Maluku. But in its developments, the 
eleventh point of the agreement was widely interpreted by most of the people 
in Maluku. They felt that the equality concept must be applied not only in 
the access of education but also in every aspect of the people’s life in the form 
of balanced representation of both groups. The balance factor has, in turn, 
a fairly significant role in the political dynamics in Maluku including in the 
implementation of post-conflict local elections
c .  M a l u k u  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  i n  Nu m b e r s 
Post-conflict local elections in Maluku were organized for several times. 
Especially for the election of Maluku governor, post-conflict local elections 
were conducted three times, namely in 2003, 2008, and 2013. However, in 
2003 the implementation of pemilukada was conducted indirectly by DPR. 
The implementation of direct pemilukada was conducted in 2008. For com-
parison purpose, the study will only discuss the implementation of direct 
post-conflict local elections in 2008 and 2013. Detailed implementation of 
the governor post-conflict local election in Maluku is explained in Table 9.
Table 9: Implementation of 2008 And 2013 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor 
and Vice Governor in Maluku13
2008 2013
Number of Rounds 1 round 2 round
Number of voters in 
DPT
963,519 people Round 1 Round 2
1,185,661 people 1,117,694 people
Number of voters that 
exercised their voting 
right
728,521 people Round 1 Round 2
850,632 788,208
Number of candidates 
running for election
4 pairs 5 pairs
Name of winners Karel Albert Ralahalu and 
Said Assagaf
Said Assagaf and Zeth 
Sahuburua
Number of winners’ votes 452,117 389,884
In 2008 pemilukada was won in 1 round by the pair Karel Albert 
Ralahalu and Said Assagaf who gained more than 60% votes. Karel was 
the incumbent Maluku governor when the post-conflict local election was 
13 Processed from Maluku KPUD data and Political Statistics (BPS 2012).
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executed. Before that, Karel Albert Ralahalu was the governor with his 
vice Governor Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina, from 2003 to 2008. 
However, Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina did not pair with Karel in 
the 2008 post-conflict local election. He joined the election and became 
the governor candidate with his pair, Eduard Frans. In the 2012 post-
conflict local election, Said Assagaf as the incumbent vice governor joined 
it and nominated himself as governor candidate together with Zeth Sahu-
burua. The 2012 post-conflict local election was conducted in two rounds. 
From five pairs in the first round, the pairs Abdullah Vanath–Marti Jonas 
and Said Assagaf–Zeth Sahuburua were entitled to compete in the second 
round. Initially, the pair Abdullah Vanath–Marti Jonas got more votes 
than the pair Said Assagaf–Zeth Sahuburua. But in the second round, the 
condition reverted. The pair Said Assagaf–Zeth Sahuburua managed to 
surpass the pair Abdullah Vanath–Marti Jonas. In details, the name of the 
pairs and gained votes can be seen in Tables 10 and 11.
Table 10: Gained Votes in 2008 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and Vice 
Governor By Names of Candidate Couples14
Names of Pairs Gained Votes
1 Karet Albert Ralahalu and Said Assagaf 62.14%
2 Abdullah Tuasikal and Hematang Septinus 26.37%
3 Aziz Samual and Lucas Uwuratuw 5.35%
4 M. Abdullah Latuconsina and Edward Frans 6.14%
Table 11: Gained Votes in 2013 Post-Conflict Local Election of Governor and Vice 
Governor By Names of Candidate Pairs15
No Round 1 Round 2
Names of Pairs Gained 
Votes
Names of Pairs Gained 
Votes
1 Abdullah Tuasikal dan 
Hendrik Lewersissa
18,85% Abdullah Vanath 
dan Marti Jonas 
Massapaittela
49,60%
2 Jacobus F Puttileihalat 
dan Arifin Tapi Oyihoe
13,67% Said Assagaf dan Zeth 
Sahuburua
50,40%
3 Abdullah Vanath dan 
Marti Jonas Massapaittela
23,56%
4 Herman A Koedoeboen 
dan Daud Sangadji
21,57%
5 Said Assagaf dan Zeth 
Sahuburua
22,74%
14 Processed from Maluku Province KPUD data.
15 Processed from Maluku Province KPUD data.
30 P O S T - C O N F L I C T  D E M O C R A C Y ,  V I O L E N C E ,  A N D  P E A C E  B U I L D I N G
d .  C o n d i t i o n  o f  E c o n o m i c ,  S o c i a l  a n d 
C u l t u r a l  D e v e l o p m e n t s
The Maluku Province Gross Domestic Product (PDB) with oil and gas 
in 2013 was IDR 13.25 trillion. The number increased compared to in 2012 
at IDR 11.46 trillion, in 2011 at IDR 9.6 trillion and in 2010 at IDR 8.04 
trillion (Maluku Province BPS 2014). The biggest contributing sector in the 
Maluku economy were trade, hotel and restaurant (29.26%), then agriculture 
(28.22%) and service sectors (20.81%). The economic growth rate in Maluku 
was fluctuating as seen in Graph 6.
Graph 6: Maluku Province’s Economic Growth Rate (with oil and gas)  
Years 2010–201316
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Graph 7: Maluku Province’s Human Development Index, Years 2010–201317
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The above graph shows that the Maluku economic growth in 2012 in-
creased compared to the previous year. But in 2013 the economic growth 
performance was not higher as in 2010. The poverty rate in Maluku Province 
was 19.49%, with the poverty line at IDR 298, 778, - per capita per month 
(BPS 2013). The community’s gap rate in the economic aspect based on the 
calculation of Gini coefficient was 0.38 in 2012 (Bappenas 2013). If compared 
to other provinces in Indonesia, Maluku Gini coefficient rate sat in the 17th 
position. In the social development aspect, the human development index rate 
of Maluku Province experienced an increase since 2010 to 2013 (Graph 7). 
16 Cited from http://bps.go.id.
17 Cited from http://bps.go.id.
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The genuine educational participation rate in 2013 was 71.63% (Elementary 
School, Junior High School, Senior High School, and its equivalent) (bps.
go.id).
The customary communities in Maluku are still very strong. The Maluku 
people consist of more than 700 customary communities called negri.18 Each 
negri has a leader called king. The negris are institutionalized into one insti-
tution called Latupati Assembly (Photo 1). The Latupati Assembly (Majelis 
Latupati) functions to coordinate the negris located in Maluku in any cus-
tomary affairs.
Photo 1: Head Office of Latupati Assembly (Majelis Latupati)
If seen from the post-conflict condition, since 2003 the focus on peace-
building between the two parties in Maluku had a special attention. Reli-
gious institutions started to open interfaith communications forum between 
them to mutually maintain brotherhood tie. The construction of Peace Gong 
Monument in 2009 became a symbol of collective memory from the Maluku 
people in order to keep maintaining peace. 
18 Interview with Head of Latupati Assembly, Ambon, 22 August 2014.

C H A P T E R  I I I
Post-Conflict Local Election, 
Peace-Building and 
Democracy Development as 
Well as the Challenges 
Post-conflict local election in Aceh and Maluku are generally designed to 
facilitate conflict resolution (Garber 1998) and/or as an effort to rehabilitate 
both regions (Flores & Nooruddin 2011, p. 1). As emphasized earlier, the 
goal of post-conflict election in both regions in general serves as an instru-
ment for conflict resolution and also sustainable peace promotion (conflict 
resolution/peace-building) and at the same time, to build democracy, even 
though both do not always walk abreast (e.g. Kumar 1998; Garber 1998: 
Lyons 2002; Korth 2011; Jarstad & Sisk 2008; Fogg 2005). As post-conflict 
regions, Aceh and Maluku are considered still vulnerable to conflicts and 
violence (war-torn societies/regions). Such communities are easily fragment-
ed and polarized. Issues in this kind of society are often related to political, 
social and economic stability. Even, electoral competitions in both regions 
can become an extended polarization that occurred in the previous conflicts 
(Kumar 1998, p. 6-8).
This section is designed specifically to analyze various theoretical issues 
with a focus on two post-conflict local election cases in Aceh and Maluku. 
In detail, the chapter is divided into four sub-chapters namely (1) condition 
of post-conflict local election implementation in post-conflict regions; (2) 
the role of post-conflict local election in peace-building; (3) the role of post-
conflict local election in democracy development; (4) potential and threat of 
instability in peace-building. This chapter is closed by comparative analysis 
on the post-conflict local election implementation in two regions by referring 
to various themes or issues already mentioned. 
I .  A C E H
a .  G e n e r a l  C o n d i t i o n  o f  Po s t - C o n f l i c t 
L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n
Apart from various issues occurring in the implementation, post-conflict 
local elections in Aceh are generally regarded as a success. Especially in the 
34 P O S T - C O N F L I C T  D E M O C R A C Y ,  V I O L E N C E ,  A N D  P E A C E  B U I L D I N G
international community, and if compared with post-conflict local elections in 
other post-conflict regions/states like Afghanistan, Kosovo, Nepal, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Irak, etc., the post-conflict local election must be 
admitted as a particular accomplishment.1 Besides that, in formal-procedural 
manner, it is regarded as being suitable to the prevailing rules, and therefore, 
on this level it is relatively democratic. Below are the expressions stated by 
some informants:
Procedurally speaking, we think it is democratic. I mean, the post-conflict 
local election process is in accordance with the existing rules. According 
to the selection of KPU. In a certain context, it is successful.2
I think it already run optimally nowadays although some technical prob-
lems and political education to the people are not yet fulfilled.3
According to me, I think it’s very good. If people said there is intimidation, 
I think it is not only in Aceh and it is normal for future improvements. 
Other areas with no conflicts may have ones. Well, I think it is great and 
extraordinary. It can be a sample that it is democracyi.4
Especially, Irwandi Yusuf, the former Aceh Governor made an interesting 
assessment on the implementation of post-conflict local election in Aceh by 
comparing it with local elections in normal areas (not post conflict areas in 
Indonesia. According to him, if the reference is USA, the post-conflict local 
election is still far. However, if we look at local elections in other Indonesia re-
gions, it is relatively a success as stated by him below5. As he emphasized below:
Well, the democracy agenda started to exist in 2006. The landmark in the 
post-MoU democracy in Aceh was in the 2006 post-conflict local election. 
At that time, I participated in it and won in the 2006 post-conflict local 
election. Based on the US standard, our post-conflict local election was 
still poor but for Indonesia it was excellent. There was no money politics 
because the winner did not do it. I don’t know about the others.6
Yes, especially in 2006. It was the first stage of transition to democracy. 
That was the best post-conflict local election in the history of Aceh. It was 
the first and direct. There were independent candidates. Thirdly, combat-
ants were given their voting rights and could nominate themselves.7
1 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
2 Interview with one of peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
3 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
4 Interview with one of former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
5 Interview with Sabang Panwaslu commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
6 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
7 Interview with one of senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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The landmark of democracy development in post-conflict Aceh started 
in 2006 through the implementation of the first post-conflict local election 
after the 2006 Helsinki Peace Agreement. The post-conflict local election was 
regarded as the best and eventually placed Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad 
Nazar in the gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial positions. Besides that, the 
2006 post-conflict local election was considered to have created a particular 
history by staging pairs of gubernatorial and vice gubernatorial candidates 
from independent pathway, namely Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar. It 
is deemed historical in the macro context of post-conflict local election in In-
donesia because the independent pathway was the first initiative taken in the 
Aceh post-conflict local election. The 2006 Pemilukada ran relatively safely 
and in a stable manner,8 if compared to the 2012 post-conflict local election. 
Even the 2012 post-conflict local election was regarded as very hot because 
since the beginning there were internal conflicts in the Aceh Party (PA).9
In the first post-conflict pemilukada there are some challenges and obsta-
cles. The first was infrastructure readiness. When tsunami in 2004 hit, many 
buildings were damaged, including election organizing offices. Secondly, it 
deals with population data for producing the DPT (List of Permanent Vot-
ers). When Tsunami hit Aceh many Acehnese left their houses. Thirdly, it 
relates to the very tight readiness of post-conflict local election regulations.10
However, there were people who gave various evaluation and critical feed-
backs on the post-conflict election implementation in Aceh. At a certain level, 
the post-conflict local election was considered less democratic because of some 
“non-democratic” factors or actions. One of the main highlighted issues was 
the partiality of post-conflict local election organizers to certain candidates or 
parties. This condition was confirmed, for instance, by one of the negotiators 
of 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement:
But, I reemphasize here that democracy in Aceh is less perfect. Why? Be-
cause of non-democratic condoned actions. The selection of KPU members 
took sides; the KIP took sides. So, this made chaos and it was condoned. 
For instance, when we took a case to the Constitutional Court. The Court 
stated that there were irregularities, but the Constitutional Court said it 
was normal in the post-conflict situation.11
The selection process and post-conflict local election organizers’ partial-
ity issues have become a particular spotlight and common concern among 
activists and supporters of democracy development in Aceh. The partiality of 
8 Interview with a former Aceh KIP Chief, Banda Aceh, 2o June 2014; and with commissionaire 
of Sabang Panwaslu Sabang, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
9 Interview with Governor’s Expert Assistant for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
10 Interview with Governor’s Expert Assistant for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
11 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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post-conflict local election organizers originated from the main problem of the 
screening and selection processes by DPRA. Often times in these processes 
there were certain parties who intervened so that the people in the organizers’ 
structure would take action in accordance with and/or fight for their inter-
ests.12 Critical attention to the organizers is given to their low capacity and 
characters, especially to much dishonesty done by post-conflict local election 
elements such as KIP, PPS, PPK, Panwaslu, dsb.13
Another critical note which drew the attention of many parties was wide-
spread intimidation both verbal and physical, and which can be said to be 
visible in all parts of Aceh region, both in the areas that used to be GAM 
basis or non GAM basis. Even Sabang was included even though during 
the conflict this area was relatively peaceful due to relatively heterogeneous 
composition of the population. But in the 2012 post-conflict local election, 
intimidation was a common scene there.14 In general, the intimidation is 
aimed to influence, and at a certain level, tends to force voters to vote for a 
particular party or candidate. 
[In the 2006 post-conflict local election] I know who was behind the at-
tack and burning as well as grenade throwing to 16 PA offices at that time 
and 15 damaged cars. I know who did it and that would ruin democracy 
too. There were many foreign election observers coming at that time but 
intimidation existed but not by us... So, democracy started to break on the 
eve of 2911-2012 post-conflict local election. Therefore, related to…. Well, 
that’s the course of elections in Aceh. I think it already went away from 
the principles of democracy. Yes, extraordinary intimidation. They banged 
on people’s doors in hamlets during the day to vote for their candidates.15
There was fear. We just had this Pemilukada for the first time. So this is 
an issue of people’s feeling. For instance, if in this area A did not win, that 
would have an impact. But it cannot be proved. This becomes traumatic 
feeling.16
This was what usually happened in hamlets: in the forums usually the 
people were informed that if PA did not win, that would be war... But in 
2012 we could feel it. Many people actually had their own choices, but 
due to the terror, they did want to take risks because the police did not 
guarantee the security.17
12 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
13 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairs, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
14 Interview with Sabang Panwaslu commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
15 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
16 Interview with one of the Aceh Panwaslu expert assistant, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
17 Interview with one of the local journalists, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
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Intimidation happened both in 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elec-
tions. However, the 2012 post-conflict local election was considered as the 
peak of a huge number of intimidations. Especially, verbal intimidations were 
more dominant, such as “If you don’t vote for this party, we will always be 
colonized,”18 “It’s obvious, if you don’t vote for it, we will be in trouble again, 
Aceh will be in chaos, no more,”19 and there are still many other verbal-intim-
idating expressions. Many verbal threats make use of the people’s traumatic 
condition to the conflicts in order to pressure or force people to vote for a 
particular party, both directly or via SMS. A message through SMS says: “We 
want you not to vote for the candidate you support. You must choose our 
candidate if you want to be safe.”20
In general, many intimidating efforts were directed against Aceh Party 
(PA), and especially occurred massively in the 2012 post-conflict local elec-
tion, as stated by an informant:
If we mentioned a PA member, they will never be in the structure. But they 
are sympathizers. That has been set up that there will be no player in the 
SK and they are free. Recently, I looked for several confirmations to PA 
members themselves. They said they were sympathizers. The sympathiz-
ers’ work is not related to the party. They enter hamlets. If in a hamlet PA 
used to lose, then they will come and say, “We have one stamp seal for this 
hamlet. If we lose again in this village, don’t ever expect our government 
to give funds to this hamlet.”21
Intimidating actors were mostly related to PA sympathizers. Interestingly, PA 
did not deny that many intimidating behaviors were conducted by its sympa-
thizers. However, we cannot expect a confirmation from PA that it was a struc-
tural instruction. One of the PA spokesperson, for instance, emphasized that 
such intimidation was a normal thing especially in the post-conflict region.22 
Massive intimidations conducted by PA withdrew a particular attention from 
one of the founders/former secretary of GAM, Husaini M. Hasan, who said:
Not only feeling ashamed, I don’t know where to hide my face. I am very 
disappointed… just look in the election, it was a democracy, but why were 
there intimidation and imposition of will... I feel sad why they (Acehnese 
elites) did not prioritize the interest of the Acehnese people. Instead, they 
only thought about their own interest.23
18 Interview with a Gayo resident, Banda Aceh, 22 June 2014.
19 Interview with a local Bireuen NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
20 Interview with Sabang Panwaslu commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
21 Interview with one local journalist, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
22 Interview with one of former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
23 Merdeka.com, 4 December 2014. “Ex-GAM State Secretary accepts NKRI, but disappointed 
with Acehnese leader”. Taken from id.berita.yahoo.com/eks-sekretrais-negera-gam-terima-nkri-
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For Husaini M. Hasan, intimidation was a form of PA elites’ behaviors 
that tended to think about their own interest and sacrifice the people.
In generally Intimidation physically takes the form of violence and terror 
targeting certain groups. Especially in 2012, it is predicted that many cases 
of violence accompanied the implementation of post-conflict local election.24 
Interestingly, cases of violence were higher in the 2012 post-conflict local 
election than in the 2006 post-conflict local election. In 2006, there were 
not much violence, and often times terrors occurred because at that time PA 
did not break yet, as stated by some informants below.
All violence was taken in order to win PA in 2012. Acehnese people even 
did not dare to go out at night. That was just on the brink of post-conflict 
local election. In Bireuen a Javanese was shot, in Banda Aceh a doll seller. 
Javanese was intentionally targeted so that Jakarta would pay attention. 
This was purely done to cancel the pemilukada.25
2006 and 2012. The same. Well, we also monitored the violence in the 
general election, I mean pemilukada. We had lots of findings; in 2012 there 
were around 112 cases that we found. And for us, from the two actors of 
post-conflict local election, the 2012 was the gravest. Because in 2006, 
the level of violence was not so high. It was only terror. And PA was still 
solid. Between Irwandi and PA groups.26
Based on some statements of the informants above, the important points 
to be taken are that the gravest and massive violence occurred in the 2012 
post-conflict local election, assumed as the effect of PA disunity (PA vs PNA). 
Based on the data from a local NGO, there were an estimated number of 
112 cases of violence. More that, Yusni Saby, former BRA-Aceh (Aceh Peace 
Reintegration Agency) Chairperson emphasized that”... here and there were 
violence and conflicts, but they did not end up riots. There was still aroma 
of conflicts during post-conflict local election.”27 At this level, he sees the 
emergence of violence in the Aceh post-conflict local election process was 
more a nuance of the previous conflicts that do not fully disappear. 
However, in the eye of the international community, some violent incidents 
that claimed lives in the post-conflict elections processes in Aceh are consid-
ered as a normal and tolerable thing. Even on At a certain level, by consider-
ing the long duration of the conflicts in Aceh, such violence is considered a 
tapi-kecewa-105440264.html, pada 25 Desember 2014.
24 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
25 Interview with one of the senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
26 Interview with one of the Bireuen NGO figures, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
27 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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normal thing and therefore, with international standard and comparison, the 
implementation of Aceh post-conflict local election is very good.28
b .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g 
The important thing to consider in this section is that post-conflict post-
conflict local election in Aceh is an instrument for implementation of UUPA 
(Aceh Government Laws), which is explicitly a derivative from the Helsinki 
MoU (Memorandum of Understanding). Thus, this post-conflict local election 
is not only an integral part of peaceful agreement between GAM and the 
Government Of Indonesia but also one of the strategic instruments to build 
peace, as emphasized by some informants below.
When peace occurred on August 15, 2005 there was a high hope among 
the people that peace really happened. Then, when post-conflict local 
election or general election took place, the people did not want to lose it 
again and thought that the election was for peace… there was political 
dynamics. But it did not harm the process in general. The peaceful con-
dition that was reached, see the dynamics from 2012 and 2006 did not 
give influence. I think it was still in the corridor of left-right conflicts. It 
was normal. It was a normal political dynamics. It did not influence the 
peaceful condition. I am optimistic it would continue. My biggest concern 
is not about politics but economy.29
I think democracy in Aceh is only an instrument, and not a satisfier of 
people’s aspiration towards individual welfare and stability. It is only an in-
strument so that in Aceh people don’t fight for the cake of power. Through 
post-conflict local election. we will see how resources in Aceh will be 
distributed peacefully and democratically.30
Post-conflict local election is a peace consolidation, apart from internal 
conflicts between them. But then their relation with Jakarta keeps strong. 
If we talk about vertical conflicts in Aceh, the relation is still good. So far 
Jakarta under SBY government has spoiled GAM, I think.31
Post-conflict local election is a consolidation, instead of instrument for 
generating new conflicts. If some conflicts, fights and violence occurred in 
the post-conflict local election implementation, that was only the general 
dynamics of inter-elites political competitions, which has so far supposedly 
not harmed the peace building process. Through post-conflict local election, 
28 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
29 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO figures, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
30 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
31 Interview with one of the Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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Acehnese resources can be distributed in an equal and democratic manner 
through economic development. Therefore, the important thing that is feared 
to harm peace-building is not the post-conflict local election with various 
negative effects, but the economic development and improvement in the 
Acehnese people’s welfare.
Concerns specifically related to the economic development are addressed 
to former combatants, most of whom are not still integrated yet. With the 
incompletely stable economic condition and driven by a feeling that they are 
the real main “share holders” of peace in Aceh,32 they can be the spoilers of 
post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh.33 The peace challenges 
are reflected in the statement of a former BRA-Aceh Chairperson:
At macro level, it is already achieved. But at micro level, the effectiveness 
of peace can been seen from the people who have returned to their habitat. 
There should be no group’s arrogance nor domination. No more former 
GAM, former combatant, former conflict victims; because they could 
become a new problem. What exists is the people of Aceh. Aceh needs 
development and special attention in the development. It is important. 
When there is a tender, people bearing the name of his group will intervene 
to get share and benefit from the cake of development.34
Widespread pressure by certain groups as former GAM members is an 
expressive form of peace share owner, who at a certain level has not benefited 
from the share. As the impact of this disappointment, they could become 
potential threat to the peace-building. 
So far the peace-building in Aceh can be said to be relatively good,35 although 
some post-conflict pemilukadas were accompanied by conflicts, violence and 
other problems. If analyzed more deeply, there is interplay relation between 
political factor and opportunity to economic access which plays an important 
role in making the pemilukada relatively peaceful and the peace in general runs 
well. The first is the victory of former GAM group through Aceh Party (PA), 
which is definitely not deliberateness, even though it received lots of spotlights 
by the public due to intimidating ways in the 2012 post-conflict local election 
and various issues. The victory then placed many PA cadres in various power 
positions in Aceh, both in legislative and executive positions, and especially the 
position of Aceh Governor. This condition can be said to have helped Aceh 
32 Detik.com, ”Rapat Paripurna Penetapan Pimpinan DPR Aceh Ricuh”. Diambil dari detik.com/
news/read/2014/12/09/012421/2771443/rapat-paripurna-penetapan-pimpinan-dpr-aceh-ricuh, 
pada 25 Desember 2014.
33 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
34 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
35 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014, with one of the 
former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014, with one of the former KIP Aceh 
commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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relative ”silent” and conducive. Nevertheless we don’t have the right to imagine 
if the post-conflict local election was since the beginning won by non-former 
GAM. This would create “noises”, social, political and economic noises. Some 
informants emphasized this matter:
Now, the established peace, in my opinion, is just political. For instance, 
they who were involved in wars now get positions and are then given op-
portunities for getting this and that projects. This is a kind of a price to 
be paid for a peace.36
Not yet into fundamental things. After the conflict, the first thing to 
be fixed is integration. This relates to combatants in order that they can 
return to normal life. This can trigger conflicts.37
It has become peaceful so far because one party is accommodated. The 
previous party, Irwandi Nazar, both people involved directly in conflicts 
and peace, after that Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf, and many 
other PA cadres in the government. With their presence, I think there 
will be an impact.38
Secondly, still related to the first, it is the wider economic access for for-
mer combatants after they are in power. Many of them have relatively good 
economic incentive and have won many development tenders in Aceh with 
various ways (Ansori 2011; Aspinall 2009). Even though it must be admitted 
that there are still particular elements among the former combatants alienated 
from the core group and who feel that they did not get the proper portion.
With the generally well maintained and relatively well running peace,39 
as well as ripple effect from the assumed power in Aceh by former combat-
ants, then the question is how far and what is the condition and dynamics of 
peace-building nowadays? Below are some views of informants on the current 
peace-building condition which can be analyzed more deeply:
So far, according to Jhon Galtung, it is still in the negative peace posi-
tion. The absence of violence. Equality does not exist, nor equity. Event 
though it has been raised in several UUPA (Aceh Government Law), but 
the realization is nothing. It is merely planning. No active and positive 
participation from the grass root. Not an cumulative participation. There 
is no management system for aspiration coming from the grass root... In 
government affairs, there is no good governance. It is all the same: what 
happened before the conflicts and after the conflicts. However, post-con-
36 Interview with one of the Aceh Panwaslu expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
37 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
38 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
39 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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flict communities have more access and opportunities and are free to go 
anywhere.40
In terms of security, yes, the communities can go out at night to watch 
football together. But in terms of comfort, we cannot feel it yet because 
there are illegal weapons. In some elections there were shootings. That has 
not showed the face of peace.41
Critical evaluations on the current peace-building condition in Aceh are 
related more to macro basic elements, namely unrealized socio-economic jus-
tice, equality, pubic participation and positive and active participation access. 
Similarly, good governance is still considered incompletely good.42 At this 
level, peace in Aceh—lending Jhon Galtung concept (1985)—is still in the 
“negative peace” phase, or only at the level of violence absence. More than 
that, peace in Aceh still negates comfort. Such condition is more caused by 
the presence of illegal arms. This condition is also reconfirmed by Irwandi 
Yusul, the former Aceh Governor, who underlined that with reference to the 
2012 post-conflict local election, there were many GAM groups that still hold 
arms. In the 2012 post-conflict local election, Irwandi Yusuf ’s group often 
became a target of armed terrors, but he advised not to retaliate even though 
they also had arms.43
It must be admitted that to make post-conflict local election better and in 
general peace-building in Aceh more mature, longer process ad timeframe are 
required. So far there have been two leadership shifts in post-conflict Aceh, 
namely the Irwandi–Nazar and Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf periods. 
Several conditions are assumed to become the cause of less optimal develop-
ment in Aceh. They are (1) limited number of competent Human Resources; 
(2) Most of the government top officials were new comers; (3) Massive poverty 
in various areas.44
c .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d 
D e m o c r a c y  D e v e l o p m e n t 
In general, it is assumed that democracy development tends to prioritize 
institutional changes and two other changes namely representative change and 
(more substantial) functional transformation will automatically follow them. 
Di Palma (1990) emphasized that democracy development can essentially be 
referred to the crating of new institutions (general election, new political party 
40 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
41 Interview with one of the Women’s NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
42 Based on IGI ranking (Index Governance Indonesia) year 2012, Aceh ranks the 18th with score 
of 5.82, which means medium.
43 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
44 Interview with Aceh Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
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and executive-legislative relation) (Faulk 1999). Implementation of democratic 
general elections is considered as the first step of democracy development 
( first sign and step of democratization). However, it must be admitted that this 
condition does not just run. Many general elections are utilized to sustain the 
non-democratic regime. In this context general elections can be used to cover 
dictatorship like general election in Ghana and Tanzania (dynastic succession) 
(Faulk 1999).
The implementation of post-conflict local election in Aceh, both theoreti-
cally45 and empirically, is intended not only to strengthen peace-building, but 
simultaneously develop democracy even though it is just within the limit as 
“ first step and sign of democratization”. The next question is how far post-
conflict local election in Aceh to build peace? In general it can be said that 
post-conflict local election in Aceh at a certain level especially the formal-
procedural and institutional development, help build local democracy, as ex-
pressed by some of the informants below.
Well, formally speaking we have run it well. I mean the pemilukada ran 
well. Even after the conflicts, we chose Mr Irwandi. In the second elec-
tion, we chose “Zikir” (Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf—ed). Then 
we recently did legislative elections. Formally they ran. Right, there is de-
mocracy, which sometimes threats exist. We don’t know if the committee 
had lied. Who knows. Here and there, there is money. Yes, whenever it is 
needed, it will be there. But not that massive. Formally there was no riots. 
We could still smell conflicts aroma. We hope it is getting better day by 
day. Another issue is the organizers. Not only the people, KPU, Panwas, 
PPK, PPS, KPPS may be wrong.46
The Acehnese people perceive democracy through elections, I guess. But 
it is still not in the substantive issue. So they don’t talk about freedom 
of expression, then how the minority groups are protected. We haven’t 
reached there except for Banda Aceh city.47
The democratic festival have not shown the maturity of the people in-
volved. For instance, After the conflict, there was intimidation process. 
Election organizers, political party supporters and others should have been 
able to develop democracy in Aceh. But we saw that the organizers harmed 
the elections. For instance, some KIP took the role in winning one of the 
candidates. The proof and facts are available.48
45 See the conceptual and theoretical framework, in the Introduction.
46 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
47 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 Junei 2014.
48 Interview with one of the Women’s NGOs activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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The first step of democracy development is through the good and smooth 
implementation of post-conflict local election. If we analyze more deeply 
the statements of some informants above, the post-conflict local elections in 
Aceh have so far run well, using multi-party system and some local parties. 
The general public, including former combatants and non combatants, have 
equal rights to vote and to be voted.49 Therefore, post-conflict local election 
can be said to play an important role in helping peace-building in Aceh. 
However, there are some weaknesses to be improved, namely (1) many threats 
and intimidations; (2) dishonesty and partiality of post-conflict local election 
organizers including KPU, Panwas, PPK, PPS, KPPS; (3) increase in money 
politics; (4) intervention from rulers on post-conflict local election results, etc.
In this context, democracy development in Aceh is still in the formal-
procedural phase or moving towards institutional development, which still has 
many “holes”. Various weaknesses can cause post-conflict local election not 
to be “genuine competition” (fair and just competition) (Faulk 1999). Besides 
that, democracy development in Aceh has not fully entered more substantial 
functional transformation such as freedom of expression, minority protection, 
equality in social and economic development, respect for differences, etc., as 
emphasized by an informant below. 
We push for better democracy process even though many parties have not 
position democracy accordingly. So, the perceived context of democracy is 
still partial. Democracy issues should cover welfare, education, basic rights 
that must be met. We see them partially addressed. For instance, it is only 
by fixing good governance on locality.50
In a separate occasion, the informant highlighted more the issue of under-
standing on democracy among the rulers and Acehnese in general. Democracy 
is not fully understood with only reference to formal-procedural rules, good 
governance, and local symbols. Democracy in Aceh is perceived to have not 
much touched substantive issues such as welfare and people’s education, which 
are the ultimate goal of the development of democracy. 
Once again, the substantive important value of democracy that received 
many critical spotlights in Aceh is the respect for differences in values, point 
of views and opinions in the society. Another important value is the respect 
for equality, including protection o the minority both in religious and tribal 
aspects, as emphasized by some informants below:
So, they don’t talk about freedom of expression, then how the minority 
groups are protected. We are not there yet, expect for Banda Aceh City. 
49 Interview with one of the Acehnese senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
50 Interview with one of the Women’s NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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But if compared to other regions that are strict to…. I think democracy 
in Aceh is more about, I vote, I am involved in the democratic processes.51
The substance of democracy, namely the respect for differences in values or 
respect for equality, is not much practiced yet nor trained yet. Democratic 
values have not been adequately set up. If there is a different opinion or 
point of view, the people easily get into conflict and debate and even this 
leads to violence.52
Furthermore, the Acehnese society is regarded as easy to take shortcuts of 
violence, intimidation and terror, when dealing with different opinions and 
points of view.53 Democracy in Aceh, therefore, can be said to be relatively 
in the phase of “ first step and sign of demcratization”, in which democracy 
prioritizes more the formal-institutional aspects of success and smoothness of 
post-conflict local election implementation. Higher levels, namely internaliza-
tion and practice of democratic values should become the agenda and priority 
of the future democracy development. In reality, democracy development is 
not an instant one-night process. Besides, there is no country in the world 
that is fully democratic (Faulk 1999).
Another criticism to the democracy development in Aceh is related to the 
treatment of minority groups in Aceh especially referring to various minority 
tribes there. Based on the testimonies of some informants, fair treatment and 
protection to minority tribes have not been much done. Such condition is very 
visible from the existing developmental discrimination. In general develop-
ment is more prioritized in the areas where the majority Acehnese tribe live, 
especially in the eastern coastal areas,54 as emphasized below:
There is difference in physical infrastructure development between certain 
areas and the others. For instance, the asphalt construction in the eastern 
coastal areas (GAM basis) is very smooth and tight while the other areas 
are smooth with a few holes and slightly thin. This is contradictory to 
democracy.55
The discrimination is not only related to the unbalanced infrastructure 
construction, but also to the recruitment of public offices. Such condition was 
then realized by Irwandi Yusuf when he was the Aceh Governor (2006-2011). 
Then he recruited and took people from Central Aceh with the majority of 
51 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaire, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
52 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
53 Interview with one of the Aceh DPRA from Golkar Fraction, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014.
54 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014; with one of 
the Aceh Panwaslu expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014, with one of the Gayo people, 
Banda Aceh, 22 June 2014.
55 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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people of Gayo tribe to sit in the Aceh government. However, unfortunately 
this policy was ignored by the current Aceh leader, Zaini Abdullah and Mu-
zakkir Manaf.56
Another emerging problem in Aceh is related to gender equality and eq-
uity. In general, representation of women is not much visible both in the 
post-conflict local election implementation process and political recruitment 
process. Even though there is an increase, but it is not even.57 The position 
of local heads in Aceh assumed by females, for instance, is only one, namely 
the Deputy Mayor of Banda Aceh. The position was even granted after the 
death of the previous mayor so that she was automatically promoted as the 
mayor. However, there are a few positive developments in the legislative area, 
namely an increased role of women as the impact of the general election’s 
requirement set by KPU.58 Overall, the number of females that have seats as 
DPRA is currently 12 people(Aceh Party= 3 people; Golkar Party =4 people; 
National Mandate Party =2 people; Democratic National Party =1 person; 
Aceh National Party = 1 person; Gerindra Party =1 person).
Issues on gender equity are not only related to the domain of political 
recruitment, but also gender-sensitive development. Based on the testimony 
from one gender activist in Aceh, gender-sensitive or female-sensitive devel-
opment programs are in general not much practiced, especially during the 
period of Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf. In the current leadership of both 
leaders, access and partiality to females are even more closed and limited, 
especially in the application of Islamic Sharia accompanied by various qonun 
which not only limits the movement, but in general discriminates women in 
Aceh.59
Apart from various issues and weaknesses of the democracy development 
above, post-conflict democracy development in Aceh is currently considered 
to still have better quality if compared to democracy implementation before 
the 2005 Peace Agreement. During the conflicts era, many people came to 
the ballots rather because of fear of the central government than coming in 
their own initiative. Fear was very dominant and massive, not only during 
the election but also in the daily life.60
Interestingly, another perspective is given by an informant in looking at 
the process and dynamics of post-conflict local election implementation and 
democracy development in Aceh. The post-conflict local election model as 
applied in Aceh is considered not suitable with the real culture and condition 
of Acehnese people. At a certain level, it can even harm the peace process. 
56 Interview with one of the Acehnese senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
57 Interview with one of the Women’s NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
58 Interview with former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014
59 Interview with one of the women activists, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
60 Interview with Chairperson of Aceh Traditional Council, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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The current democracy model is considered to be too “western style”. The 
democracy model should be more based on “concensus-building” on the values 
and culture of the Acehnese people. Besides that, Aceh condition as post-
conflict region is much related to the issues of former combatants and peace 
agreement trade-off.61
Apart from the critical issues and debates on the democracy model in 
post-conflict Aceh, major challenges that need to be immediately tackled is 
the gap of knowledge on democracy between the people living in Banda Aceh 
and outside Banda Aceh. The spotlight is mainly aimed to the process and 
mechanism of political education which is still far from the expectation, as 
emphasized by an informant. 
Let’s say many of us are democracy-literate. But not all of the people under-
stand it, especially those living in villages…The challenge is to give educa-
tion, for instance political education. This is not the responsibility of the 
government, right? We all have to be there, but we haven’t gotten there.62
In the future, the important aspects in the democracy development in 
Aceh are improvement and strengthening of the understanding of democ-
racy, both in the formal-procedural dimensions and its substance. Political 
education is a strategic foundation to improve people’s understanding on 
democracy, especially those living in isolated rural areas, in which access to 
media and education is still very limited. However, according to the infor-
mant’s testimony, political education is still very rare here. Education should 
be the shared task and responsibility of all democracy stakeholders in Aceh, 
including local government, CSO, political parties, etc.
d .  Pe m i l u k a d a  a n d  T h r e a t  o f  I n s t a b i l i t y 
i n  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g 
Studies on post-conflict local election especially become interesting because 
there are dilemmas often faced in the post-conflict local election implementa-
tion process. In general, as emphasized earlier, the post-conflict local election 
implementation in post-conflict areas have two important goals (double goals), 
namely as the peace building process and an first step to democracy develop-
ment. However, this condition can produce contra-productive thing in which 
post-conflict local election is not helping, consolidating and strengthening 
accomplished peace, but it creates fictions and conflicts and threats to in-
stability given the fact that the inherent character of election is competition. 
It must be admitted that the threat to instability in the post-conflict local 
election implementation in Aceh exists. Such threat in general takes the form 
61 Interview with one of the former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
62 Interview with one of Aceh DPRA from Golkar Fraction, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014.
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of conflicts between Aceh Party supporters and non-Aceh Party supporter, 
and between supporters, or Aceh Party elites. In the 2006 post-conflict local 
election violence and intimidation were less than in the 2012 post-conflict 
local election; political frictions still revolve between Aceh Party supporters 
and non-Aceh Party supporter. However, entering the 2012 post-conflict local 
election, the levels of violence, terrors and intimidation tend to increase and 
accompanied by the emergency of new political friction in the macro Aceh 
political constellation, namely between Aceh Party (PA) and Aceh National 
Party (PNA) whose supporters of both parties are GAM supporters. It needs 
considering that the emergence of escalated violence in the 2012 post-conflict 
local election is the impact of division in Aceh Party.63
Various forms of potential threats to instability in the post-conflict local 
elections, and generally in the peace-building prospect in Aceh can be seen 
in the following informant’s statements:
The perpetrator is free. I did not say who the perpetrator was, but people 
who are used to violence, the habit is transferred to the current democratic 
festival. They feel they are immune. This applied to the yesterday’s post-
conflict local election. So, they do one thing to show their interest, and 
feel that they feel they have the rights in the power in Aceh after their 
long struggle.64
So, the law enforcers must explain this. For instance a PNA house is 
demolished. It must be clarified who attacked the PNA personnel and 
burnt the car. The current government thinks that security counts. No 
problem with a small number of deaths. Internationally speaking, this 
thought does not exist. What matters is Aceh is safe. In its democracy, 
if there are some small holes, that won’t be a big deal. It’s normal. Okay, 
they have changed the clothes and been disarmed, but their thoughts are 
still there, do not disappear. The idea of independence is still in the heart 
of Acehnese people.65
One of the forms of potential threats in Aceh so far is inter-civil society 
violence. This condition is worsened by the absence of proper resolution (rule 
of law), especially in the context of prevailing positive laws. Then it becomes a 
bad precedent as it will create revenge and opportunity to carry out the same 
thing. If so, violence and intimidation in the post-conflict local election in 
Aceh may become the “cycle of evil”. Violence is not definitely something 
strange for former combatants who have just descended from mountains. 
The “culture of violence” and intimidation may not fully disappear from 
63 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
64 Interview with one of the Aceh Panwaslu expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
65 Interview with one of the former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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their ways, and proves to be taken to the political competition domain, as 
emphasized by one of the Sabang Panwaslu commissionaires. “I think intimi-
dation becomes a trend. Why? Because it is an effect from conflict areas.”66 
Transformation of combatants, both economically and socially, can be said 
to be not completely finished yet, especially if the idea of Free Aceh is always 
boiling in their minds.
Another factor which can trigger tension, conflicts and violence is the 
role of mass media. It must be admitted that media also plays an impor-
tant role in shaping and aggravating instability because often times media 
reports negative and provocative things, which in their perspective are more 
interesting to readers and potentially increase their turnover. Besides that, 
people’s economic condition also plays a crucial role in triggering instability. 
Less employment opportunities and high poverty in Aceh have made it easy 
to mobilize the people for the interest of a particular party, and even to do 
violence. Besides that, many of the people ran for legislative candidates with 
high political cost. Consequently, anything will be done, including violence 
and terror, for victory.67
From the aspect of actors, the group of former elite combatants is often 
accused of being the cause of conflicts and threat to instability of post-conflict 
local election and peace-building process.68 Pemilukada then becomes the 
sales product of the elites. For instance, many of them stated in an intimi-
dating tone and threatened that if they lost, the peace would be in jeopardy 
and chaos would return again.69 They did such ways merely because they 
understood that many of the Acehnese people still felt traumatic and feared 
conflicts. This traumatic condition is often utilized by the former combat-
ants’ group,70 even though potential for returning to wars as before was nil. 
However, the government is still traumatic for the return of GAM, as stated 
by some informants.
Yes, in my opinion it is already nil. But the government is traumatic to 
the 1990s incidents when GAM was regarded as already finished, but they 
returned with full force. Well, the government feels afraid there.71
What for will they rebel? Because currently they have enjoyed the cake of 
peace. The cake of power and they can threaten people to get projects. If 
he does not get the cake they won’t rebel… Yes; if they are not given food 
66 Interview with one of the Sabang Panwaslu commissionaires, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
67 Interview with one of the former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
68 Interview with Aceh Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
69 Interview with one of the senior Acehnese journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014, and with 
one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
70 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
71 Interview with Irwandi Yusuf, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
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how will they survive up in the mountain? They used to survive there 
because people brought them food.72
Condition for the return to the past time and involvement in conflicts is 
not something that can easily happen. Not only because their arms have almost 
completely been gone but also because former combatant group is considered 
to feel comfortable with their current power position and enjoy “the cake of 
development”, at least at their elites level. The threat to return to the conflict 
period and create chaos may be just a camouflage for short-time political goal.
The threat of instability that comes the concerns of many parties above 
can be regarded as relatively weak. In reality, the implementation of post-
conflict local election in Aceh is relatively conducive and stable, although 
with various weaknesses that require improvements. Stability and smoothness 
of post-conflict local elections in Aceh are actually much helped, and at a 
particular level, owe to the reality of Aceh Party’s victory in the two periods 
of post-conflict local elections, as stated by some informants below. 
In my opinion, elections is related to conflicts because the actors are PA 
who are GAM elite. They also took an important role in the Aceh conflict 
contest. In the previous post-conflict local election, when I was in office, 
the internal conflicts were strong, between PNA and NA. NPA was rep-
resented by Irwandi… If Aceh conflict used to be vertical one. But today 
it started to be horizontal because of the internal conflict between PNA 
and PA. They are still the strong actors, influential actors in the stream 
of conflicts in Aceh.73
It did trigger new conflicts, for instance local parties. Within the Aceh 
Party itself. Between PA and NPNA. Various tender and nepotism prob-
lems have generated conflicts, which cause one another to become hostile 
and this became a particular threat in the previous post-conflict local 
election. Luckily, Aceh Party won at that time. It is the basis of GAM 
militant supporters.74
Apart from the disunity between supporters of Aceh Party which then 
created a new party, the Aceh National Party (PNA), the victory of Aceh 
Party (PA), that can be said to the representative transformation of GAM, 
is helpful and becomes one of the important factors for strengthening the 
post-conflict local election stability in Aceh. In this context, various violence, 
intimidation, terror and conflicts occurring in the society did not manage to 
72 Interview with one of the PNA (Aceh National Party) spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 28 October 
2014.
73 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
74 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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cancel the post-conflict local election implementation or even threatened the 
prospective peace-building in the region. The situation might have changed 
if Aceh Party had lost and the center of power in Aceh disappeared from 
their hands. However, the key behind the victory-defeat of Aceh Party in 
the post-conflict local election and its impact on the potential instability is 
the behavior of the Party Aceh’s exponents,75 especially democratic attitude 
or character, as emphasized by Kumar (1998, p. 6-8), namely be willing to 
accept defeat with a big heart.
I I .  M A L U K U
a .  G e n e r a l  C o n d i t i o n  o f  Po s t - C o n f l i c t 
L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n
Post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku was in general rela-
tive safe and stable. In the post-conflict local election implementation process, 
various forms of conflict, violence, terror of intimidation were rarely found.76 
Violence can be said to have only taken place in some post-conflict local 
elections at the district level, especially post-conflict local election in Eastern 
Seram district (SBT), as stated by some informants below.
Thanks God, that in the most recent developments, Maluku is still safe 
and secure. However, some exceptions are in some villages because of 
internal conflicts. For instance Polto and Aria; the problem was related 
to water source. It was not because of post-conflict local election, but the 
post-conflict local election in general ran smoothly. So, both elections of 
regents, governors and legislators and presidential election.77
In general the post-conflict local election condition in Maluku province 
and our government ran as usual. There was one or two conflict but they 
did not explode because they could be curbed. There were people who try 
to stir the people to return to the year of 1999, but we were not tempted 
to it because we have learnt from experiences.78
It was safe. People did campaigns and it was Okay. I think the people were 
aware and not easily triggered by those things. Actually the government 
both the governor or mayor have given awareness, (and also religious and 
local leaders), that if you found those things, you should not be tempted.79
75 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
76 Interview with the chairperson of Latupati Council, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
77 Interview with Kesbangpol Maluku, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
78 Interview with Maluku Bappeda, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
79 Interview with one of Women’s NGO, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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Both Maluku local government and the people seem to agree to emphasize 
that the post-conflict pemilukada has so far run safely and smoothly although 
it must be admitted that there were some conflicts and violence in certain 
districts. However, that did not create agitation and concerns in Maluku at 
the macro level.80 Besides that, there were also inter-hamlet conflicts, but they 
were more caused by non-post-conflict local election issues.81
Stability and security in post-conflict local election are not only realized 
in Ambon, the capital city of Maluku, but also in another islands such as 
Central Maluku.82 The pemilukada in Central Maluku was not only safe and 
stable, but also the people did not care about various conflicts involving the 
elites. Besides that, in the 1999 conflict period, the condition in Maluku was 
not as bad and complex as in Ambon, as emphasized by one of the Central 
Maluku figures as follows:
In Central Maluku I wanted to say that the people did not care about the 
elites’ conflicts. They never knew what the elites wanted. Again the people 
did not think about things related to the prolonged conflicts occurring 
after the post-conflict local election.83
However, comparatively, the tension and competition of the provincial 
post-conflict election tended to be stronger than those in the districts or other 
islands in Maluku.84 From the security aspect, the post-conflict local election 
implementation was considered conducive and stable, especially if compared 
to the neighboring province, North Maluku. There was nothing significant 
that required the police to work hard, as emphasized the Maluku:
The security situation related to completed post-conflict local election in 
Maluku was fairly conducive. We feel it because we look at other regions 
like North Maluku, in which the post-conflict local election was still go-
ing on. Alhamdulillah all have run smoothly. So there was nothing too 
significant that required the police to work hard. On the other hand, the 
people are already aware of the importance of security so that the security 
personnel did not have to work extra for guarding.85
The Maluku local police itself admitted the security and stability of the 
post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku. The evaluation is es-
80 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Inter-Faith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 
2014.
81 Interview with one of Central Maluku figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
82 Interview with the head of Central Maluku KPUD, Masohi, 20 November 2014, and with 
Central Maluku Bappeda, Masohi, 20 November 2014.
83 Interview with one of the Central Maluku figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
84 Interview with one of the Maluku PDIP figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
85 Interview with the Maluku local police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
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pecially supported by the reality that the Maluku local police did not have 
to work extra hard or had to deploy so many personnel for the guarding 
process because there was almost no violence in the Maluku post-conflict 
local election.
Interestingly, there is one important factor which is often referred to as the 
supporter of the security and stability of the post-conflict local election imple-
mentation in Maluku. The factor is the people’s awareness that includes local 
wisdom in religious life both between the Christian and Moslem communi-
ties, in order not to get involved in the inter-communal conflicts, especially 
the conflicts that drag religious variables. Both communities are more aware 
that the 1999 conflicts between them was basically the product of external 
intervention. They feel that they used to only be “engineered” by particular 
parties who wanted to divide them. The awareness, if analyzed further, more 
builds on and is supported by the Maluku traditional wisdoms, namely “pela 
gandong”, “aini ain” and “siwalima”.86
So far the raising awareness as mentioned early has been conducted by 
various society elements such as government, traditional leaders, religious 
leaders, NGOs, etc. Many forms of awareness such as local wisdom of the 
society are expressed in various statements such as ”Never try to provoke in 
Christian communities as if it is from Moslems, so you will get it first. At 
present Christian people will not easily believe it and Moslems won’t too.”87 
Many parties have tried to provoke again the groups that used to be involved 
in conflicts using religious variables, especially through SMS and leaflets, but 
almost all of it did not work. The people’s awareness is considered to start 
grow maturely.88 From the political party’s point of view, for instance, the 
effects of the 1999 conflict and strong segregation do not have significant 
influence as long as the approach they use is nationalism, instead of religion.89
From the implementation side, the post-conflict local election implemen-
tation in Maluku is considered to run smoothly, according to the rules and 
procedural phases of post-conflict local election implementation. Particular 
cases, as an exception, are the post-conflict local elections in Central Maluku 
and Tual City, which are the proliferated areas. Both post-conflict local elec-
tions were conducted simultaneously on June 9, 2013. There were tensions and 
technical problems, especially in the post-conflict local election in Tual City, 
which resulted in the postponement of the post-conflict local election until 
June 17, 2013. Such postponement resulted from some already-opened ballot 
boxes before the post-conflict local election implementation time scheduled 
86 Interview with the Maluku Legal Bureau, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
87 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
88 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 
2014, and with Maluku Bappeda, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
89 Interview with one of the Maluku PDIP figures, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
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for June 9, 2013. Clashes broke between the supporters of the candidates. It 
was suspected that there was an involvement and partiality of KPUD (Local 
General Election Commission) to the incumbent candidates.
Another case occurred in post-conflict local election in Eastern Seram 
(SBT). It was suspected that there were many irregularities done by post-con-
flict local election organizers. The organizers were regarded as partial to the 
incumbent candidate. Even, the vote calculation process had to be repeated. 
Consequently, five commissionaires of the KPUD and three members of East-
ern Seram Panwaslu were dismissed by DKPP (Election Organizers Ethics 
Council) in August 2013 because they were considered to violate the code of 
conducts. Then, the Eastern Seram KPUD was taken over by the Maluku 
Provincial KPUD, while the Maluku Provincial Bawaslu (General Election 
Supervisory Body) established a new Panwaslu (General Election Supervisory 
Committee) in the district. The disappointed supporters of the incumbent 
candidate (incumbent), Abdullah burned the DPRD and sub-district office.90 
This also happened in post-conflict local election in Aru Islands. The KPUD 
commissionaires were evacuated by the police. The dissatisfaction of the can-
didates and the supporters were triggered by a suspicion of KPUD partiality.91
Dissatisfaction with the post-conflict local election results is not absent. 
Many dissatisfactions with the post-conflict local election results ended up 
in the Constitutional Court. This condition is regarded as a good progress, 
because the existing dissatisfaction is not channeled into violent ways or clash-
es.92 Dissatisfaction occurs as a reaction over the independency and neutrality 
of the post-conflict local election organizers that are questioned by the candi-
dates’ supporters. Based on the observation of one Maluku DPRD member, 
the KPUD and Banwaslu independency is relatively good in general. However, 
it must be admitted that there were certain parties that try to do political 
intervention so that it harms the fairness in pemilukada.93
b .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g 
Once again, local election (pemilukada) conducted in post-conflict regions 
is not only intended to build democracy, but also to develop and consolidate 
peace in the regions. Among the Maluku leaders develops a strategic point of 
view that the political process —post-conflict local election—must be part 
of the integral process towards peace-building Maluku, as intended by one 
of the informants:
90 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014, and 
Maluku KPUD Head, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
91 Interview with Maluku KPUD Head, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
92 Interview with Maluku KPUD Head, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
93 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 
2014.
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The political process after the conflict is one of the reconciliation in-
struments. That there is a slice of religions is not too significant for me. 
Because people have new awareness that this process must be guarded 
together. People return to the agreements that existed long before the 
conflicts; if the regent is Christian the vice regent is Moslem; the governor 
is Christian, the Vice Governor is Moslem; the Governor is Moslem, the 
Vice Governor is Christian. There have been unwritten agreements like 
in the old days.94
Looking at the fact that several post-conflict local elections implemented in 
Maluku ran relatively smoothly and stable, it can be assumed that so far the 
post-conflict local elections play an important role in helping to build peace 
in Maluku. The nuances of inter-religious frictions are relatively visible in the 
surface, either intentionally or not, but that does not influence much.95 The 
building and consolidation of peace through this political process increasingly 
show the maturity. Therefore, the post-conflict local election implementation 
and the important role in the peace-building in Maluku can be said as a 
particular success.96 In this context, one of the Maluku DPRD member em-
phasized that “how to measure the success of post-conflict local election can 
be seen from the appearance of the results and the process. The democracy 
process indeed runs relatively safe and quite well.”97
The frequently-referred thing as the political foundation of peace-building 
through post-conflict local election is the power sharing between the Moslem 
and Christian groups, as emphasized by some informants below.
After conflicts, then the candidates should be from Moslem and Christian 
groups. This did not exist before. People did not pay attention to this. 
Whether the candidates were from Moslems or Christian, there were no 
rules about that in the old days. But after the conflicts, there is unwritten 
rule that if the governor is Moslem, the vice governor is Christian or if the 
governor is Christian, the vice governor is Moslem.98
For me, the chance is still there. The chance of building peace is still 
there as long as there are, for instance, candidate representations. Back to 
balance. Back to representation. The candidate representations will have 
different models from the representations but this will build dialogs at the 
94 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 
2014.
95 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum) chair persons, Ambon, 25 August 
2014.
96 Interview with Maluku PKB figure, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
97 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 
2014.
98 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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grass root level. And I am convinced the dialog would be positive. That 
would depend on the practitioners.99
The power sharing is not definitely a formal regulation for post-conflict 
local election implementation, but more a local initiative of the Maluku people 
so that it can be said as “unwritten agreement”100. Concretely speaking, the 
power sharing takes the form of candidate pairing that combines Moslem and 
Christian candidates both at the district and provincial levels. At a particular 
level, the sharing is regarded as a form of community or group representation, 
which has basically been established, even before the 1999 conflict broke out.
Of course, the combination of elected candidates does not automatically 
bring peace in Maluku. Therefore, the problem is how far this combination 
is not only a symbol of representation, but also implemented in the sharing 
of the equal development program, as well as more productive dialogs and 
inter-community interactions, as stated in the statement of an informant 
below.
There is development... [...] None of the government’s development pro-
grams is oriented to how the peace grows powerfully, by the society. No 
orientation to prevent conflicts, to keep on building peace.101
Some criticisms are directed against the local initiatives and ideas above. 
One of them underlines the shift of point of view of the Maluku society that 
the elected candidates should not be based on religious or tribal variables, but 
on their track records, including the experiences, capabilities and integrity, as 
emphasized by an informant below.
It is said that the current governor is from Bugis, outsider of Maluku, 
but the majority of voters are Christians. Then the question is that why 
Christians do not vote for the Christian candidate. For this fact, they can 
differentiate who is the most likely to be the leader.102
Our consideration is that if the sharing of power becomes an indicator for 
setting up a government or an organization, the competent persons will be 
eliminated due to the power sharing factor, for instance.103
There is a shift of people’s point of view in determining choice to a particu-
lar candidate. Electing a candidate is not merely based on the religious similar-
99 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
100 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 
2014.
101 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
102 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
103 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
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ity variable but also on the competency aspect,104 which means the candidate’s 
”track-record”. Therefore, Christian community does not automatically tend 
to elect Christian candidates, but it is most probably that they elect Moslem 
candidates if the candidates are considered to have good track record, be able 
to develop Maluku and maintain peace. The currently-elected governor can 
be put in this case category because the voters’ basis is Christian communities. 
However, symbolization of power sharing is seldom considered still necessary 
given the fact that not all of the people share the similar thought, and many 
of them prioritize religious variable.105
To a certain level, power sharing helps to build peace and unite the Ma-
luku community’s common sense as the united and peaceful communities, 
especially the grass-root communities whose points of view are still traditional/
conservative. At another level, the mechanism sometimes does not run fully, 
even fails. Not all candidate pairs that use power sharing strategy can win 
post-conflict local elections. At the same time some candidates use the same 
strategy, the voters generally will shift to track-record and integrity aspects 
of the candidate pairs.106 Especially the figures that are considered to have 
vision and missions of peace-building and development of Maluku will be 
superior.107
The condition that needs to be understood in this relation is that the 
candidates elected through power sharing (combination of Moslem and Chris-
tian) do not automatically. A more substantial problem is how the elected 
candidates can implement policies and programs that target peace-building 
and welfare of the Maluku society in general.108 In another word, how the 
local leader pair can become leaders that are able to build peace-related good 
governance in Maluku. At this level, power sharing is not fully significant 
and automatic, but merely a first prospective step.
Another important influential factor is the society’s huge passion and feel-
ing of not being involved in various forms of conflicts. The people feel fed-up 
with the sufferings resulting from the 1999 conflict, as intended by one of 
the informants below.
104 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
105 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
106 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum) chair persons, Ambon, 25 
August 2014; with one of the refugees’ figures, Ambon, 23 August 2014; and with one of the 
Maluku MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
107 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 
2014; with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; and with one 
of the Christian refugees’ coordinators in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 24 August 2014.
108Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; with 
one of the Christian refugees’ coordinators in Kayu Tiga, Ambon, 24 August 2014; and with 
King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
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So, through general election we do not want to live hard any longer. With-
out being instructed, being instructed by leaders or officials, the people 
here feel being called to refuse to do such things so that naturally…. Be-
cause people feel tired, tired. How can we eat everyday? So that, in their 
own initiative they do not want to listen to any issue. Such awareness may 
make people not willing to do anarchic things any more.109
Such feeling above then becomes a type of public awareness and hope 
to avoid various forms of anarchism which can emerge due to tension and 
competition in post-conflict local elections. The people have more interest in 
peaceful and conducive condition and avoid all actions and involvement that 
can create conflicts.
Lastly, the mass media also plays an important role in helping to condition 
post-conflict local elections and consolidate peace in Maluku. The media has 
so far been regarded as helpful to reduce tension by not blowing up or cover-
ing things that are considered provocative. Mass media is regarded as relatively 
wise in offering news that may trigger inter-group tensions.110
c .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d 
D e m o c r a c y  D e v e l o p m e n t
Procedurally speaking, the post-conflict development of democracy in 
Maluku has run relatively well. In this case, various rules and process of the 
post-conflict local election implementation have been well implemented.The 
security and stability conditions are well maintained. Almost no massive and 
bloody violence nor clashes were found except in Easter Seram district (SBT) 
and Tual city. In this context, an informant emphasized:
Procedurally speaking it was good. All of the people were involved and 
there was no discrimination. All had the same right. We saw it from the 
rights of the voters and the nominees. The procedures and technical imple-
mentation was in accordance with the rules of post-conflict local election 
implementation. It ran safely, in orderly manner and smoothly. Maluku 
is actually a former place of identity conflicts, but the nuance of identity-
based competition has started to fade.111
One of the important characters of the democracy development process 
is inclusiveness (Faulk 1999), in which all components of the society are 
included in the public decision –making process. In other words, all of the 
people have the same rights to vote and to be voted in post-conflict local 
109 Interview with Central Maluku KPUD, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
110 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 
2014.
111 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
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election, or to influence public decision-making processes through the post-
conflict local election process. However, it must be admitted that there are 
still technical-procedural issues in the post-conflict local election implemen-
tation. For instance, voters do not have voter invitation letter nor give their 
rights, vote counting irregularity, etc.112 The successful post-conflict local 
election is part of the first step of the overall democracy development. Besides 
that, substantively the people are free to channel their aspirations, opinions, 
and voices without any pressure. They are free to stage a demonstration as 
long as it is according to the standard permit and security.113
Inclusiveness of democracy development is also related to the issue of gen-
der equality, both in the political domain and other public spaces.
We should first make balances such as between women and men. For 
gender issue we have to make it in the same aspect, in the aspect of em-
ployees’ affairs and positions and others. In the aspect of business this has 
been considered; we are going to that direction, Sir. Slowly. Last year we 
developed gender-responsive budget development planning.114
Gender equality is being developed by the provincial and city govern-
ments through their programs which are claimed to be gender responsive; 
integrating those differences into their programs. But we are with women; 
again we find that the issue has not finished yet.115
The Maluku local government is very much aware of the importance 
of equality and equity among all the components of the society in every 
aspect of life. Gender equality becomes a special attention of Maluku local 
government in development planning as managed by the Development and 
Planning Agency (Bappeda). The important domain of the gender-responsive 
development is related to budgeting, employee affairs, and public offices. The 
Maluku local government admitted that the strategy runs slowly but the effect 
or impact may not be fully felt by the women at present. 
One of the important post-conflict democracy developments in Maluku is 
the gradual fade-out of identity politics. Before the 1999 conflict the identity 
politics was quite tight and strong. Related to this, there is a shift in paradigm 
of determining candidates. Many people do not tend to choose leaders based 
on identity variables such as tribe, religion, area, etc. any longer, although 
significance of these variables does not completely disappear. Nevertheless, 
the paradigm shift is a development which is worth appreciation. Some in-
formants below emphasized the condition.
112 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
113 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
114 Interview with Maluku Bappeda, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
115 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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We don’t vote for leaders based on tribe, religion and race. The people 
seem – some of them because I think if 100% is impossible- some of the 
society have move away from the traditional thought and start to move 
towards the modern one.116
The life in Maluku is very democratic, Sir, but when it is already deals with 
belief… many people think that God the Allah needs to be defended. But 
such tendency has started to fade in the political sphere. The people have 
growingly understood which is the political interest or religious affairs.117
So, religion is not the background. Why? If I am in brotherhood with 
Christians, let’s say a Christian is the leader, but I love Moslem brothers, 
why should we choose the others. It depends on the figures, both Moslem 
and Christian, but the performance, appearance, approaches are good, 
that’s all.118
It can be said that the 1999 conflict has caused an extraordinary social 
change in the Maluku society (Coser 1967, p. 26), especially with growingly 
mature behaviors of diversity and inter-fait tolerance as well as political choice 
which is not always based on religious identity but more on rational consid-
erations.119 It must be admitted that it is one of the positive developments in 
post-conflict Maluku. Even an informant explicitly emphasized that at this 
point the post-conflict local election is better than the ones before the con-
flict.120 A concrete example is as follows.
A Moslem child who used to live here (Suli/a Christian community area), 
in the post-conflict local election he got votes from here. It means, we 
cannot see whether the person is Moslem or Christian but we see that the 
person will be the one that will pay attention to us and consider people’s 
aspiration. That means there is no partition.121
Yes; so, after the conflict, automatically the people are still segmented. 
Therefore, there is a will among the people that still think of democracy 
in a traditional manner, that still determine their political choices based on 
tribe, religion and others. There is emotional closeness. There people will 
hand down their political preference. But after improvements take place in 
the campaign period, when the candidates communicate their vision and 
116 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
117 Interview with Maluku Legal Bureau, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
118 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
119 Interview with one of the Maluku DPRD members from PKS Fraction, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
120 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
121 Interview with Kind Suli and Latupati committee, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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missions and others, then changes start to occur gradually; slowly there 
have been changes.122
The change takes place indirectly and not automatically after the 1999 
conflict, but gradually. In the initial period of the post-conflict local elec-
tion, in which the people were still relatively “segmented”, the majority of the 
people still handed down their choice based on religious variable so that the 
emotional dimension was tight. However, in its course, the Maluku people 
started to tend to consider their choices based on the factors of capability 
and experiences of the candidates. This paradigm shift occurs definitely due 
to support from various stakeholders of democracy development in Maluku.
Nevertheless, although the paradigm shift is a positive progress of devel-
opment, not all the people share the thought. Still there are many Maluku 
people who determine their choices based on the identity consideration. The 
condition definitely slices with local initiative development in the form of 
power sharing which develops and is chosen as a strategy by many candi-
dates of local leaders. Behind the power sharing is the awareness of political 
actors of the still strong identity politics within the society. With the power 
sharing, they hope to win the votes from traditional voters who still tend to 
base their choices on identity. The rooted identity politics was revealed by an 
informant below.
If I were Moslem. If I were the candidate of governor or regent, I would 
also know by heart the words of Bible, when I visited a Christian com-
munity and talked about the words. O..they would be very happy. If I 
were Christian, I would know by heart the Al Fatihah, then the Moslems 
would be happy. Or for instance, the person visited a Moslem commu-
nity. That’s the experience in my hamlet. He talked and entered with Al 
Fatihah. The people were happy and came. On the D-day for voting, the 
person got many votes…. We here, for the level of acceptance, cannot 
deny that for Maluku the religious factor is one of the variables. Tribe is 
also a variable.123
One of the characteristics related to the strong identity politics is the tight 
religious symbolization. For the above example, even though a candidate is 
Moslem, but if he can mention Bible’s verses when visiting Christian com-
munities, it is almost sure that the people will be happy and tend to give their 
votes for the candidate.
Still related to the identity politics issue, one of the unique dynamics in 
the Maluku post-conflict local election context is the relation between pela 
122 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
123 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014. 
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and vote support. In general, it is assumed that one community that have pela 
relation with the candidate from another community will “morally” give the 
votes to the candidate, as emphasized by an informant below.
Like this; community A of a negeri with the community B of a negeri, the 
person is pela Gandong, morally they will support. Morally, they support 
because that’s the way it works, “Oi ela,” the social slogan, “E, That’s my 
ela, so it’s ok..” But, we can see how far the percentage of the support and 
I would say it is relative.124
Interestingly, even though morally a candidate should get support from 
another community that has pela relation with the candidate, but in reality 
this does not always happen. It turns out that not all communities that have 
pela relation with particular candidates would give their votes to the candi-
dates. For instance, if a candidate comes from Lehitu, morally the candidate 
will get support from Saparua, because both Lehitu and Saparua has pela. At 
least, when doing political dissemination or campaign, a candidate tends not 
to enter a community that has pela with their contender.125
Critical spotlight to democracy development in Maluku is addressed to 
the issue of strong money politics.126 This is not Maluku’s typical issue but a 
national issue in the democracy development process in Indonesia. Related 
to the condition, some informants revealed:
We can say it is safe. But the level of awareness and understanding of 
the people on the democracy may be right or wrong. Now, with only 
IDR50,000, it will work. That’s the reality. With this kind of system, are 
the people not yet ready to implement pemilukada as being implemented 
now? Because people want to win it and have money, so they will get 
elected.127
Yes, for the post-conflict local election, the level of grass-root people’s 
acceptance is similar to those in other regions. If you want to be success-
ful, you must have money; You may be well-known but the strategy you 
have must be good and it needs money. This is even stronger after the 
conflict.128
In the context of democracy development in Maluku, a critical problem 
that should be considered in the future is money politics, which is regarded 
124 Interview with Central Maluku community figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
125 Interview with Central Maluku community figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
126 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
127 Interview with one of the Maluku refugee empowerment activists, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
128 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
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as increasingly strong after the conflict. Money politics, and corruption 
in general, is regarded as a serious democracy pathology beside violence, 
authoritarianism, ethnical or particular group discrimination, etc. (Warren 
2004). Democracy in Maluku can be graded relatively sterile from various 
pathologies of the democracy development except money politics and cor-
ruption. 
d .  P e m i l u k a d a  a n d  T h r e a t  o f  I n s t a b i l i t y 
i n  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g
Theoretically, post-conflict local elections become a particular issue be-
cause they need different treatments from the pemilukadas in normal regions. 
This becomes an issue that requires a particular treatment because on one 
hand post-conflict regions still tend to be vulnerable to conflicts and on the 
other hand, intrinsic character of a post-conflict local election is competi-
tive (Kumar 1998, p. 6-8). Therefore, once again, post-conflict implemented 
post-conflict local elections can create instability and violence in a region. At 
a certain level, if not well managed, post-conflict local elections can threaten 
the recently-gained peace.
In the context of post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku, 
potential for threat of instability is considered likely to come from indi-
viduals, groups or particular community organizations that often conduct 
political provocations using religious variable. The community organiza-
tions are in general affiliated to a particular religion and radical in the 
character.
From Moslems: “Don’t vote for Christians; This is RMS.” Also from 
Christians: “Don’t vote for this; this person is Laskar Jihad.” So, it is very 
dangerous, but we know it very well. But we fear if there is a certain group 
that blows up the issue even more strongly.129
What we fear now is that there are some other issues brought by any people 
or community organizations that influence the people’s mindset through 
provocation, leaflets and SMS.130
That can become a fuel. Why making and sending SMSes anywhere? I think 
these people have better knowledge and perspective and know that the 
move may become a timed bomb that can explode. What do these people 
aimed at, without even thinking that this will be used by provocateurs? 
129 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
130 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity), Ambon, 26 August 
2014.
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Recently, two months ago there was a news that the people sending SMSes 
would get sentenced but until now it is not realized yet.131
The main challenge of post-conflict local election implementation in Ma-
luku, related to the threat to instability, is to deal with many communal 
provocations which at a certain level are no more than a kind of inter-faith 
conflict-creating efforts. The actors involved in the provocation can be indi-
vidual and groups/organizations. The common media includes leaflets and 
SMSes. Like the above example, the people are advised not to choose Chris-
tian candidates because they are members of RMS (South Maluku Republic), 
or not to choose Moslem candidates because they are members of Laskar 
Jihad. Kesbangpol added that if there is provocation or inter-faith conflict-
creating efforts carried out by a community organization, usually the orga-
nization is not registered in Kesbangpol yet.132
Analytically speaking, provocations that use religious issues and generally 
are intended to discredit a candidate, originate from a point of view that re-
ligious issues are still considered sexy and strategic to win votes without con-
sidering the consequences and risks at the macro level.133 On the other hand, 
primordialism is still a threat to the peace-building in Maluku.134 However, 
for another informant, provocations that use variables of tribe and hamlet 
are not less dominant and have the risk of threatening the process of peace-
building rather than religious variable.135 The SMS case that uses SARA issues, 
for instance, never involves a certain political party elite, as emphasized by 
an informant:
For instance, there is a political element from the Head of Ambon City 
Golkar Party Local Leadership Council (DPD) whose SMS targeting SARA 
issues. We will push that that should be legally processed and in the win-
ning team, he should be dismissed from the position of the winning team 
leader. Because he can disturb the social stability.136
Nevertheless, the above provocations occurred in particular areas. In Cen-
tral Maluku, such provocations were relatively rare during the post-conflict 
local election. The condition is more caused by increasingly strong awareness 
131 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
132 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014.
133 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014, and with Maluku 
KPUD Chairperson, Ambon, 25 Augustu2014.
134 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; with 
one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014; and with riot victim community in 
Waringin, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
135 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairpersons, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
136 Interview with peace and democracy NGO activist, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
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on diversity and inter-community tolerance so that any candidates that use 
religious issues are believed to get difficulty in winning pemilukada.137
In response to the above potential instability, some strategic steps were 
conducted by Maluku local government especially through Kesbangpol. To 
keep Maluku conducive in the post-conflict local election, Kesbangpol actively 
coordinated with the police, intelligence agency, etc. as emphasized by Kes-
bangpol, “so, we usually have meetings in Depkominda or usually in Kesbang 
office every three months. Even when it is urgent, we will require it.”138 The 
strategic steps are very helpful to keep the implementation of post-conflict 
local election in Maluku safe and conducive. 
Beside the response and anticipation from the Maluku local government, 
public initiatives and responses are also strategic in preventing various threats 
to instability. Some statements of the people below describe various initiatives 
and efforts below.
The people are sometimes are provoked but there is a counter by making 
counter-leaflets. We make counter-SMSes. Peaceful provocation, the one 
that we use, and media provocation. If there is another provoking SMS, 
we will make another counter, and that will continue.139
That’s a provocation, but Ambon people, Maluku people have known it 
exactly and are not provoked. I already told when voting for Mr. Karel to 
the kings that before the election there should be no instruction that we 
Christian must choose Christians; on the contrary, for Moslems. That’s 
what I mean by local wisdom that after the riot, people realized why we 
had to do that; eventually we all looked back to our history that we were 
all one.140
One of the creative initiatives taken by the society or community organiza-
tions is to make a kind of counter provocation which is called peaceful provo-
cation. Such provocation is disseminated through mass media and intends 
to counter various interfaith conflict-bringing provocations. Besides that, the 
very helpful factor is the increasing strong and mature awareness of people on 
community differences. The awareness is often called as “local wisdom”.141 
Awareness or tradition-based “local wisdom” —pela gandong—becomes a 
137 Interview with Central Maluku Panwaslu, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
138 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol (National and Political Unity ), Ambon, 26 August 2014; 
and with Maluku Bappeda, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
139 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 
2014.
140 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
141 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014; 
with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August; and with riot victims in Waringin, Ambon, 23 
August 2014.
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kind of strategic counter to various threats to instability in post-conflict lo-
cal election.142
I I I .  P O S T- C O N F L I C T  P E M I L U K A D A ,  P E A C E -
B U I L I D I N G  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y  D E V E L O P M E N T , 
A S  W E L L  A S  T H E  C H A L L E N G E S  I N  A C E H 
A N D  M A L U K U :  C O M P A R A T I V E  A N A L Y S I S
In general, the implementation of post-conflict local election in Maluku 
is relatively better compared to that in Aceh, although each has various dy-
namics and unique challenges. The condition is a reflection for the different 
conflicting characters between the two. However, in the international point 
of view, post-conflict local election in Aceh remains a particular success. For 
instance, from the security dimension the post-conflict local election in Ma-
luku is relative safe and stable compared to that in Aceh which are filled with 
violence, intimidation as well as horizontal conflicts. Even, the violence and 
intimidation tended to increase and almost spread evenly, instead of decreas-
ing in the 2012 post-conflict local election. Therefore, there is degradation 
of post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh. In Maluku, sporadic 
violence is only found in Southeast Maluku, Tual City and SBT (Eastern Se-
ram). Many dissatisfactions with the results of the post-conflict local election 
in Maluku ended up in the Constitutional Court. The condition is regarded 
as a good progress as disputes were not channeled in violent ways or clashes. 
From the technical-procedural aspect, both ran smoothly according to the 
general standard of post-conflict local election implementation. However, 
many criticisms were directed against the post-conflict local election organiz-
ers in Aceh who were often considered not neutral. This condition was much 
more caused by Aceh KIP selection that was conducted by DPRA.
At a particular level, the implementation of post-conflict local elections 
in Aceh and Maluku can be regarded as relatively helpful to consolidate and 
build peace in both regions. This condition is strengthened by economic 
and political stability as well as increasingly solid social relation and interac-
tion. However, criticisms are addressed to the level of peace in Aceh which 
is believed not to have greatly touched the substantive problem yet, such as 
socio-economic equity and equality especially inter-region and tribe, public 
participation, access to participation, and good governance in general. The 
peace in Aceh is still in the negative peace (absence of violence) level.
Important factors regarded as helpful to build peace in Aceh and maintain 
the stability are political, opportunity, as well as inter-play economic access. 
The first is the victory of the former GAM groups through Aceh Party (PA). 
The victory places many cadres of Aceh Party in various offices of power, 
142 Interview with Maluku PKB elite, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
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both in the legislative and executive positions, especially the position of Aceh 
Governor. The condition can be regarded as helpful to make Aceh relatively 
“silent” and conducive. Secondly, it is still related to the first, namely wider 
economic access and opportunities to former combatants after they are in 
power. 
The important factor regarded as helpful to build and consolidate peace 
in Maluku is power-sharing, which is a local creative initiative. Of course, 
the power sharing does not automatically build peace in Maluku. Therefore, 
what is more important is how far the combination is not only a symbol of 
representation, but also is realized in various equal developmental programs 
and inter-community dialogs. However, at least, the power-sharing initiative 
can unite the common sense of Maluku society as a united and peaceful soci-
ety, especially the grass-root communities whose points of view still tend to be 
traditional/conservative. Other factors are a cultural entity of “pela gandong” 
and increasingly strong post-conflict public awareness. 
In the perspective of democracy development, the implementation of post-
conflict local election in both regions above is considered to have formally-
procedurally run well and smoothly. In this relation, various rules and process 
of post-conflict local election implementation have been well implemented. 
However, it still must be admitted that there are still technical-procedural 
problems in the post-conflict local election implementation. For instance, 
there are voters who don’t get voting invitation letters or cannot exercise their 
rights, vote-counting irregularity, etc. In other words, institutional democracy 
development is the first step of democratization which can be regarded as a 
particular progress. 
Substantial democracy development in Aceh is believed to have not been 
achieved yet, such as the freedom of expression, minority protection, social 
and economic development equity, respect for differences in values, points 
of view, and opinions, etc. The Acehnese people are still believed to easily 
use violence, intimidation and terror as a shortcut to deal with different 
opinions and points of view. In this context, Jarstad (1998, p. 21-25) em-
phasized that one of the dilemmas of post-conflict democracy development 
is that peace-building will probably involve some limitations of freedoms, 
such as freedom of the press and demonstration. Another substantive factor 
is related to fair and balanced treatment to minority groups in Aceh, which 
specifically refer to various minority tribes. On the other hand, substantively 
the development of democracy in Maluku is still regarded as better, in which 
the people are free to channel their aspirations, opinions and voices without 
any pressure, intimidation, nor terrors. Besides that, inter-community and 
inter-tribe justice and equality are better. Below is one of the examples of 
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demonstrations conducted by Maluku society to voice their aspirations. 
(Photo 2).
Photo 2: Demonstration to Express Aspirations in a Free Fashion
From the aspect of post-conflict democracy development, there are some 
weaknesses believed to require improvements in Aceh, namely (1) There are 
still many threats and intimidations; (2) Dishonesty and partiality of post-
conflict local election organizers, including KPU, Panwas, PPK, PPS, KPPS; 
(3) Increased number of money politics, (4) There are still ruler’s interven-
tion on the post-conflict local election results. The challenges of democracy 
development in Maluku are especially the strong money politics, which is 
even considered to have increasingly strengthened after the conflict. Besides 
that, there is still partiality of some post-conflict local election organizers, as 
found in some particular cases. 
In relation to gender equality, gender equality and equity in Aceh is con-
sidered relatively poor. Gender problems in Aceh are not only related to the 
political recruitment, but also in gender-sensitive development. Even in the 
current period of Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf leadership, access to and 
partiality of women are believed to be more closed and limited. On the other 
hand, gender equality especially has become the attention of the Maluku lo-
cal government. The important domain of gender-responsive development is 
related to budgeting, employee affairs, and public offices. 
The threat to instability in the post-conflict local election implementa-
tion in Aceh tends to take the form of inter-civil society conflicts and vio-
lence, both between Aceh Party (PA) supporters and non-Aceh Party sup-
porters and inter-supporters or elites of the Aceh Party (PA). In the 2006 
post-conflict local election, political frictions still revolved between Aceh 
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Party supporters and Non-Aceh Party supporters. But, entering the 2012 
post-conflict local election, the levels of violence, terror and intimidations 
tended to increase, and new frictions occurred in the Aceh macro political 
constellation namely between Aceh Party (PA) and Aceh National Party 
(PNA). This condition is even worsened by the absence of proper dispute 
resolution (rule of law), so that it becomes a bad and repeated precedent. 
From the aspect of actors, former combatant elite group is often referred 
to as the cause of the emerging conflicts and threat to instability in post-
conflict local election and peace-building process in general. However, the 
threat to instability can be regarded as relatively weak because it does not 
cancel the post-conflict local election implementation or threatens peace-
building prospect in the region. 
On the other hand, the threat to and potential for instability in post-
conflict local election implementation and peace-building Maluku is believed 
to potentially come from various types of actors, both individuals and groups 
or particular community organizations. In general, the potential for the threat 
takes the form of political provocations by using religious variables, both via 
SMSes and leaflets. In response to this threat, Kesbangpol actively coordinates 
with the police and intelligence agency in every post-conflict local election 
implementation. Similarly, creative initiatives that are taken by the society or 
community organization; they make a kind of counter provocations which 
are called peaceful provocations. The growingly strong and mature public 
awareness on diversity in Maluku also plays an important role as the counter 
to various provocations.

C H A P T E R  I V
Post-Conflict Local Election, 
Governance, and Peace-Building 
As explained earlier, the goal of post-conflict general elections is not only 
to develop democracy but also to build in post-conflict regions. Both are 
assumed to have constitutive/mutually beneficial relation. Korth (2011) clari-
fies that some goals included in the frame of the two major goals of post-
conflict general elections namely (1) to validate peace strengthening (peace 
settlements); (2) to generate new sovereign authority; (3) to legitimize new 
constitutional rules; (4) generate symbolic cut-off from the past to the new 
life; (5) to improve civil society development; (6) to support political par-
ticipation in various political processes; (7) to stimulate people to generate 
various initiatives. Besides that, as developed by the World Bank, there are 
six dimensions that are often referred to as the form of good governance, 
namely (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and lack of vio-
lence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and 
(6) control of corruption.1 
This section is especially designed to discuss various variables/indicators of 
the above post-conflict local elections. However, by considering the limited 
space in the section, some indicators will be analyzed more deeply such as is-
sues of violence and political stability, as well as civil society development. In 
detail, this section will consists of four sub-chapters namely (1) post-conflict 
local election, accountability, and corruption, (2) post-conflict local election, 
transparency, and public service, (3) post-conflict local election and political 
participation, as well as (4) post-conflict local election and rule of law. This 
section will then be concluded by a comparative analysis between the post-
conflict local elections in Aceh and in Maluku with reference to the four 
issues. 
1 Generally The World Bank defines governance as the entire traditions and institutions in which 
authority or power of a government is practiced. This includes three domains, namely (1) election, 
control and power shift processes, (2) government capacity in formulating and implementing good 
policies, and (3) to get recognition from the citizens on the institutions that manage economic 
and social interactions between them. See Mastimo Mastruzzi, et al. (2010). World governance 
indicators: methodology and analytical Issues. Policy Research Working Paper 5430, The World 
Bank. Development Research Group, Macro-Economics and Growth Team. 
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I .  A C E H
a .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n , 
A c c o u n t a b i l i t y,  a n d  C o r r u p t i o n
One of the key goals of the post-conflict local election implementation 
in Aceh is to get accountable and legitimate government and authority that 
are not involved in and/or commit corrupt actions. Theoretically, one of the 
variables of democracy development and promotion of sustainable peace in 
post-conflict regions is the election and availability of leaders both legislative 
and executive ones who are accountable and legitimate (Kumar 1998, p. 6-8; 
Flores & Nooruddin 2011, p. 1). Because of the strategic roles of local lead-
ers as decision and public policy makers, accountable and legitimate leaders 
are expected to help and facilitate democracy development and promotion of 
local sustainable peace. 
In the Aceh context, “new” leaders elected through post-conflict local elec-
tions have not so far been able to meet the big expectations of the people yet. 
Various problems and negative things are directed against them. Statements 
from some informants below show the condition:
They promised to give trainings, for instance in this sector and that sector, 
but no realization ever. True liars. In term of knowledge, they lie. Mor-
ally they lie too. Eventually what would they work on? That’s the current 
DPR... so they become burglars. The people get angry at them. Now, they 
have Billion. And they feel 1 Billion treasures are not enough. Let’s look 
at them all.2 
I think there is no change. We cannot entrust our hope to these people... 
they, the elites, are the ones who get prosperous; not the people that have 
voted for them. Even though they are all former combatants. No differ-
ence. The people have hope and this hope has not been met. For instance, 
in Buloh all. There is no electricity until today in the area, even though 
the budget is always abundant every year. But with the abundant fund, 
such need cannot be met.3 
The leaders elected through post-conflict local elections are regarded as 
less able and willing to listen to people’s aspirations, but they know more 
how to secure the next power.4
Leaders such as regents, governor, DPRD are considered to have brought 
little change and welfare, or even to eliminate poverty. Even, there is no 
2 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
3 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
4 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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difference between the directly-elected regent and indirectly-elected regent. 
Many of them try to prioritize their own interests. Those who controls and 
get many benefits are their relatives and colleagues.5
From such statements above, it can be emphasized that some problems 
and/or negative predicate addressed to the current Aceh leaders has made the 
level of public acceptance to them relatively low. Firstly, many among the 
current Aceh leaders are often considered to lie and break their promises. Sec-
ondly, the leaders tends to enrich themselves rather than to make the people 
prosperous. At a certain level, they are believed to tend to be greedy. Then, the 
leaders do not want to listen to the public voice and aspiration. Some of these 
problems get the most spotlights and attention from the Acehnese people.
This condition becomes a particular blow in the Aceh context, in which 
the majority of the elected leaders are former combatants. Initially, many 
people hoped their participation to the center of power would change the face 
of Aceh and make the people better and prosperous. However, the reality is 
below their expectation.
This will then impact the level of participation. The people do not trust 
any longer. No trust any more. Because the end will be like this. It’s all 
the same. It is a kind of gradually decreasing level of trust.6
The current widespread public opinion is that the leaders from nongame 
and former GAM are no difference – they are all the same. This condition 
resulted in the reduced level of trust to former combatants, especially to Aceh 
Party (PA). The reality can be seen from the gained seats of PA in DPRA 
(Aceh Legislative Council) which more and more decreased in 2012 period 
even though until now PA is still the majority in DPRA. Besides that, the con-
dition also impacts the gradually decreasing level of political participation in 
post-conflict local election if seen from the comparison between the 2006 and 
2012 post-conflict local elections, as emphasized by an informant as follows.
Resistance and trust to PA more and more decreased by looking at the 
indicator of their decreasing gain votes in Aceh parliament (from 33, that 
have 69 seats, it got 48 percent; now it has only some 30 percent). The 
condition is more caused by the condition and fact that they are all “the 
same” and cannot be expected to do much. The relatively significant seats 
were gained by fraudulent ways. They have many complaints like under 
spent, then it is easy for them to change the cabinet and replace office 
5 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
6 Interview with a former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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head. You know what…to get the position of office heads, it needs money. 
Some come from Muzakkir Manaf’s link, and some from governor’s link.7
The decreasing trust to former combatants, once again, has a significant 
impact on the decreasing number of their votes, from 48% down to more 
or less 30%. Efforts to gain the votes were already done by various methods 
including cheats and various intimidating actions.
Analytically, the key problem of the leaders who are mostly former com-
batants is euphoria of winning post-conflict local elections after going down 
from mountains without nothing. Then they feel they don’t have to listen 
to the society expect their group, because in their point of view all of this is 
the result of their struggle. The following is one of the analytical interesting 
reviews from an informant.
Like this; If I look from the aspect of quality, I am not satisfied, frankly 
speaking. I talk about it in a fair way, from the aspect of quality, I am 
not satisfied. And we cannot deny that they had euphoria for sure; they 
just went down from mountains, having nothing, how could they listen 
to others. They would listen to their own group first... In general they 
are uneducated in the state administration system; they don’t know about 
democratic system. They still have military spirit in their heart.8 
Another problem is the majority of combatants are uneducated after they 
go down mountains. Consequently, their competency, capability, and knowl-
edge on leadership and governance are often doubted. Such problem brings a 
major impact on their performance when governing Aceh. 
More concretely, some reasons for the decreasing trust to them are (1) they 
often commit violent ways, (2) low budget absorption, (3) KKN (Corruption, 
Collusion and Nepotism) in the recruitment of office heads, (4) They are 
believed not to have done many changes—“ just as usual, no change”—or no 
breakthrough. On the other side, the people dare to conduct performance 
evaluation and give “sanction” through reduction of seats in the legislative 
body or reduction of votes for the executive candidates.9 Furthermore, in the 
context of comparison between Irwandi Yusuf ’s leadership period and Zaini 
Abdullah’s leadership period, the people prefer to accept the leadership of 
Irwandi Yusuf with various programs and policies.10 However, it is not fair 
to compare the leadership of Zaini Abdullah that has not completely finished 
and is still running, with the leadership of Irwandi Yusuf.
7 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
8 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
9 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
10 Interview with one of the journalists, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
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b .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n , 
Tr a n s p a r e n c y,  a n d  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e
Transparency and public service are some of the key dimensions and 
indicators for peace-building and democracy development in post-conflict 
regions. Post-conflict local elections are a strategic part in the election and 
leadership shift processes, which definitely becomes the first and main step 
of governing (Mastruzzi, et al. 2010). Furthermore, how far the elected lead-
ers who are entrusted with the development of public policies and decisions 
which are not only accountable but also can implement the government in a 
transparent manner and provide public services in an effective manner. The 
last-mentioned two things are key dimensions of good governance (Mastruzzi, 
et al. 2010).
In the post-conflict Aceh context, it must generally be admitted that 
transparency is still hard to find; public access to public service is still a rare 
product, although it does not mean that there is no public services at all. The 
services exist but are still far from people’s expectations.11 Important points 
can be seen in some statements of the following informants.
I think, related to public services, or public service sector, the current gov-
ernment is not serious or does not understand. For instance, regarding the 
SPM (minimum service standard) agenda and the like. They do not apply 
the minimum service standard seriously. And we feel that, for instance, 
in some service providing units the services do not run well. This is what 
we experience in community health center, sub-district office. I look at 
the government vision. The government has a political background and is 
filled with former combatants. They don’t understand the problem even 
though it is the responsibility of the local government.12
A group of unprofessional people enter infrastructure world and impose 
their will to win tends, then in Aceh many office heads were hit. Many 
auction committee heads were terrorized only because the unprofessional 
people want to win. No open tender, nor transparent and open recruitment 
of government employees or office positions.13
Based on the experiences of the informants above, the post-conflict public 
service in Aceh seems not to be fully good and needs many improvements. 
The sources of problems may vary such as absence of political will of the 
public officials to provide public services or lack of understanding among 
the public officials. Besides that, the issue of transparency needs special at-
11 Interview with former GAM negotiator, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
12 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
13 Interview with one of the senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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tention. Many tender processes of post-conflict construction projects were 
not conducted in a transparent and open manner. Particular groups that are 
assumed to have network with the government often impose their will to win 
tenders. They can even beat a particular office employee who does not want 
to win them. It was emphasized by an Aceh Traditional Council chairperson, 
“Now it is not, you are close, there is KKN, there are family members, how 
come? We try by ourselves.”14 Recruitment of office positions is still much 
dominated by nepotism and closeness factors.
Transparency of employees is considered as far from the good governance 
standard, and of course, far from the expectations of many Acehnese people. It 
is hard to find transparent recruitment procedures and process for employees 
and officials. In this relation, a peace activist in Aceh emphasized,
Good governance and especially transparent recruitment does not exist. All 
is the same between before and after the conflicts. But in the post-conflict 
situation the people have many more accesses to jobs and opportunities 
and are free to go anywhere.15
The problem of transparency is seemingly not a typical post-conflict condi-
tion problem. It means, this problem occurred frequently before. Therefore, it 
can be said that in this context there is almost no change at all. The different 
condition is only the access to jobs and wider freedom in the post-conflict 
period.
Actually, post-conflict public service problem becomes one of the home-
work of Aceh Provincial Government. The problems of public transparency 
and public service often blame the capacity and vision of the existing human 
resources.
I see the same. The previous regent in Bireuen did not understand public 
service affairs. More or less the same. It is too far, if compared with Ja-
karta, Solo. Our district is still left behind. Because of what? The capac-
ity and vision and understanding of the local government is still low for 
those affairs. They still believe that this political position should be man-
age politically. Sharing of development’s cakes and the like. What will it 
become? And this is actually the same with what happens in some other 
districts in Aceh.16
Public service in Bireuen district is believed not to have met the people’s 
expectations yet. It is still almost the same with the previous regent’s lead-
ership, and not so different from other districts in Aceh. The capacity and 
14 Interview with Aceh Traditional Council Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
15 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
16 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
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knowledge of the public officials on good governance is still low. Many of 
them think that their positions are political ones, so that they must be man-
aged politically by prioritizing their political groups and coalitions rather than 
public interests and needs. The condition is also confirmed by one of the 
women activists that stated, “They must obey the interests of certain parties 
instead of the interests of the public.”17
The bureaucratic reform program launched by the Aceh government is 
actually a form of awareness to improve the quality of public service and 
bureaucratic transparency. Unfortunately, bureaucratic reform has not been 
implemented yet seriously in various districts. Besides that, the problem is 
not in the agenda, but in the placement of the right and competent people to 
carry out the tasks. The program exists, including the program to deal with 
unemployment, but the execution and implementation are nothing at all.18
Lastly, the dynamic political constellation in post-conflict Aceh has in-
vited community elements to often compare the performances of both Aceh 
governors Irwandi Yusuf (2006-2011) and Zaini Abdullah (2012-2017), espe-
cially on the transparency and public service. Some informants shared their 
testimonies and experiences on the leaderships of both governors as follows. 
Comparison of both periods is almost the same. However, the Irwandi 
period had fit and proper tests in the recruitment and office position tender 
processes. So, in general governance is better during Irwandi’s period; and 
in Zaini Abdullah’s period it is completely nothing at all and tends to be 
closed. Despite fit and proper test, in Irwandi’s period the test was not 
serious and only became a camouflage.19
It was far better in Irwandi’s period; many people believe that. For the cur-
rent government, I haven’t seen it yet. Many programs from Irwandi’s era 
are continued by the current government. JKA has a new name as JKRA. 
But the problem is on the management.20 
Irwandi’s era was very good. Now it has gone. Another quality of Irwandi 
is that he conducted tender of official positions. It does not exist any-
more. He placed an advertisement in Serambi newspaper. Any Acehnese 
who wanted to become Aceh officials were welcomed to register. All was 
through tender. Acehnese from universities and outside Aceh came. They 
were screened and selected to be office heads. Even though he still used 
Baperjakat records, Irwandi recruited many Central Aceh people. That’s 
17 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2012.
18 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
19 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
20 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
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not conducted any longer. Whatever Irwandi did is rejected by the current 
leadership.21
Irwandi’s government is better. The current bureaucracy has not improved 
yet. We hope he who has been in Europe (Zaini Abdullah—ed.) can im-
prove good governance. Mr Irwandi knows people in the districts better. 
Officials were once selected through fit and proper test. Not any more 
now. The change in officials is more frequent than it used to be.22
If various statements above are learned more deeply, in terms of program 
and transparency, it is clear that the majority of informants believed that 
Irwandi Yusuf leadership era is relatively better than that of Zaini Abdul-
lah. In general, Irwandi Yusuf ’s leadership is considered more open through 
fit and proper test mechanism that he used to recruit public officials, even 
though some parties thought the mechanism were less serious. Besides that, 
public service during Irwandi’s time is regarded as better especially related to 
the JKA (Aceh Health Insurance), which is renamed as JKRA (Aceh People 
Health Insurance) in Zaini Abdullah’s era. The JKRA program management 
is believed to be poor. With these all considerations, many parties conclude 
that at macro level the governance during the Irwandi Yusuf period is better 
than Zaini Abdullah. Apart from debates on the transparency in the periods 
of both governors, at macro level it must be admitted that based on the In-
donesia Governance Index (IGI) in 2012 (p. 67) Aceh local government got 
a score of 3.39, which means poor.
c .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n s  a n d 
Po l i t i c a l  Pa r t i c i p a t i o n
Political participation is one of the important variables of the successful 
post-conflict local elections, and also an important dimension in solidifying 
domains of election and leadership change in the good governance. Even 
political participation is believed to be one of the important connectors in 
the relation between a state and civil society, beside citizenship and political 
culture (Sherman & Kolker 2000, p. 145-162). In general, political participa-
tion is defined as various forms of mechanisms for the public to express their 
opinions with the goal of influencing political decisions (Orum 2001). In 
the context of this study, such participation is seen and limited more to the 
voting in the post-conflict local election rather than all forms and hierarchy 
of political participation.23
21 Interview with one of the senior journalists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
22 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh Chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
23 Form and hierarchy of political participation includes taking political positions, looking for 
similar positions, active membership in an organization, passive membership, political pseudo-
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In the context of post-conflict local elections in Aceh, political participa-
tion is generally considered good. Political participation tends to be stable at 
around 70 percent. Nevertheless, some informants saw the decreasing partici-
pation in the two post-conflict local election periods. 
I think it decreases. Why? People expect general election would bring 
better change. If so, it declines here. It keeps on reducing in relation to 
the government. Corruption. Officials who don’t provide service. Poor 
bureaucracy.24
Honestly speaking, the people are apathetic already. When the 2006 hope 
was broken. In 2006 people were enthusiastic. Five years after that, we saw 
a decrease. The number of golput [not participating] voters was high. The 
people put too high hope of change and of the elected people. When the 
hope is not realized, the people think like this: our people who lead us, 
why the pattern is like strange people?25
Learning from the above statement, there is a perception that political 
participation experience decrease between the 2006 and 2012 post-conflict 
local elections. Some factors are believed to be the causes. Firstly, the level 
of public trust to public officials drastically drops. In the 2006 post-conflict 
local election, the Acehnese people hoped better change. Unfortunately it did 
not materialize. Even worse than that, the behaviors and performance of the 
public officials are not better than before, especially in relation to corruption, 
bureaucracy and public service. The people feel that”... what happens is that 
we get out from crocodile’s mouth and get into tiger’s mouth.”26 There is no 
difference between the leaders from former combatants and non-combatants.27 
Public disappointment can be understood if we refer to the basic drive of the 
Acehnese people to choose local party, namely their closeness to the offered 
figures and legislative candidates, security factor, as well as symbol of fight 
against the pressure of the central government that has not granted the rights 
of Acehnese people yet, in relation to the sharing of mining products.28
However, another informant who is a DPRA member has an opposite per-
ception. He thought that participation is not only stable but also experiences 
an increase in the 2012 post-conflict local election. Similarly, the composition 
of voters is believed to increase especially the participation of young voters 
active membership, general meeting, hearing, demonstration, informal general meeting, and voting. 
See Anthoni Orum (2001). Introduction to political sociology. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
24 Interview with one of the former BRA-Aceh Chairpersons, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
25 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
26 Interview with former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
27 Interview with one of the DPRA members from Golkar fraction, Banda Aceh, 28 October 2014.
28 Interview with one of the researchers on peace building in Aceh, Jakarta, 29 January 2015.
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from senior high school.29 However, based on the KIP (Election Independent 
Committee)’s official data, the participation of Acehnese people in the post-
conflict local elections does decrease. In the 2006 post-conflict local election, 
the participation reached 79.9%, and in the 2012 post-conflict local election, 
it decreased to 76.6%. If analyzed more deeply by looking at the real number 
and increase of the number of voters in the Permanent Voters List (DPT) of 
2012 post-conflict local election, the decreasing number can be said to be quite 
significant. In 2006 post-conflict local election, the number of voters in DPT 
was 2,632,935 people and those who used their voting rights were 2,104,739 
people. Therefore, the total number of those who did not use their voting rights 
was 528,196 people. In the 2012 post-conflict local election, the number of 
voters in DPT was 3,453,703 people and those who used their voting rights 
were 2,453,703 people. Therefore, the total number of those who did not use 
their voting rights was 1 million people. In other words, the decline in the 
number of participation in the 2012 post-conflict local election is almost twice. 
There are various reasons that encourage the people to participate in both 
post-conflict local elections. Firstly, the people want to participate again be-
cause they feel to get benefit in various forms, both from a leader or a par-
ticular party. The forms may vary including road construction, infrastructure 
construction, financial incentive, etc. Secondly, they want to participate be-
cause they feel acquainted with or have relation with particular candidates or 
party.30 Thirdly, they want to participate because of pressure and intimidation 
from a particular party. For this group, participation is expected to bring a 
sense of security. The choice tends to be given to the dominating party.31 
Fourthly, participation is due to mobilization by particular people or group 
and not fully an initiative from the voters themselves. In other words, their 
participation is more passive.32 
Apart from various motivations and reasons for people’s participation, vari-
ous problems that need to be considered concerning the participation is that 
in the conflict period people come to TPS (Polling Stations) is caused more 
by fear, especially of the government, while in the post-conflict period, they 
are more driven by the sense of trauma and fear, especially if a particular 
party (Aceh Party) lost in their area.33 Political education and socialization is 
also very minimum, especially in villages. Consequently, participation tends 
to be passive and commodified. Many of voters participate and vote for par-
ticular people based on requests or instructions from charismatic figures such 
29 Interview with DPRA member from PKS fraction, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
30 Interview with one of the former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014.
31 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
32 Interview with one of the women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
33 Interview with one of Aceh Panwaslu expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
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as tengku or teuku, and particular village heads.34 However, the government 
effort to improve the condition is considered less maximum yet.35
d .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d  R u l e  o f  L a w
Rule of law is one of the important variables in the democracy develop-
ment and peace-building in post-conflict regions (see Kumar 1998). In the 
perspective of governance, rule of law is one of the important dimensions as 
prerequisite for good governance.36 In the macro context, rule of law is not 
only a foundation of democracy but also one of the important characteristics 
of a democratic state, beside the minimum and legal use of force, repre-
sentative government controlled by constitution and impartial bureaucracy, 
existence of various centers of power, access and channel to public decision-
making, etc (Sherman & Kolker 2000). In this relation, Weber emphasizes 
that law which is established based on common agreement contract (nature of 
rule), is an impersonal instrument of state authority. Therefore, rule of law will 
by itself support the standing of a democratic state (Majumdar & Singh 1999). 
So far rule of law in Aceh is believed to be far from people’s expectations. 
Many of the Acehnese people still feel disappointed with the law enforcement 
conditions in Aceh, especially in the post-conflict local election implementa-
tion, as stated by some informants:
I see that law enforcement factor is a huge problem because there is no 
law enforcement process. So there is an impression of condoning violence 
perpetrators and terrors. But on the other hand, the police probably do not 
want their strict attitude or policy to influence political dynamics which 
can change this condition just like before. So they have a strong reason. 
One of the reasons is to maintain the peaceful process.37
Political socialization and education are very low. All are conducted in a 
formal manner and no impacts on the society. The negative thing is there. 
Law certainty is absent.38
That’s the failure of law implementation. That’s all. Law enforcer should 
follow up one incident; who is the perpetrator and take concrete actions. 
Well, that will not be completed there. We can see partiality so that the 
national Indonesian police needs to come here. Why not the local police? 
Why we need national Indonesian police? The national police will not 
34 Interview with one of former GAM spokespersons, Banda Aceh, 25 June 2014, and with one 
of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
35 Interview with one of Aceh Panwaslu expert assistants, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
36 See more details PB (Policy Brief)-National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS), The Habibie 
Center, Edition 08/November 2014.
37 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
38 Interview with one of the peace activists in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
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let the perpetrator go free. Omission, you can interpret it. I see this as a 
failed rule of law.39
Various statements above emphasize that the rule of law condition still dis-
appoint people a lot. Various violence and terrors that accompany post-con-
flict local election processes tend to be omitted. Often times what people dub 
as”omission” occurs. This intrinsically means an intention. In this regard, rule of 
law is believed to be one of the failures or even weaknesses that need improving 
for the advancement of democracy development and peace-building in Aceh.
The police, especially the Aceh local police, become the target of criti-
cism of all the failed rule of law in Aceh. The roles of security elements are 
deemed to be still weak. Various analyses are mentioned by the people. One 
of the causes that are believed to be weakening the roles of the police is the 
appointment process of the Aceh police chief through DPRA and on the 
approval of governor, as regulated in Law No. 11 Year 2004. The process is 
regarded as very vulnerable to “bargaining” which can weaken the position 
of security personnel.40 As also emphasized by an informant who said, “Law 
No. 11 Year 2004; of course there is political deals. ‘Don’t mess with me. If 
you do, I will propose another one”. 41 
Settlements to some violent cases related to the post-conflict local election 
implementation are also deemed unfair and tends to be political. If violence 
perpetrators are announced and judged before the post-conflict local elec-
tion, the condition will become a pressure for a certain party and cause the 
reduction of the party’s votes—in this context generally referring to Aceh 
Party (PA).42 Thus, the method is by buying time of arrest and court until 
the completion of post-conflict local elections. However, the many of the 
court processes end up only in superficial actors, instead of the masterminds.43 
Another factor related to the bad law enforcement is a technical issue. Law 
violation, especially in post-conflict local election, is difficult to follow up 
due to the fact that many of the reporters do not want to witnesses or with-
draw. Many people fear intimidation, pressure, violence and other action even 
though law enforcement is always based on proofs and witnesses, as stated in 
the testimonies of some informants:
If we do something, there are reports from them. 31 people reported on 
frauds, organizers, intimidation, hidden campaigns. Just like that. But 
when we want to confirm, we make report to Banwaslu; when confirmed 
to Banwaslu, they are afraid. That happened, bro. No one wants to be a 
39 Interview with former GAM negotiators, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
40 Interview with Governor’s Expert Assistant for Politics, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
41 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
42 Interview with Sabang Panwaslu commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
43 Interview with Governor’s Expert Assistant for Politics, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
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witness. Legally speaking we should have proofs and witnesses, where we 
see that and all those things. Then, it is over at last.44
They feel very afraid and worried because there are cases of shooting. So 
the people get worried. And that applies to all areas in Aceh? But, it is 
hard for us to get a kind of testimony because someone wanted to confess 
but did not want to be a resource person or witness and many of these 
cases are reported to the supervisory committee (Panwas) because nobody 
wants to be witness.45 
It is clear that the main obstacles in the law enforcement against various 
violations and violence related to post-conflict local election are the fear and 
reluctance of the people or reporters to become witnesses. It can be assumed 
that people or reporters that become witnesses often get pressure, threats and 
intimidation, which to a particular extent can threaten their own and their 
family’s safety. However, if analyzed more clearly, the cause of their reluc-
tance to witness again to security elements is weak. People are reluctant to 
become witnesses more because of the absence of security certainty given by 
the security elements. 
The problem not only ends with the reluctance of the public and CSOs to 
become witnesses of various post-conflict local election violations. Panwaslu 
(election supervisory committee) itself is considered to fail in the settlement 
of various post-conflict local election violations even though the case becomes 
one of their main tasks, as criticized by an informant below. 
Even according to my experience, Panwas (supervisory committee) cannot 
do anything against the violations in the post-conflict local election. In 
2012 they could not do anything. I was part of the selection team for the 
election supervisory committee, and most of the old personnel joined. I 
asked why with so many violations only one case, the Batubo destruction 
was tackled. What about murder, torture, shooting? There are no reports 
on them. That means they are powerless. They don’t dare to.46
In other words, many violations occurred in post-conflict local elections 
in Aceh. However, it is deeply regretted that the Panwaslu itself is considered 
to fail in conducting their main task to guard post-conflict local elections, 
even it is deemed powerless and afraid to settle various violations. In general, 
it is known that in conflict areas, general election organizers such as KIP and 
Panwaslu tend to be the target of intimidation.47
44 Interview with one of the former Aceh KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
45 Interview with one of the local Bireuen NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
46 Interview with Governor’s Expert Assistant for Politics, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
47 Interview with Sabang Panwaslu commissionaire, Sabang, 30 October 2014.
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The absence of law handling on a violation case brings ripple effects, 
namely repetition of other law violation cases. Absence of sanctions against 
law breakers has made other parties tempted to repeat and/or carry out the 
same thing. Firm sanctions must be imposed both on the people and post-
conflict local election-participating political parties that do violations such 
as violence, intimidations, terrors, etc and on various levels of post-conflict 
local election organizers that commit frauds, partiality, etc. 
Besides that, other important problems related to rule of law is discrimina-
tion in Aceh as revealed in a testimony by an informant that took a case of 
the Islamic Sharia implementation in Aceh.
Unmarried couples from security elements, free. If they come from or-
dinary people, they will be whipped. Many Sharia violators are official 
functionaries. But why are they left free? They can go free. Yesterday, the 
violator is the adjutant of Banda Aceh Mayor. That person was free. The 
people see the Sharia is just a game. So, the state’s law and religion is the 
same. People do not trust legal rules. So, that’s it. I see the formulation is 
already mismanaged and the implementation is discriminatory.48
Law enforcement in Aceh still tends to be discriminatory, “sharp down-
ward but upward blunt”. Nevertheless, this may be not a typical problem of 
Aceh but the macro/national problem of Indonesia. In the context of Islamic 
Sharia law implementation, some violations done by security personnel or 
officials are never processed legally and the perpetrators are free. However, if 
the violators are ordinary people, they will be whipped or sentenced in jail.
I I .  M A L U K U
a. Post-Conf l ict Loca l Elect ion, Accountabi l it y and Corruption 
One of the important goals of the implementation of post-conflict local 
elections in Maluku is to get “new” accountable leaders that are acceptable 
to all the people (legitimate), and are not involved and/or do not commit 
any corrupt actions. Particularly, the new leaders are expected to bridge both 
communities that were fighting in the conflict period namely Moslem and 
Christian communities. In the previous subchapter it is explained that one of 
the positive developments or trends that occurs in the post-conflict democracy 
development in Maluku is the election of leadership that is not based “fully” 
on variable of identity both tribe and religion. Indirect effect of the develop-
ment is that many elected leaders both legislative members and local leaders 
have so far been accepted by the people or communities whose religion is 
different from them, as emphasized by an informant.
48 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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In general they are accepted, but we don’t know it for detail. However, in 
a personal discussion, even though they accept a person as a leader, but the 
person is not their choice. Especially, if the leader is from their community. 
The community will just accept the person. Or maybe in the case of the 
current governor, both communities tend to accept him.49
He is really a figure that really wins the people’s heart, is close to people 
and works well. He wins the heart of the people living in isolated areas. 
Especially if the leader does not commit any KKN practices and many of 
the programs are good.50
The main factor of a person to be elected and accepted by the communities 
is hard work and can wind the people’s heart by being close to the people and 
developing policies and programs that make the people prosperous. Another 
important factor to be considered is that the leader is not involved in KKN. 
Another factor is the ability to stand between Christian and Moslem com-
munities.51 In particular, the evaluation is given to the current governor, Said 
Assagaf, a Moslem, who tends to be widely accepted by the Maluku people, as 
emphasized by a Christian informant, “Yes, we have to elect him because we 
don’t think about religion, but it is about his skills and capacity and experience 
in bureaucracy, so we have to choose the people like that”.52
Accountability of post conflict public authority is very much dependent 
on how the leader can realize the promises in the campaign. Disappointment 
often occurs with the elected candidates, but then they forget their constitu-
ents so that the people feel that they have only been used for their advantage.53 
Furthermore, public acceptance to their leaders is also related to the capacity 
of the leaders in carrying out tasks and responsibilities, besides their behaviors 
that are close to the people, good and free from corruption.54 Maluku people’s 
satisfaction to post-conflict new authority is relative. Particular communi-
ties may be very satisfied, while other communities are not so satisfied,55 as 
revealed by an informant.
Yes, many people are less satisfied, less satisfied. Why? Because when 
they become leaders, they don’t care about their constituents, the ones 
that elected them. They don’t think about them anymore. Less attention. 
49 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
50 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014, and 
Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
51 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
52 Interview with Christian refugees coordinator, Ambon, 23 June 2014.
53 Interview with riot victim in Waringin on 11 September 2011, Ambon, 23 June 2014.
54 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
55 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institute) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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People say like this: “It is useless that we chose them, because after they 
reach the top, they forget us.”56 
Once again, satisfaction and the level of acceptance of an elected leader 
through post-conflict local election are relative and subjective. In other words, 
in the context of Maluku, the level of legitimacy or acceptance of the leader 
is still different between one community segment and another.57
Another thing to be considered is a critical evaluation on the accountability 
of performance of the leaders elected through post-conflict local elections. 
One of them is the absence or not much change in the improvement in the 
mentality and character of the current leaders:
This still requires decisions, but not many substances have been made. No 
significant changes. There is change in mentality that tends to prioritize 
the interest of their group and families, change in the character of leaders 
that are not corrupt.58
I feel sorry to almost all the candidates of local leaders in Maluku and 
those who have become local leaders. Why feeling sorry? Their intention 
is not for accomplishment. Their vision is materials-oriented; that does 
damage the region. At last- I am sorry- local government “officials” in 
Maluku do not generate any accomplishments.59
Spotlight is also addressed to the behavior and character of officials or 
leaders that are considered to prioritize the interests of their group, party or 
family. As leaders, they are expected to prioritize the interests and prosperity 
of the general public.60
Besides that, the criticism is also aimed at the corrupt behaviors of the 
officials. This point of view is definitely not aimed to generalize that the 
majority of the leaders in post-conflict Maluku are corrupt. At least the 
statement assumes corrupt behaviors by the leaders. This fact is not only 
confirmed by the Maluku political elites, especially in the post-conflict lo-
cal election implementation,61 but also by the people.62 Corruption problem 
is believed to be widespread in Maluku, even more open and frank in the 
post-conflict period. Massive corruption is assumed to break out especially 
after many post-conflict construction projects in Maluku. In the projects, 
56 Interview with Central Maluku Panwaslu, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
57 Interview with Maluku printed media journalist, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
58 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairs, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
59 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
60 Interview with King Suli and one of the Latupati Council committee members, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
61 Interview with Maluku PDIP elite, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
62 Interview with Central Maluku figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
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many developmental funds are taken illegally, as revealed by some infor-
mants below.
Corruption is massive. Now it is more open than before the conflict. More 
open. KKN is widespread.63
But if we analyze variables of governance in general, for instance corrup-
tion and law enforcement, they remain unmoved. Law enforcement to 
corruptors remains unmoved. Then, for instance, there are findings from 
Maluku Provincial BPKP and inspectorate that identify state’s loss due to 
corruption. Many cases.64
Sometimes we find our officials make use of conflicts. For instance, people 
say when many projects come to Maluku there will be many corruptions. 
But, after the post-conflict local election, such transaction is common. 
There are many law enforcements against corruption problems. For me, 
the post conflict era, the corruption is massive but there has been no in-
tegrated corruption eradication.65
Unfortunately, law enforcement and corruption eradication have so far 
not met the people’s expectation. Corruption becomes massive after the con-
flict not only through funds of post-conflict reconstructions as assumed by 
informants, but also through funding of various post-conflict local election 
processes. In other words, after the conflict there is degraded governance in 
Maluku, especially related to corruption. 
Many party cadres or leaders failed in the following election due to cor-
ruption case.66 Besides that, in general the officials do not have significant 
accomplishments or success as leaders, and use many negative ways when 
registering their candidacy. These negative ways may include use of thugs, 
intimidation and inter-religious or inter-tribal division.67
b .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n , 
Tr a n s p a r e n c y,  a n d  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e
In general Maluku local government realizes the importance of good gov-
ernance and particularly the weakness in the transparency issue. Based on the 
2012 Indonesia Governance Index (IGI) (p. 76), in relation to the government 
transparency, the Maluku local government gets score of 2.88 which means 
poor. Therefore, the Maluku local government has so far been trying hard 
63 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairs, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
64 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 June 2014.
65 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 
22 August 2014.
66 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
67 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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to carry out improvements related to transparency especially transparency 
in the recruitment of employees or public officials. Some statements of the 
informants below describe the condition.
So I think, this Maluku, it is time to do improvements? There are 8 areas 
of changes that we are implementing, starting from the rules. We have 
changed the governance process. The accountability is now more transpar-
ent. And we improve the management and I think slowly but surely. The 
hard thing is one, namely mindset.68
In my opinion, it is getting better day by day. The Ambon City Govern-
ment, for instance, in their website, we can access various things including 
financial management. But as far as the people can access it, I think the 
government should be wise too. Opening something to the public must 
have good consideration.69
As emphasized by Maluku local government through its Bappeda (local 
development and planning agency) and Kesbangpol (national and political 
unity) unit, that the local government has made many improvements related 
to the transparency of employees and management as well as the quality of 
public service. The progresses of such improvements are confirmed by the 
people. Some of the community elements admitted that there are improve-
ments in the public information transparency. For instance, much information 
on Maluku local government can be accessed through their website, especially 
related to the finance, budgeting, public services, etc. however, some other 
segments doubted and even criticized the transparency issue in Maluku. This 
condition may be caused by different dimension and perspective of evaluation 
as emphasized by some informants below.
Transparency in government affairs has not existed yet. With the indica-
tor of transparency, the local revenue has not been publicized. That is the 
right of the people to know. They have this right in the DPRR as called 
budgeting. That’s the rule and it must be open to the public. But it does 
not exist yet. So it is not transparent. In the employee recruitment all the 
project tenders are just engineered, but it is hard for us to prove it.70
I am supporting the participatory approach. For instance, we don’t see 
transparency in the region. It is very poor.71
68 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014, and with Maluku Bappeda, 
Ambon, 27 August 2014.
69 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
70 Interview with one of the mass media journalist and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 
22 August 2014.
71 Interview with one of the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith Institution) Directors, Ambon, 22 August 
2014.
89L O C A L  E L E C T I O N ,  G O V E R N A N C E ,  A N D  P E A C E - B U I L D I N G 
Transparency in the government is believed not to have fully recovered, 
instead of saying that it has not existed yet. One of the indicators of the 
absent transparency is the unpublished Maluku Local Revenue (PAD). Criti-
cisms are also directed against the process of employee recruitment which is 
still considered less transparent. Similarly, many project tenders are deemed 
to have been engineered in such a way. Lastly, the spotlight is also given to 
the Maluku development planning process which tends to be less participa-
tory (bottom-up). Many development programs are planned behind the desk 
instead of directly visiting people in the field. In this context an informant 
emphasized:
But let’s say they go down to the field. They must to learn well what is the 
people condition after the conflict because what they will do will impact 
on the community. Rather than, they make programs based on what they 
have in the office, within their environment.72
In response to the criticisms related to the recruitment of public officials, 
the Maluku local government emphasized that they have used the principle of 
transparency in the recruitment process by informing to the public through 
Maluku local government website and explain in details all the necessary 
requirements. The step is taken especially to avoid any suspicions or clashes 
in the society. If there are people who fail, we can prove it through the exist-
ing system.73 Related to this, some of the people think that the provincial 
recruitment is relatively good in the aspect of transparency, but this has not 
applied to the district level such as in Central Maluku and SBT (Eastern 
Seram), and SBB (Western Seram).74 One of the highlighted real cases is the 
dismissal of 10 employees by SBT regent because they were part of the old 
regent’s regime.75 However, access to information in general is more transpar-
ent after the conflict compared to before the conflict. For instance, if there is 
a case or problem made by an official, the information will be disseminated 
quickly to mass media.76
Responding to various attention to public officials without competency 
who are recruited by the governor and based on tendency to show gratitude,77 
Maluku local government through Kesbangpol and Bappeda emphasized that 
the selection was the governor’s prerogative right and it has been conducted 
through open discussions where journalists could observe. In general the 
72 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
73 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
74 Interview with one of Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
75 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum) Chairs, 25 August 2014.
76 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
77 Interview with one of the mass media journalist and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014, and with one o the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
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governor determines public officials based on two key factors, namely com-
petency and loyalty, and also based on the power sharing element although 
it must sacrifice competency.78
In the context of public service improvements, the particular attention 
of Maluku local government is the mindset of public officials. Many public 
officials have the mentality of ‘waiting’ or acting passively. The level of initia-
tive and creativity is still considered low. The particular spotlight is directed 
to the culture of being served instead of serving the society. The Maluku 
local government realizes that the change in the level of mentality definitely 
requires a long process. The change is already there, but not significant yet.79
In term of public service, Maluku local government has conducted a break-
through in the form of public service performance dissemination program 
aimed to motivate the SKPDs’ officials to work optimally. The applied method 
takes the form of reward and punishment system. Reward is given to SKPDs 
that are considered to be competent in and good at providing public services. 
The reward can also take the form of award or even job promotion.80 The 
public service dimension can be said to receive much more appreciation from 
the people than the dimension of transparency in public information and 
employee recruitment as stated by some informants below.
Yes, in general for the province and Ambon city and some areas, the public 
service affairs have run relatively well.81
Not anymore. The charge will occur depending on those who manage it, 
but in general the head emphasizes there is no charge. Yes, the arrangement 
process is quick, like yesterday with the ID card arrangement. So far the 
Mayor has been warning that bureaucracy should be genuine. But we don’t 
know what happen in the field but it is fairly good. No more difficulty 
that prevents the arrangement process.82
In Ambon city, it has been running well. When we go to a sub-district 
health center, we are served. The point is that it runs well and it is a suc-
cess. We must give appreciation to Ambon, for instance.83
The above statements at least shows public satisfaction related to public 
service in Maluku, even though the judgement is relative. Particularly, the 
good public services taken as an example is the ID card arrangement and 
78 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014, and with Maluku Bappeda, 
Ambon, 27 August 2014.
79 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
80 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
81 Interview with one o the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
82 Interview with riot victim in Waringin on 11 September 2011, Ambon, 23 June 2014.
83 Interview with Maluku printed-media journalist, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
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health service in sub-district health center. Of course there will always be 
different judgements from other society segments that have different experi-
ences in the public service. Interestingly, there is a gap between the people’s 
and government’s claims on public service improvements. Meanwhile, the 
local government often claims that they have done many improvements and 
advancement of public service quality. The people or public tend to think 
the opposite.84
Besides the aspect of public satisfaction, there are some critical evaluations 
that need to be considered for the future public service improvements. The 
critical evaluations are conveyed by some informants below.
Sometimes because of limited professionalism, eventually the quality of pub-
lic service is sacrificed. The important thing is that public service is available, 
but the more important thing is to provide quality public services.85
We have friends and younger brothers. So if we want to get things done 
quickly, we can contact them. Everything is the same but we can be priori-
tized. So, here the full service is not done well yet. Sometimes, people get 
mad too saying that I came first, but why does this person get served first.86
In the province, it is already better. In Ambon, it is good. In the districts, 
it is not maximum yet especially in the districts that are far from the 
provincial capital city.87
Based on the above statements, we can conclude that the main problem 
in the context of public service in Maluku is related to (1) competency and 
professionalism of public service providers that need improving—as a result, 
often times service quality is sacrificed; (2) discrimination in public service 
provision—someone who has family relation or friendship is often given prior-
ity; (3) there is a gap in public service between Ambon city and other cities/
districts, especially those far from Ambon—public services in the regions are 
considered not maximum yet.
c .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d 
Po l i t i c a l  Pa r t i c i p a t i o n
Political participation is one of the key indicators for the successful post-
conflict local election and democracy development in general. In the context 
of Maluku, political participation in the post-conflict local election is gener-
84 Interview with Central Maluku figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
85 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
86 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
87 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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ally considered to be relatively good. Some informants shared relatively similar 
opinions and emphasized that the participation is quite good.
The people have the freedom to vote, openness and comfort. There are 
no pressures. It is more enjoyable now. The people enjoy it more. But it 
is up to them.88 
The participation is good. People went in the campaign they are involved. 
They were invited to discussions we held. They raised questions to the 
candidates, etc.89
Participation in the post-conflict local elections in every district in Maluku 
and the province is 75%. 75%. 75%...so for those in Maluku is 75% with 
fairly high participation.90 
Based on the official Maluku KPAD data, political participation in the 
2013 post-conflict local election was 71.74% in the first round and decreased 
drastically by 66.92% in the second round. In the first round the number 
of voters in the Permanent Voters List (DPT) was 1,185,661 and those who 
used their voting right totaled 850.632. In the second round, the number of 
voters in the DPT was 1,177,694 and those who used the voting right totaled 
788,208.91 Compared to the participation in the Maluku gubernatorial post-
conflict local election in 2008, which was at 76.78%, the participation in the 
2013 post-conflict local election had a decline. In the 2008 post-conflict local 
election, the number of voters in the DPT was 963.519 and those who used 
the right were 739,750 (BPS 2012).
In reality, the high political participation is accompanied by the feeling of 
freedom and comfort in determining choice or giving votes. It can be said that 
there is almost no significant pressures nor intimidations found. Pressures are 
only found in particular isolated areas such as SBT.92 Probably the condition is 
caused by excessive enthusiasm after the proliferation as a new district.93 More 
than that, political participation is not only limited to giving votes, but also 
in the involvement in campaigns, public discussions, political education, etc. 
however it must be admitted that most of the political participation is limited 
to giving vote only.94 Theoretically speaking, the condition can be regarded as 
general reality in the political participation pyramid (Rush & Althoff 2003).
88 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
89 Interview with one of the Women NGO activists, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
90 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
91 KPUD Maluku
92 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
93 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
94 Interview with Central Maluku figure, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
93L O C A L  E L E C T I O N ,  G O V E R N A N C E ,  A N D  P E A C E - B U I L D I N G 
Then the question is which factors encourage the people to participation? 
To know various motivations behind the participation, it is important to look 
at the opinions and judgements of some informants below:
The wrong leader wins but cannot control peace, the situation will be 
chaotic. For instance, a fanatic leader such as in a particular religion, he 
assumed top position, the region may be in confusion. Another aspect 
is that because they know the leader. For instance, the leader knows me 
and familiar with me. So if the person does not participate in, then I will 
arrest the person.95
They go to TPS (Polling Station) because they want to vote for someone. 
That’s it. So who will be the leader is the person the people like and 
know.96
The candidate is nominated based on the affiliation to the party. Affili-
ation from the same region. Then the figure. About the program I think 
the people do not quite understand on the programs; it is only for the elites 
who understand that. So I think because of the desire to carry out change, 
then the general election becomes the means.97
From various statements above it can be concluded that various factors influ-
ence the political participation of the people. The first one is the public aware-
ness on the elected leaders, especially in relation to peace-building and pro-peo-
ple development. The people are afraid if the elected leader is somebody which 
is considered wrong and even harm the peace.98 Secondly, the knowledge on 
track record of a candidate. Thirdly, the candidates are considered to be famil-
iar.99 Next is an affiliation to parties, regions, tribes or even extended families/
kinship.100 Fifthly, there is awareness on the duty as citizen to participate and 
join it. Lastly, there is a desire to a change in Maluku, in which post-conflict 
local elections are deemed as the most strategic facilities to realize the change.
The opposite question is why some of the people do not want to participate 
or apathetic? First, it is because a name of a person in DPT is not registered. 
In this case, the person did not bother himself to process or register his name. 
Secondly, because there is a perception that anyone who is elected as leader 
will not bring a significant impact on the life of voters. If the person is a driver, 
anyone who is elected, this person will still become a driver. Thirdly, the factor 
95 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
96 Interview with one of the Maluku Panwaslu commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
97 Interview with Maluku KPUD chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
98 Interview with one of the Maluku FKUB (Interfaith Forum), 25 August 2014.
99 Interview with King Mamalat, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
100 Interview with one of the Maluku LAIM (Interfaith Institution) Directors ), Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
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is related to the time and business of a person that cannot be left behind.101 
Lastly, the factor is related to the lack of information on post-conflict local elec-
tion due to poor socialization especially among the people who live on islands. 
Poor political socialization on islands territory becomes a particular spotlight 
because it is not supported by proper funding.102
One of the unique phenomena related to political participation in Maluku 
is the identification of the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) with 
the Christian community, even though explicitly PDIP is a nationalistic party. 
Moslem community tends more to be divided into various parties. Besides 
that, the awareness and participation of Christian community are considered 
stronger. There is stronger togetherness among Christian communities to choose 
candidates nominated by PDIP.103 Besides that, traumatic aspect following the 
1999 conflict has not fully disappeared. In the post-conflict local election situ-
ation, in which political temperature is boiling and tension is high, Christian 
community feel worried to come to Moslem areas; and the opposite.104
d .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d  R u l e  o f  L a w
It is widely known that law enforcement is the foundation of democracy 
development. Moreover, in the context of post-conflict local election, rule 
of law is one of the important variables and indicators to evaluate the level 
of success (see Kumar 1998), and one of the good governance domains (see 
Mastruzzi et al. 2010). Related to the focus of the study, how has the condi-
tion of post-conflict rule of law in Maluku been so far?
In post-conflict Maluku, the rule of law has so far, despite being relatively 
conducive, been not in accordance with the people’s expectations yet, as re-
vealed by some informants below.
Yes, more careful. We need to look at the law enforcement again. There 
are many general violations. Violators are well handled, they have been 
seriously handled. Sometimes in driving vehicles, for instance, people do 
not bring their driving license.105 
More cases are still pending. Many corruption cases are pending. We push 
them. Abraham Samad has been here…. There are not many cases of theft 
and violence. A chain of thefts occurs.106
101Interview with riot victim in Waringin on 11 September 2011, Ambon, 23 June 2014.
102 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
103 Interview with one of the Maluku MUI chairpersons, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
104 Interview with one of the mass media journalists and former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
105 Interview with Maluku Bappeda, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
106 Interview with one of the Maluku LAIM (Interfaith Institution) Directors ), Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
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If observed from both statements from the perspectives of the Maluku 
local government and community figures above, there seems to be a kind 
of agreement that law enforcement in post-conflict Maluku has been quite 
good, especially related to crimes. The main problem in the law enforcement 
in Maluku has been so far related to major cases especially related to two 
communities, corruption and law enforcers.107
The first problem is related to law enforcement to some major cases that 
tend to be sensitive due to involvement of two communities, Christian and 
Moslem. Some of the cases are not well resolved due to some reasons. An 
informant explained:
The stab of Kudamati driver in Waihaong has not been revealed yet now; 
ojeg rider in Benteng village, we don’t know what happened. The police 
must reveal all of these; what happened? What triggered September 11 
conflict? Even though the local police chief is from Waihaong, until now 
in the traffic in Waihaong, Kudamati vehicles cannot pass through. So, 
the pubic expectation to the police is still weak. It means that the people 
hope for more transparency; what happened should be revealed especially 
to the police.108
The case with major highlights was the stab of Kudamati driver (Christian 
area) in Waihaong (Moslem area). The next was the death of Darwis Saiman, 
a motorcycle rider of Waihaong. Darwis’ death allegedly caused by traffic 
accident triggered suspicion from both communities. Rumors said Darwis 
who was Moslem was killed by Christian community. Poor treatment of 
the cases triggered a bigger riot on September 11, 2011, which claimed 3 
lives and injured 24 people heavily (NVMS-THC 2013). The concern is the 
unsuccessful legal aspect revelation of the September 11 riot. This is worried 
that this will become a bad precedent of law enforcement. In this context, 
police performance received many criticisms. Even one of the Maluku figures 
emphasized that “public satisfaction with the police with scores from one to 
ten, the scoring is at the satisfaction level of 4.”109 Of course, this must be a 
particular attention in the law enforcement improvement agenda in the future 
and the promotion of sustainable peace in general.
Maluku local government through its legal bureau admitted that the riot 
case was not settled although it should have been settled well by consider-
ing the interest of peace-building in Maluku. The reason for the failed law 
enforcement of the case is more technical, namely absence of legal proofs for 
107 Interview with one of the peace building and democracy development NGO activists, Ambon, 
18 November 2014.
108 Interview with one of mass media journalists and also former regent candidate, Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
109 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
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processing. This reason has generated many critical spotlights to the police. 
The Legal Bureau admitted that the unsettled case handling could be a bad 
precedent with possible repeated similar cases in the future.110
The next critical evaluation is related to rule of law in the corruption 
field, which at a certain level remains unmoved or is not much addressed. 
Corruption is believed to be fairly massive in Maluku, and even tends to be 
more dominant in post-conflict era. Some informants shared their concerns 
below:
Law enforcement against these corruptors remains unmoved. Then, for 
instance, findings of indication on state’s loss are due to corruption from 
Spoktorat and BPKP. There are hundreds of thousands cases of the city 
development.111 
It is not too perfect because again information is not too clear in Maluku 
and the central level so that this make the law enforcers here not too 
serious because they know that the central level does not know it. So, 
sometimes here law enforcers do not settle the cases. I think the current 
law enforcement like ATM. There are many in the newspaper but people 
say there are few law enforcements.112
One of the future law enforcement focuses should be aimed at corruption 
handling, although the problem is a national one, and it must be admitted 
it is not typical of Maluku. Corruption cases become everyday meal in the 
newspaper. But unfortunately, massive coverage on corruption is not paral-
lel to the reality of law enforcement. The spotlight is mainly aimed at law 
enforcers who are regarded as less serious and playful due to being far from 
central-level monitoring or KPI in Jakarta. It is not surprising if the general 
public has been so restless with corruption condition in Maluku and hopes 
that KPK can directly go down to Maluku.113 An alternative to control cor-
ruption whose rule of law is believed to remain unmoved is through the power 
of CSO (Civil Society Organizations) in Maluku, both through mass media, 
universities, and NGOs or other community organizers.114
For Maluku local government, in order that the law enforcement run 
better it is necessary to have synergy among various stakeholder. Inter-stake-
holders synergy has so far not fostered yet. The Stakeholder includes Local 
Police, Local Military Command, Justice, Local Government, etc. if some of 
110 Interview with Maluku Legal Bureau, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
111 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
112 Interview with one of the Moslem academicians, Ambon, 22 August 2014.
113 Interview with one of the Maluku LAIM (Interfaith Institution) Directors ), Ambon, 22 
August 2014.
114 Interview with one of the Unpatti academicians, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
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stakeholders can collaborate and gain public support, it is predicted that law 
enforcement will predictably run far better.115
e .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n ,  G o v e r n a n c e , 
a n d  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g  i n  A c e h  a n d 
M a l u k u :  C o m p a r a t i v e  A n a l y s i s
In the context of post-conflict accountability, the Acehnese society feels 
that the elected authority has not met their huge expectation. The current 
widespread public opinions are that the leaders from non-GAM and former 
GAM are no difference, or the same. Based on the Indonesia Governance Index 
(IGI) in 2012 (p. 67), in the area of accountability, the Aceh local govern-
ment gained a score of 3.79, which means poor. Qualitatively, the evaluation 
is caused by some factors, namely elected authority (1) who are believed to lie 
much and not break promises, (2) have more tendency to enrich themselves 
than think about making people prosperous, and to a particular level, tend 
to be considered being greedy, (3) do not want to listen to the voice and as-
piration of the general public, (4) do not make many changes, (5) do many 
violent actions.
Meanwhile, the post-conflict government accountability in Maluku can 
be accepted by some segments of Maluku people. More than that, there is a 
tendency when a leader can be accepted by communities outside his religion 
or tribe. Some reasons for a leader not being accepted by the people is the 
leader’s tendency to prioritize the interest of his/her group’s interest party and 
family rather than the interest of the public. Based on the 2012 Indonesia 
Governance Index (IGI) (p. 76), in terms of accountability, the Maluku local 
government gets a score of 5.15, which means medium. So the post-conflict 
government accountability in Maluku tends to be better than in Aceh. In 
relation to corruption, both regions relatively similarly experienced the prob-
lem. This is strengthened by the weak law enforcement in corruption area, 
as seen in the Table 12.
Public transparency still becomes a problem and object of many criticisms 
in Aceh, both transparencies related to the recruitment of public officials and 
project tenders and finance of the Aceh local government. Many post-conflict 
construction project tender processes are not conducted in a transparent way. 
Seldom are found transparent recruitment procedures and process of officials 
or officials, except in the period of Irwandi Yusuf with his fit and proper test 
that is removed in the era of Zaini Abdullah. Based on the 2012 Indonesia 
Governance Index (IGI) (p. 67), the Aceh local government got a score of 
3.39 for its government transparency, which is poor, while the Maluku local 
government, based on the 2012 IGI (p. 76) got a score of 2.88, which means 
115 Interview with Maluku Bappeda, Ambon, 27 August 2014.
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poor. The Maluku local government admitted the weaknesses in the trans-
parency issue; and therefore, they try to carry out improvements especially 
in relation to the transparent recruitment of employees and management as 
well as quality of public service through the official Maluku local government 
website. However, it cannot be avoided that there are still many criticisms 
from the public which are aimed to the recruitment process of employees and 
project tenders because they are considered less transparent. Therefore, the 
condition of transparency in both regions tends to be almost similarly poor. 
Based on the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index (IGI) (p. 16), the rate of ac-
countability aspect for provincial local governments across Indonesia tends to 
be better than the accountability aspect.
Table 12: Accountability and Corruption Conditions: Comparative Analysis
Province Accountability 
condition 
Causal factor Corruption
Aceh •	Elected authorities 
have not been able 
to meet the huge 
expectation of the 
Acehnese people so 
far yet.
•	No difference be-
tween the leaders 
from GAM and 
non-GAM.
•	Tend to be poor.
•	Much considered not to keep 
promises.
•	More tend to enrich and prioritize 
themselves.
•	Not willing and cannot listen to 
the voice and aspiration of the 
public. 
•	Do not make many changes.
•	Commit many violent ways.
•	Corruption 
tends to be 
massive.
•	Law enforce-
ment is con-
sidered week.
Maluku •	Particular segment 
of the society can 
still accept.
•	There is tendency 
to accept authorities 
in different com-
munity.
•	Tend to be medium 
or better.
•	Tend to prioritize the interest of 
group, party or family more than 
the public.
•	Corruption 
tends to be 
massive.
•	Law enforce-
ment is con-
sidered weak.
In relation to public service, the Acehnese society considers the public 
service in Aceh does not fully meet the expectation. Some problems can be 
identified related to this matter, namely the absence of political will of public 
officials to provide public service, poor capacity and knowledge of public of-
ficials, as well as gap of public service between Banda Aceh City and outside 
Banda Aceh. Comparatively, the Maluku local government has attempted 
many improvements to enhance public service quality. These efforts specially 
refer to reward and punishment system. Reward will be given to SKPD that 
is considered competent and good at providing public service. The reward is 
also aimed to the improvement in the mindset of Maluku public officials so 
that they are proactive in providing public service. Some criticisms are aimed 
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to the improvements in public service in Maluku, namely (1) competency 
and professionalism of public service providers need improving; (2) there is 
still discrimination in providing public service; (3) there is still gap in public 
service between Ambon city and outside Ambon, especially in the areas quite 
far from Ambon. Table 13 gives a summary of the condition of transparency 
and public service in both provinces.
Table 13: Condition of Transparency and Public Service: Comparative Analysis
Province Condition of Transparency Condition of Public Service
Aceh •	Many post-conflict construction 
project tenders are not carried out 
in a transparent way.
•	Government finance (budgeting) is 
not transparent.
•	Recruitment process of particular 
employees or officials is not trans-
parent, especially in the Irwandi 
Yusuf ’s era (2006-2011).
•	Tends to be poor.
•	Still not fully meet public expecta-
tions.
•	Absence of political will among 
public officials to provide public 
service.
•	Poor capacity and knowledge of 
public officials.
•	There is gap in public service be-
tween Banda Aceh city and outside 
Banda Aceh.
•	Tends to be poor.
Maluku •	Recruitment of employees is be-
lieved to be still not transparent.
•	Project tenders are also considered 
not transparent.
•	There is awareness of the local gov-
ernment on the poor transparency.
•	Still tends to be poor.
•	Competency and professionalism of 
public service are still low.
•	Local government’s programs take 
the form of reward and punishment 
system for public service improve-
ments.
•	There is still a gap of public service 
between Ambon city and outside 
Ambon.
•	Relatively medium with various 
improvements.
Related to the political participation in the post-conflict local election, 
Aceh and Maluku provinces share the score with almost similar reduction 
dynamics. Overall, political participation in the post-conflict local elections 
in both regions is relatively good, namely 79.9% (2006) and 76.6% (2012) in 
Aceh, as well as 76.78% (2008), 71.74% (first round in 2013), and 66.92% 
(second round in 2013) in Maluku. From the numbers it can be seen that 
political participation experiences a decrease. Some factors are assumed to be 
the cause of decreased participation in Aceh, namely reduction in the level 
of public trust to public officials due to absence of changes expected by the 
people as well as the behaviors and performance of public officials which are 
not considered better than the previous ones, especially related to corruption, 
bureaucracy and public service issues. In Maluku, the decrease is more sup-
ported by a common perception that anyone elected to be leaders will not 
bring many changes to the life of the poor people, lack of information on 
post-conflict local election due to poor socialization especially to the com-
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munities living on islands and other technical problems such as someone’s 
name being not registered in the DPT (Permanent Voters’ List), business or 
jobs that cannot be skipped, etc.
Related to the motivation of participation in Aceh, several factors can be 
identified, namely (1) having enjoyed benefits beforehand, including road 
construction, financial incentives, etc., (2) Feeling acquainted or having rela-
tion with particular candidate or party, (3) pressure and intimidation from 
certain parties, (4) mobilization done by particular individuals or groups. In 
the context of Maluku, the factors include (1) public awareness on policies to 
be taken by elected leaders, especially policies related to post-conflict peace-
building, (2) knowledge on track record of a candidate, (3) the candidate are 
regarded as familiar, (4) affiliation to party, region, tribe, or even kinship/
extended families, (5) awareness on obligation as citizens to participate, (6) 
desire for change in Maluku, in which post-conflict local elections are con-
sidered the most strategic means.
In Aceh, the people still feel disappointed with the existing law enforce-
ment condition, which is believed to be still worrying especially in the 
post-conflict local election implementation. Various violence and terrors 
accompanying post-conflict local election processes tend to be ignored. The 
absence of law enforcement against a violation case has ripple effect in the 
form of repeated cases of other law violations in Aceh. In the context of 
Maluku, even though in general law enforcement is relatively conducive, it 
has so far been considered not to meet the public expectation yet. Gener-
ally, law enforcement against crimes is relatively good. Many criticisms are 
aimed to law enforcement against corruption which at a particular level is 
considered to remain unmoved, and against major cases, especially Septem-
ber 11 riots. Table 14 presents the condition and dynamics of participation 
in Aceh and Maluku.
Law enforcement problems in Aceh relating to the role of security per-
sonnel are also still considered weak. Many law violations, especially in 
post-conflict local elections, tend to be ignored. One of the causes which 
is considered to weaken the role of police personnel in Aceh is the process 
of appointment of Aceh Police Chief that must go through DPRA and on 
the governor’s approval, as regulated in Law No. 11 Year 2004. The second 
thing is reluctance of reporters of law violations to become witnesses due 
to absent security guarantee. Even election organizers, KIP and Panwaslu 
tend to be the targets of intimidation. The last is law enforcement in Aceh 
still tends to be discriminatory, sharp downward, blunt upward, especially 
related to Islamic Sharia which is much considered to discriminate women. 
The law enforcement problems in Maluku generally include cases that 
involve variables of religion or race and corruption, and weak security 
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personnel. Generally, law enforcement runs relatively well after the peace, 
especially related to criminal problems. However, both provinces are still 
considered very weak in law enforcement against corruption. Table 15 
summarizes the condition and challenges of law enforcement in Aceh 
and Maluku.
Table 14: Condition and Dynamics of Political Participation: Comparative Analysis
Province Level of 
Participation
Motivation of 
Participation
Dynamics and Challenge of 
Participation
Aceh •	 In 2006 post-
conflict local 
election was 
79.9%.
•	 In 2012 post-
conflict local 
election was 
76.6%.
•	Relatively 
good.
•	Already enjoyed ben-
efits beforehand, in-
cluding road construc-
tion, infrastructures, 
financial incentives, 
etc. 
•	Feel acquainted or 
have relations with 
particular candidates 
or party. 
•	Pressure and intimida-
tion from particular 
parties.
•	Mobilization done by 
particular individuals 
or group.
•	There is tendency in reduction 
between 2006 and 2012 post-
conflict local elections.
•	Various causes of decreased 
participation:
1. Reduced level of public 
trust to public officials due 
to absence of the expected 
changes;
2. Behaviors and performance 
of public officials who are 
not considered better from 
the previous ones, espe-
cially related to corruption, 
bureaucracy and public 
service.
Maluku •	 In 2008 post-
conflict local 
election was 
76.78%.
•	 In 2013 post-
conflict local 
election (first 
round) was 
71.74%.
•	 In 2013 post-
conflict local 
election (sec-
ond round) 
was 66.92%.
•	Relatively 
good.
•	Public awareness on 
policies to be taken by 
elected leaders, espe-
cially policies related 
to post-conflict peace 
building. 
•	Knowledge on track 
record of a candidate.
•	The candidate is con-
sidered familiar. 
•	Affiliation to party, re-
gion, race, or kinship/
extended family.
•	Awareness on obliga-
tion as citizens to par-
ticipate.
•	Desire for change in 
Maluku, in which 
post-conflict local 
election is regarded 
as the most strategic 
means.
•	There is tendency in the de-
crease between the 2008 and 
2013 post-conflict local elec-
tions.
•	Various causes of decreased 
participation:
1. Public pessimism about 
better changes;
2. Lack of information on 
post-conflict local elections 
due to poor socialization, 
especially to the people 
living on islands;
3. Other technical problems 
such as someone’s name 
being not registered in 
DPT, business or jobs that 
cannot be skipped, etc.
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Table 15: Condition and Challenges of Rule of Law: Comparative Analysis
Province Condition of Rule of Law Challenges of Rule of Law
Aceh •	Law enforcement against viola-
tion and violence in post-conflict 
local elections tends to be less 
satisfactory to various parties.
•	Role of Aceh local police and in 
general security personnel is still 
considered weak. 
•	Law enforcement is still consid-
ered to tend to be discriminatory.
•	Not deal with corruption prob-
lems very much.
•	Reluctance of reporters of law 
violation to become witnesses due 
to absence of security guarantee.
•	General election organizers (KIP 
and Panwaslu) tend to be the tar-
get of intimidation.
Maluku •	Law enforcement is relatively 
good, especially in relation to 
crimes.
•	Not deal with corruption prob-
lems very much.
•	 Inclusion of variable of religion in 
particular law violation s such as 
the September 11, 2011 riot case 
in Waringin.
C H A P T E R  V
Post-Conflict Local Election, 
Institutional Infrastructure 
and Political Dynamics 
The concept of institutions discussed in this chapter is a system of norms or 
particular opinions which formally describe procedures and are organized to 
reach a goal.1 Scott (2012), by a perspective of new institutionalism,2 defines 
institutions as a group of regulations, normative values and cultural-cognitive 
elements related to activities and resources in order to implement stability, 
and have a significance to the social life. The perspective of new institution-
alism not only looks at the institutional roles and functions, but also the 
social dynamics within them. Institutionalism does not refer to one unit of 
particular group of units, but also to social relation system among organized 
units. The units are conceptually called association. Association functions 
to mobilize the system of opinions in institutionalism. But, to facilitate the 
understanding of the empiric reality, the concept of association in this dis-
cussion will be called “institutions” while the ongoing procedural system is 
called “institutionalism”. Thus, institutionalism of post-conflict local election 
is a system that regulates how the people at the local level (province and 
city/district) can access the power in a political manner through a particular 
mechanism. The institutionalism of post-conflict local election has a set of 
formal regulation and general norms recognized by the people and influenced 
by a local cultural context. Technically, an institution cannot run by itself. 
Every activity of an institution is influenced by another institution. Similarly 
in the institutionalism of post-conflict local election, there are particular units 
in another institutionalism which is probably formally not directly related to 
the mechanism of post-conflict local election, for instance traditional, social, 
religious institutions, and others, but has contribution in the ongoing post-
conflict local election system. 
1 Horton and Hunt (1999), concisely emphasize that “Institution is a system of norms to reach 
a goal or activities that the people consider important, or, formally, a set of habits or conducts 
related to a human main activity.... institution is always a system of ideas or behaviors that are 
organized within the behaviors.”
2 Is a new perspective of seeing an institution. Is a development of old institutional perspective 
(institutional approach). The perspective sees how institutions must be inclusive to collective 
interests (Scott 2012: 56).
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In post-conflict regions, an institution has its own characteristics. Insti-
tutional process in post-conflict regions can be seen through the concept of 
democratic conflict governance (Susan 2009, p. 128, 214). Democratic con-
flict governance regulates the mechanism for existing actors and institutions 
to create inclusive politics with democratic values-based governance intended 
to create and maintain peace. Post-conflict local election institutions in post-
conflict regions must be designed based on the principle in order to maintain 
peace stability. Post-conflict local election institutions in post-conflict regions 
must be able to accommodate interests of various groups inclusively in term 
of power authority resource, so that reconciliation among previously-fighting 
groups can be generated.
Disputes about control over resources are one of the triggers of conflicts; 
similarly it applies to power. In post-conflict regions disputes about control 
over resources may become motives for elites to mobilize masses by using 
memory of old conflicts for obtaining power. This situation can recreate 
instability. Therefore, post-conflict local election institutions in post-conflict 
regions must be designed to accommodate interests of various groups in an 
inclusive manner. Institutions are formed in such a way to create distribution 
of power among many groups of interests within the social system. This is 
done in order to prevent one group from ruling in a government, because if 
that happens, the group tends to be despotic to the people, which may gener-
ate new conflicts (Heslin 2006). 
I .  A C E H
a .  R e a d i n e s s  o f  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n  I n s t i t u t i o n 
Post-conflict local election agency is an association or key unit to carry 
out post-conflict local election system. The agency that is responsible for 
the implementation of post-conflict local elections, starts from the planning, 
implementation, supervision, voting through result determination phases. In 
the context of Aceh, the implementation is regulated in Law No. 11 Year 
2006 which is supplemented by Qanun3 Aceh No. 5 Year 2012. The post-
conflict local election organizing agencies in Aceh structurally are different 
from organizing agencies in other provinces. The implementation function 
is conducted by an agency called Election Independent Commission (KIP), 
while the supervisory function is conducted by Election Supervisory Com-
mittee (Panwaslih). Based on the prevailing rules, organizing agencies in post-
conflict local election implementation in Aceh can structurally be explained 
in Picture 2 as follows:
3 Qanun is a special term that refers to local regulation (perda) in Aceh.
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Picture 2: Implementing and Supervisory Functions
Implementing Function
Provincial KIP Aceh Panwaslih
District/City KIP District/City Panwaslih
Subdistrict Election 
Committee Subdistrict Panwaslih
Voting Committee Field Election Supervisor
Voting Organizing Group
Supervisory Function
1. Independent Election Commission (KIP)
Aceh KIP is the main institution that is authorized in carrying out general 
elections in Aceh. Historically, the discourse of KIP formation for the election 
of local leaders is regulated in Law No. 18 Year 2001 On Aceh Governmenth. 
In 2001 the discourse of KIP establishment evolved. But due to conflict con-
dition, the institution that was formed specially to organize direct election 
of local leaders in Aceh was realized in 2004. In 2009 KIP was officially 
dissolved into one with Aceh Provincial KPU, but still uses the name of KIP. 
Structurally KIP is part of the National General Election Commission. In 
term of authority, Aceh KIP is equal to provincial KPU. Aceh KIP office is 
currently located in Jl. T. Nyak Arief, Kompleks Gedung Arsip Banda Aceh 
(Picture 3). 
Many parties see that in terms of administration and general technical 
matters the implementation of post-conflict local elections in Aceh has run 
accordingly. However, KIP as the organizer is regarded as less independent in 
carrying out the tasks. Their position is believed to be biased in favor of the 
interest of the dominant group in the Aceh political context. This is caused 
by the fact that in the KIP recruitment system, candidates must be proposed 
and selected by the Aceh Local House of Representatives (DPRA). Conse-
quently, rumors saying that when selected, the candidates will tend to bring 
the interests of the dominant group in DPRA occur.
The process of selection of election committees is not fully democratic 
because of intervention from particular parties that impose their will. So, 
that will make bias in the political interest enter the selection process. 
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That’s the problem. So, the people who enter the institution are those that 
meet their interests. I think this has harmed our democracy at present.4
In my opinion the problem is because KIP is selected by the Aceh House 
of Representative. The district KIP is selected by the District Legislative 
Council. This is cooptation. And now, there is Aceh Party on board. So, 
the interest of Aceh Party willy-nilly is in ….. even KIP is now very visible.5
This issue becomes very strong in the Aceh society. However, the problem is 
that there is no legitimate evidence yet on the rumor. KIP gets less legitimacy 
from some of the society as a neutral institution. A socio-political observer 
cum former GAM combatant and political practitioner in Aceh sees that the 
problem lies in the space for cheating in the existing recruitment system. The 
dominant party in Aceh DPRD can recommend candidates for KIP members 
according to their interests. Thus, the proposed candidates are expected to side 
with them in post-conflict local election and win the candidates nominated by 
the dominating party. The condition may create instability in the society. The 
level of people’s trust in KIP institution is very low. Apart from the verification 
of the non-neutrality, the system that imposes the formation of KIP through 
DPRA triggers a perception that KIP commissionaires vulnerably side with the 
interests of the dominant group in DPRA. This perception eventually changes 
into a public rumor in a view of the fact the dominant parties in DPRA are the 
local parties that have less good reputation in the society. 
Picture 3: KIP (Independent Election Commission) Building, Aceh
4 Interview with Director for Center for Studies on Peace and Conflicts in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 
23 June 2014. 
5 Interview with one of the former Aceh Provincial KIP commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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Another important thing to analyze is the socialization of general election 
education for the Acehnese people. KIP chairperson admits that this program 
is very crucial due to the fact that the public awareness on general election 
is still very low. However, to realize it, KIP as the organizer feel to find ob-
stacles with regard to very low budget funding. The poor understanding on 
the general election education gives impact on the behaviors of the people 
who still want to accept money politics and regard the general election as 
less important.
It’s fair. The implementation is fair. The phases are fair. But when we talk 
about dissemination how can we say it is done fairly well or not quite well? 
So, how should we view? The impact is that the people can easily be inter-
viewed; people are easily involved in money politics, and then some people 
feel “I do not need post-conflict local election.” The second and the fourth 
had. The upper middle class people decided to escape from post-conflict 
local election so that they have gone to Jakarta long before post-conflict 
local election, bought air tickets with their families to Jakarta, to Medan 
or other destination. That’s the impact because they do not know about 
general education. It was as if the election would force them to vote for 
the local leader candidates nominated by a political party.6
Another challenge is related to the human resource in the election organiz-
ing agency at the grass root level, such as Sub-district Organizing Committee 
(PPK), Voting Committees, down to Voting Organizing Groups (KPPS). The 
capacity of the committees’ knowledge at the grass-root level is very poor in 
the aspect of understanding of regulations and technical implementation. 
Besides that, their profession that is not only organizing committee makes 
them not fully concerned to learn technical rules. Most of them believe that 
profession as committee is only a side job. The honorarium they get is be-
lieved very low so that many people are less interested in becoming committee 
members at the grass root level. It seems that profession for some people is 
taken in order to supplement the income only. This of course causes many 
problems such as unregistered people in the DPT and other problems related 
to the procedures for TPS organizing that are not in accordance with the 
rules. Actually, as implementers they are the front-line executors in the post-
conflict local election process. 
The second challenge is, let’s imagine we have to admit that election or-
ganizers at the village level like KPPS, PPS and PPK are those with senior 
high school educational background on average. Then, with only one time 
budget, what can we do to give technical guidance to them. What can 
6 Interview with Aceh Provincial KIP Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 27 October 2014.
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we hope from the human resources with average high school background 
under one-time budget allocation for technical guidance? How can we 
expect them to be perfect?7
2. General Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslih)
General Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslih) is an institution that 
functions to carry out supervision on the general election implementation. 
The goal is that the general election can be realized according to the prevail-
ing procedures. The Panwaslih is regulated by special low on Aceh namely 
Law No. 11 Year 2006. The task and authority as general election supervisory 
agency is only valid during the governor and mayor/regent’s elections.8 The 
agency is ad hoc and active for three months during the post-conflict local 
election. Panwaslih that changed into General Election Supervisory Body 
(Bawaslu) in the national election occupied the building of and used facili-
ties of Bawaslu in Jl. Arakundo I Guece, Kompleks Banda Aceh (Photo 4).
Photo 4: Aceh Bawaslu/Panwaslih Building 
Similarly with KIP, Panwaslih commissionaires are selected and elected by 
DPRA. The condition makes the people believe less in Panwaslih. The people 
consider Panwaslih as partial implementing institution. Panwaslih is often 
believed to ignore various fraud actions. Apart from the evidence verification 
that Panwaslih is not neutral, like KIP, the Panwaslih recruitment mechanism 
through DPRA also creates suspicion on the tendency of Panwaslih to side 
with the dominant party in DPRA.
Even though we cannot ensure it, but I am not sure if they are more 
neutral because there is political element in it, right? For instance, when 
7 Interview with Aceh Provincial KIP Chairperson, Banda Aceh, 27 October 2014.
8 For national election, both legislative and presidential elections, supervisory institution remained 
to be called Panwaslu with different system from that of Panwaslih.
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today, we are recruited by Bawaslu, we do not owe any gratitude to the 
recruiters. If for instance you are in DPR, you are from a particular party. 
When we both become members of Panwas (supervisory committee) that 
you recruited, I am not sure I dare to enforce law. That explains why viola-
tions are not followed up.9
Another thing that becomes the problem of Panwaslih is the lack of author-
ity in handling the existing cases. One of the challenges is structural. No law 
enforcers’ element within Panwaslih is believed to cause less maximum and 
quick law enforcement against violations in the field. Mechanism and proce-
dures for violation handling force Panwaslih to report to related parties such 
as attorney office or police through Gakkumdu10 along with strong evidences. 
Panwaslih cannot directly take action against the violators in the field. If they 
have to wait, often times the violators cannot easily identified again so that 
the case will be unresolved. Therefore, many parties feel that involvement of 
law enforcing elements within the supervisory body is very important. 
The supervisory committee (Panwas) is powerless nowadays. I think so. 
It cannot execute case directly. So not all things from the past are bad. 
Just go back to the old days, in which supervisory committee has law 
enforcing elements. There should be police officers, prosecutors. When 
they have taken an action against a case, who dares to give money if the 
person has been handled? So, today again I am talking about improving 
the regulations.11
... So far in Bawaslu (Panwaslih), violations must be reported first. Is the 
general election safe or not? The one that deals with general election is the 
police and attorney office when Bawaslu (Panwaslih) have some reports of 
violations. Why Bawaslu (Panwaslih), Why are we often mad at Bawaslu 
(Panwaslih)? Because in the old days, Bawaslu (Panwaslih) were still one. 
But now, Bawaslu stands alone, sir. Like this: there is a violation, “Wait a 
second. I am taking a bath now.” Not good. Bawaslu (Panwaslih) is also 
not loyal. There are no campaigns in Bawaslu.12
Besides that, the ad hoc status that will end after three months makes 
Panwaslih unable to build a strong network that can support their job. This 
network is deemed very important by some parties as part of investigation 
related to the supervisory activities done. The 3-month structural official 
9 Interview with Sabang City Panwaslu, Sabang, 30 August 2014.
10 Gakkumdu (Integrated Law Enforcement of General Election) is a collective forum consisting 
of election supervisors, police, and attorney office to discuss general election’s criminal violation 
cases. Quoted from www.rumah pemilu.org.
11 Interview with DPRA Fraction A member from non-Local Party, Banda Aceh, 28 October2014.
12 Interview with intelligence subdivision of Aceh Local Police, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.
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period makes them only able to conduct formal procedural supervision dur-
ing the election implementation period. Indeed, they cannot carry out deep 
investigation in the short period. Another problem related to the lack of 
quality human resources within the supervisory committees at the grass root 
level, such as sub-district and village level supervisory committees. They are 
considered to have limited understanding of the technicality and regulation 
related to their tasks as post-conflict local election supervisors.
3. Local Government
Local government in the post-conflict local election institutional perspec-
tive is the main vehicle in the post-conflict local election implementation. The 
main goal of post-conflict local elections is to get local government leaders, 
both at the provincial and city/district levels. Ideally, the government can 
support post-conflict local election implementation fully by implementing 
agencies in their respective regions. The support can take the form of budget 
resource through Local Government Budget (APBD), infrastructure, security 
and others. Explanation in this section will focus on how far is the readiness of 
Aceh local government in the post-conflict local election implementation. The 
intended local government is the local government beside election agencies.
In the institutional perspective of post-conflict local election, the role 
of local government must be neutral.13 Local government has no right to 
do any interventions. However, in the post-conflict local election imple-
mentation in Aceh the local government is believed to be not neutral by 
some parties. Local government tends to side with one of the dominating 
parties which by coincident is dominant in the government, to maintain 
their status quo. This indication is identified in the DPRA institution. 
As explained before, in the prevailing laws, DPRA has the role in elect-
ing KIP commissionaires and Panwaslih members. In the commissionaire 
recruitment process, many parties found some indication of partiality due 
to closeness to commissionaire candidate with the dominating party in 
DPRA. It has a goal in which the implementing institution will later pri-
oritize the interest of the dominant party. This partiality indication can be 
seen from the less transparent recruitment process based on the majority 
votes which of course are dominated by the dominating party.
Yes, it’s huge. Today, in Aceh, today in Aceh, last time, yes the last period 
when we elected KIP members for this election. Yes, in that period, the 
candidates were elected, selected by Commission A. and our anatomy, 
Aceh DPRA has the majority membership from the local party. So that 
13 Richard Scott (2012) identifies regulations and norms become some pillars that build 
institutional elements.
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elected KIP members on average are the ones close to DPRA and know 
them.14
Another problem is related to the role of security elements which is be-
lieved less maximum in the law enforcement. In some violent cases related to 
post-conflict local election, the police personnel is considered by some par-
ties to conduct omission. This omission is believed to be as the form of local 
police chief ’s partiality to a candidate. Of course this has made people’s trust 
to security personnel low. Another data shows that the challenge in handing 
general election violation cases is more caused by the existing system. The 
system obliges Panwaslih to report to the police through Gakkumdu, while 
Gakkumdu must learn first whether the case falls under the category of their 
authority. If not, the case should be forwarded to the General Criminal In-
vestigating Division. This system makes the case handling less responsive. 
Besides that, the due date of reporting time, namely five days since the inci-
dent also makes many cases unable to be handled. The deadline is deemed 
to be too short, given the fact that reporters need fairly much time to collect 
evidences first.
This Gakkumdu must handle cases which can help me. There is agree-
ment on the cases that can be handled by Gakkumdu. Not all cases, 
even though they are not related general election. If the examination is 
calculated, and Gakkumdu is considered less competent, it will be swiftly 
settled and taken to the court; being taken over. There is regulation on 
what to be handled Gakkumdu. Reporting a case, if it is already more 
than 5 days, it cannot be accepted.15
4. Political Parties
Political parties are community institutions that have the goal of obtain-
ing power.16 Political parties also have a role in collecting and simplify so 
many aspirations of the people into one vehicle. Therefore, political parties 
are important actors in a democratic system. In Law No. 12 Year 2008 
article 56 explains that even though candidates of local leaders and the 
deputy are individuals, political parties or a group of political parties can 
propose candidates that will participate in the competition of post-conflict 
local election. Therefore, the influence of political party’s interest is very 
14 Interview with DPRA member of Fraction A from non-local party, Banda Aceh, 28 October 
2014. Informant is one of the judges in the selection and election of provincial KIP and Panwaslih. 
15 Interview with Sub-Division of Intelligence of Aceh Local Police, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.
16 Profesor Miriam Budiarjo (2008: 403-404) believes that “political party is an organized group 
whose members have same orientation, values and dreams. The goal of the organized group is to 
get political power and win political positions (usually) through constitutional ways to implement 
the program.”
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strong. Similarly in Aceh, readiness of political parties in the political dy-
namics is very important to be analyzed further. Characteristics of local 
political parties in Aceh which are the transformation of separatist move-
ments aggravate the complexity of competition among them. 
Generally, the capacity of cadres within the party is considered very low. 
Cadres are recruited just before the election so that there is no sustainability. 
The implication is that the function of political education by parties runs less 
maximally. So far cadres have only been trained on the ways to get power, 
while education on the democratic values is still minimum, even though it is 
very important to maintain political stability. 
Political party should be like a school. At school the national cadres learn 
about politics, not only power. How can we educate people from political 
party so that they feel that they are Indonesians? But here the goal is how 
to get a position, not for education. Some of them play with money. This 
is not good. It does not provide education on political party. It should be 
like a school of politics, not only how to get power, but how to do good 
politics.17
Cadres are also recruited just before general election. We know the capac-
ity of the cadres. So it is impossible to entrust our hope to these political 
parties in Indonesia.18
Socialization on political education is deeply required to teach democratic 
values to the members. The goal of political parties is to get power, but 
democratic values are very important to be internalized so that the ways to 
get power are in line with the principle of democracy. The fact is that vio-
lence is still much done by members who are affiliated to political parties 
such as success teams, supporters, and political party’s cadres. The SNPK’s 
data identify that most of violent incidents related to elections of provincial, 
district and city official positions are conducted by those affiliated to political 
parties (Graph 8).
The data above shows that most of the violence is conducted by those af-
filiated to political parties. Based on the data, it can be said that the function 
of political parties in mediating conflicts through democracy channels is not 
maximal yet. Political parties are still unable yet to control their masses well. 
Some of the violence also occur due to competitions among local parties in 
Aceh.
Of all provinces in Indonesia, Aceh has a uniqueness as the only region 
that has local parties. This is one of the conflict resolution implementation 
17 Interview with one of the Aceh IAIN professors, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
18 Interview with one of the Democracy NGOs in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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in the Helsinki peace agreement. These local parties occurred around 2008, 
and are dominated by former GAM combatant elites. Two local parties that 
have dominating force in Aceh are Aceh Party (PA) and National Aceh Party 
(PNA), but recently there is a new party in the government, namely Aceh 
Peace Party (PDA).
Graph 8: Actors Identified to Conduct Violence Related to Elections of Provincial, 
City and District Official Positions in Aceh Province 2005-2014 (n= 263)19
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Local parties are formed to accommodate people’s political aspirations 
and to fight for Acehnese interests. But for some local parties, it seems that 
the democratic values have not been realized fully. One of the parties is Aceh 
Party (PA). The memory of old-time struggle is still implanted in the PA ideol-
ogy, so that it is deeply focused on fighting the unrealized points of Helsinki 
Agreement such as government regulation on Aceh authority, flag raising, 
local symbols, etc. The unrealized points of Helsinki agreement have made 
the PA elites think that GAM struggle has not finished yet. The Government 
of Indonesia is believed intentionally not to meet those points.
For instance, there is devolution of central authority to Aceh in 6 cases. 
We know the 6 cases, right. I think the urgent thing is the government 
regulation of Aceh authority. In the regulation, Aceh can govern itself 
through qanun and its own governance, or local symbols, and also with 
any form of government. Then, there should be government regulation 
on oil and gas in which the central government and Aceh will manage it 
together. As said in the forum, Aceh does not know exactly the income 
from oil and gas. We are just given the portion. This month’s portion is 
seventy percent.20
The elites of PA claim as the parties that have the legitimacy from the 
people to fight for the Aceh freedom. PA is the evolution of GAM to continue 
19 National Violence Monitoring System (SNPK), dalam www.snpk-indonesia.com
20 Interview with one of the Aceh Party cadres, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014.
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the unfinished struggle. Aceh should not be cheated by the Government of 
Indonesia as previously. They think that the Government of Indonesia has 
long cheated Aceh with promises given since the independence period until 
now. The realization of Helsinki agreement is believed as the product of 
GAM’s services that did fights so that Aceh gets its special status from the 
Government of Indonesia. Therefore, PA as GA representation thinks that 
PA is the only party that has the rights to get the right for authority seats of 
power due to its past-time services. 
Actually we are more oriented to Aceh. I think all Acehnese people are 
committed to reaching the desired dreams, by looking at the goal of the 
current democratic political goal. All components of Acehnese people are 
still committed. From the agreement between both parties, to fight for 
what GAM used to [fight]. Why do the people still support PA? As part of 
GAM group symbol in the conflict period, because they still believe that 
the struggle of democracy will be realized. Aceh will be free from poverty, 
stupidity, and reach its prosperity. It turns out the obstacles are from the 
points of the agreement.21
The current condition of the local party becomes one of the causes that 
make democracy in Aceh is less maximal. It seems that Aceh Party intends 
to monopolize the political power. Old-time struggles become the claims over 
the current right to authority. If there is someone who threatens the struggle, 
they will have many ways to maintain the struggle including those that are 
not in accordance with democratic values such as violence and intimidation. 
This perception spreads into some elements of the Acehnese society. This 
condition is very vulnerable and potential for generating instability in Aceh 
especially in relation to the existing political competitions.
b .  Po l i t i c a l  D y n a m i c s  a n d  F r i c t i o n /C o n f l i c t  G e n e r a t i o n
Institutional perspectives not only look at the roles of institutions’ units 
in carrying out their respective functions. As explained earlier, institutional 
perspectives also look at the mechanism of system and dynamics among the 
institutions in carrying out the existing system (see Horton and Hunt 1999). 
Understanding on the political constellation and map in a region is very im-
portant in identifying how structure of power applies. From the structure of 
power we can understand how the relation of each party in political domain 
is. Of course, this becomes important for post-conflict local election system, 
both ongoing and future ones. The political map will describe the forces of 
parties that politically have authorities over a region.
21 Interview with one of the Aceh Party cadres, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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Political condition in Aceh is closely related to the transformation of 
former GAM combatants in the political domain. According to Helsinki 
Peace Agreement in 2005, GAM participated in the 2006 post-conflict local 
election. Therefore, there were two pairs of candidates from GAM, namely 
Humam–Hasbi supported by PPP and Irwandi–Nazar as independent can-
didates. Photo 5 shows a list of candidate pairs in 2006 Aceh post-conflict 
local election. 
Photo 5: List of Candidate Pairs of Governor and Vice Governor in 2006 Aceh Post-
Conflict Local Election
This condition shows the internal disunity within GAM at that time but 
the tension was not so high. The disunity only took the form of the division 
of GAM votes into two to vote for GAM candidates who will lead Aceh in the 
future. Humam–Hasbi tended to be supported by GAM top officials while 
Irwandi–Nazar tended to be supported by GAM members who fought in the 
field. At that time, many GAM top officials spread abroad so that to give 
influence in votes collection in the field was less effective. The competition 
tension was not so high because the ideological perception between them was 
relatively similar. Many of the former GAM members did not have political 
orientation yet. Besides that, political organization resulting from structural 
transformation of former GAM combatants was still not established yet. This 
condition made Irwandi-Nazar superior to Humam–Hasbi. 
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Although from GAM, there were two pairs namely Irwandi–Nazar and 
H2O (Humam–Hasbi) from PPP, Humam dan Hasbi. Then, PPP, but 
Hasbi is a neighbor supported by GAM seniors; GAM top officials sup-
ported H2O, field-based GAM members supported Irwandi–Nazar. But at 
that that, it can be said there was no clash nor conflict. GAM top officials 
were weak. The position was abroad. No basis here, so that the massive 
campaigns were conducted by Irwandi–Nazar’s group.22
The competition tension got higher when GAM combatant started to be 
politically structured with the establishment of PA. PA was established and 
legalized in 2008; initially it was named GAM party. Then, it was changed 
into Aceh Party. The PA is the first local party established by former GAM 
elites. If we analyze 13 statements on why selecting Aceh Party that is pub-
lished in our official PA website, the core ideology of PA is to continue the 
GAM struggles politically.23 Aceh Party dominates the fair number of seats 
in DPRA as seen in the Graph 9 as follows.
Graph 9: Gained Seats in DPRA in 2009 Legislative Election24
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The above data shows that two local parties get seats in DPRA. They are 
Aceh Party and Atjeh Sovereignty Party. Besides PA, there are other local 
party in Aceh, namely Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party (Partai Aceh Aman 
Seujahtra), Aceh People’s Independent Voice (Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh), 
Aceh People Party (Partai Rakyat Aceh), Aceh Unity Party (Partai Bersatu 
Atjeh), etc. However, in the 2009 legislative election, only two local parties 
got seats namely PA dominated by former GAM combatants and Aceh Sov-
ereignty Party (Partai Daulat Atjeh) dominated by Islamic school students 
(santri).
On the eve of 2012 pemilukada, the Aceh political map changed again. 
The main actors were controlled by former GAM combatant. Competi-
tion occurred between GAM top officials and Irwandi Yusuf. Disunity was 
triggered by the fact that Irwandi Yusuf was not supported as the governor 
22 Interview with Aceh Province Governor’s Expert Staff for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 
October 2014.
23Lihat www.partaiaceh.com/2014/04/13-alasan-mengapa-memilih-partai-aceh.html diakses 
pada 12 October 2014, time 16.44 WIB.
24 National Violence Monitoring System, www.snpk-indonesia.com
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candidate in the pemilukada. The cause was the weak political communica-
tions by Irwandi Yusuf in the domain of the elites and provided a negative 
image for GAM seniors in the mass media.25 This made GAM top officials 
reluctant to support Irwandi. Another factor is the lack of Irwandi Yusuf ’s 
orientation to fighting for the unrealized points of Helsinki agreement so 
that GAM top officials believed Irwandi Yusuf did not bring along the key 
ideology of the group which is the new form of GAM struggle through 
political path. 
Photo 6: Pairs of Governor and Deputy Governor Candidates in 2012 Aceh Post-
Conflict Local Election
Eventually Irwandi nominated himself as an independent candidate. This 
created a debate in the Constitutional Court with regard to whether or not 
independent candidate was allowed in the post-conflict local election. As 
a result, post-conflict local election execution was delayed until 2012. The 
post-conflict local election was won by Zaini Abdullah–Muzakkir Manaf 
supported by PA. Competition intensified in 2012 because former combat-
ants were structured within PA, top officials had access to give command and 
influence to former combatants, and in this period, many former combatants 
wanted political positions.26 Photo 6 shows pairs of governor and deputy 
governor candidates in 2012 Aceh pemilukada.
Looking at the decreasing political support, Irwandi Yusuf invited some 
parties to establish a new local party called Aceh National Party (PNA) in 
25 Interview with Aceh Province Governor’s Expert Staff for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 
October 2014.
26 Interview with Aceh Province Governor’s Expert Staff, Banda Aceh, 31 October 2014.
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2012. PNA is dominated by former GAM elites that were divided due to 
different orientation from other GAM leadership. PNA has an ideology that 
prioritizes the interest of Aceh based on the democratic values and Islamic 
values. PNA also has orientation at the national level. It can be seen from a 
statement of “Manifesto of Basic Struggle Values of Aceh National Party” as 
follows:
PNA as a vehicle for all Acehnese people, who are not only in Aceh but 
also in all parts of nusantara (Indonesia) and world, feel committed to cre-
ate fundamental changes in the efforts of realizing healthy and democratic 
political system and to realize people’s dignified prosperity.27
The emergency of PNA generates a new pattern of competition. PA re-
gards PA as their biggest political threat given the fact that Irwandi was 
former governor and has fairly strong network among former GAM people 
in the field. This situation has made the competition between PA and PNA 
become fierce until now. However, in reality, after the 2014 legislative elec-
tion, PNA gets much lower number of seats than PA. This can be seen in 
the Graph 10 below.
Graph 10: Gained Seats in DPRA in 2014 Legislative Election28
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The above data shows that three local parties get seats in DPRA in the 
2014 legislative election. They are PA, PNA, and PDA. PA has a decline in 
the number of seats at 12% if compared to the 2009 legislative election. This 
is related to the decreased trust in PA that is rumored to often carry out in-
timidating and arbitrary actions against the people. So that the votes moved 
to PNA that has Irwandi’s figure as the governor in the previous period. The 
Aceh Local Party (PDA) is the transformation of Aceh Sovereignty Party (Par-
tai Daulat Atjeh) which got seats in the 2009 election. The party changed its 
name due to technical problem. This party is dominated by Islamic boarding 
school students (santri). 
If compared between PA and PNA which are equally dominated by former 
GAM elites, according to some parties PA is considered more radical than 
PNA. Some people perceive PNA as GAM’s intellectual circle. They struggled 
27 “Manifesto Nilai-Nilai Dasar Perjuangan Partai Nasional Aceh,” can be seen from www.pna.
or.id/profil/manifesto/#.VDpgNCj-JDs accessed on 12 October 2014, at 18.13 WIB.
28 National Violence Monitoring System- Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com
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through diplomacy before the peace agreement era. PA prioritizes GAM old 
time struggles which are not fully realized yet. The intended struggles are 
the struggle against the injustice of Government of Indonesia in treating 
Aceh. Old-time ideology is still brought by PA, but their struggling ways have 
changed from armed struggle to political struggle. 
Aceh Party is a reincarnation of GAM in a peaceful era, that changes its 
armed struggle into political struggle. 3. Since Helsinki MoU was born 
after GAM leaders signed it. After it got peaceful, GAM established KPA 
which then gave birth to Aceh Party. Therefore, Aceh Party is recognized 
as GAM’s representation successor in peaceful period.29
Yes at the intellectual level. But the command lies on the former GAM 
combatants. Yes, like Sofyan Daud, he is GAM spokesperson. Sofyan 
Daud is the PNA party leader. 30
PNA is represented by Irwandi. Even though there was no PNA yet, PA by 
GAM colleagues becomes hardliners. Eventually conflicts occurred when 
they asked Irwandi to delay post-conflict local election.31
Some people identify that patron relation among internal PA is still very 
strong. The patron relation is dominated by former GAM leadership. GAM 
leaders still have strong influence within PA so that the candidates of local 
leaders from GAM elites must share the vision with the former GAM lead-
ers. Besides that, most of PA members are currently not GAM members who 
used to struggle before the peaceful era. Most of PA members who used to be 
GAM members were fired as they supported Irwandi who nominated himself 
in the 2012 post-conflict local election, which was in conflict with the wish 
of GAM leadership.
c .  T h e  R o l e  o f  C i v i l  S o c i e t y  i n  Po s t -
C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n 
Civil society is an important part in the democratic system. Democracy 
cannot run well without civil society (Fukuyama 2005), which particularly 
takes part in creating social capital.32 Besides that, one of the important vari-
ables for the successful post-conflict local election is active engagement of 
CSO in the implementation process (Korth 2011). Conceptually, assessment 
of the role of CSOs (civil society organizations) or dubbed as NGOs (non-
29 13 reasons for electing Aceh Party,” taken from www.partaiaceh.com, on 3 January 2015.
30 Interview with Aceh Province Commissionaire Chairperson, Banda Aceh 27 October 2014.
31 Interview with former KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
32 Social capital is a set of values and norms that enable human being to work together to fight 
for the interest among them (see Fukuyama 2005).
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govermental organizations), in democracy development anywhere is closely 
related to the work of Alexis de Tocqueville entitled Democracy in America. 
The work becomes a kind of “seminal work”, a work that is much quoted by 
the next researchers. In summary, Tocqueville emphasizes that foundation of 
democratization in America in the 18th century includes equality, freedom and 
established social infrastructures with the foundation of associations (CSO). 
Through these associations the people are free to associate and express their 
opinions and aspiration equally (Tocqueville 2003). Therefore, theoretically 
CSOs become a kind of competing centers of power or alternative sources of 
power, beside states that are primary locus of power. The existence of centers 
or alternative sources of power is one of the conditions and important char-
acteristics of a democratic state or territory.
Post-conflict local elections in Aceh are intended not only for building 
peace but also local democracy. Democracy development can only get better 
if CSOs are getting stronger and growing. Based on the observation and ex-
perience of various informants, the participation and engagement of CSOs in 
the post-conflict local election implementation and democracy development 
in Aceh is still fluctuating, not consistent, and especially dependent on the 
existence of fund sources, as stated by a peace activist in Aceh and a former 
chairperson of a CSO:
The power of CSOs is very fluctuating too, very much determined by 
social moods, sometimes, when peace is trendy, all is peace, when Human 
Rights are trendy, all is Human Rights. They are not so creative in looking 
at problems and issues sustainably and less committed to the issues. In the 
context of elaborative program, there is nothing. So, the most urgent issue 
is funds. If there is some fund, they work.33
In the 2006 post-conflict local election implementation, the role of CSOs 
was very strong. Local CSOs get big support from international agencies.34 
Post-tsunami condition and the peace agreement made Aceh receive much 
attention from international parties. Support from the central government 
was also very strong in this period. But after 2009, the support started to 
decrease. CSOs in Aceh started to decline in their capacity. Similarly in the 
2012 governor post-conflict local election implementation, their role decreased 
more and more. 
The cause of the decreased role does not come from the internal factor, but 
rather from external factor that prevent them from maximal participation. 
Some factors are limited funding and dependency on donor.
33 Interview with academicians of conflict study, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
34 Interview with Aceh Province Governor’s Expert Staff for Political Affairs, Banda Aceh, 31 
October 2014.
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NGO can monitor development like whether the development is benefi-
cial, less or not. NGO is weak. Why weak? Funding problem. That’s the 
problem. Now it is not easy to get from external. Now, if they are not close, 
our civil societies are weak.35
The next obstacle is related to threat/intimidation from some parties. In-
timidation makes CSOs more careful in their action and carrying out their 
activities. When CSOs find any violation, they find it difficult to find 
the people who want to be witnesses. It is because the people are afraid of 
threats and intimidation if they are willing to be witnesses. 
Yes, for instance if we construct it like this, there will be reports from 
them, 31 people reported, frauds, organizers, then intimidation, hidden 
campaigns, just like that. But when we want to confirm them as we want 
to report to Banwaslu. When confirmed to Banwaslu, they are afraid. 
They are still like that, Bro. no one wants to be witness. Legally speaking 
we should have evidences, there must be witnesses, where did they see it, 
things like that. So, eventually it is finished.36
Competition among the parties sometimes makes us difficult. If we say A, 
we are considered being part of B group. So the most probably thing we 
is validation to voters, monitoring and the like. The roles that we might 
take are not productive yet. If we do not take policies nor actions, we try 
to influence parties.37
Besides that, there is critical spotlight that questions the people’s motiva-
tion and goal of involving in various CSOs. Based on the testimonies from 
some informants, many people get active in CSOs during the post-conflict 
local election implementation more because they want the engagement to be 
an instrument for getting access to jobs or particular positions. The condi-
tion, for instance, is proven by many CSO activists who then apply for KIP 
members, PA spokespersons, PA expert staff, PA legislative candidates, PA 
lawyers, etc.,38 or become part of other political parties. Even there are some 
of them who are then elected as legislators. However, the condition is not 
automatically negative, both in relation to individual’s right for nominat-
ing him/herself and democracy development. If CSO activists are elected as 
legislators, for instance, or elected to assume other strategic public positions, 
35 Interview with IAINAr-Raniry Professor, Aceh, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
36 Interview with one of the former Aceh Province KIP Commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 
2014.
37 Interview with one of the democracy activists, Banda Aceh 20 June 2014.
38 Interview with one of the former Aceh Province KIP Commissionaires, Banda Aceh, 20 June 
2014.
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they are expected to contribute to developing democracy with the knowledge 
they have gotten when they became democracy activists.39
Apart from various critical evaluations addressed to the engagement and 
participation of SO in the above pemilukada, another thing to be analyzed 
is programs and various forms of CSO activities in supporting democracy 
development, especially in the post-conflict local election implementation in 
an honest and equal manner. In the context of post-conflict local election in 
Aceh, CSO activities are generally related to things that are not conducted 
by political parties, such as political education and socialization that includes 
explanation of voters’ rights, vision and missions of the candidates, etc., as 
emphasized by one of the CSO activists as follows.
CSOs continue to conduct the strengthening to the society like to pro-
vide political education. For instance, political parties do not carry out 
their work fully for political education to voters. CSOs take the role 
which is not taken by political parties. CSOs educate the people so that 
they know their rights, vision and missions of candidates, etc. but again, 
the mission is about money. So, in the final days, money is given. In 
hamlets, they were given money, clothes, head scarves to Koran reading 
women group..40
One of the important roles of CSOs in the post-conflict local election 
implementation process is political socialization and education, especially if 
the role of political parties in the domain is relatively weak. However, the 
on-going fact often shows that political education given to the society just 
vanished and was defeated by material incentive/financial political model. In 
this relation, Lipset theoretical assumption is right, that one of the important 
factors for a strong democracy is the strong and prosperous middle-class. 
(Majumdar & Singh 1999).
I I .  M A L U K U
a .  R e a d i n e s s  o f  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l 
E l e c t i o n  I n s t i t u t i o n s
Election institutions in Maluku are structurally different from election 
institutions in Aceh. Election institutions in Maluku refer to Law No. 15 Year 
2011. The election institutions are structurally similar to election institutions 
in general in other provinces in Indonesia. Provincial KPU (General Election 
Commission) is established and selected by national level organizing institu-
tion namely National KPU. Similarly, provincial Bawaslu (election supervisory 
39 Interview with one of the democracy activists, Banda Aceh 20 June 2014.
40 Interview with one of the democracy activists, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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body) is established and selected by the national Bawaslu. In general, this can 
be described in Picture 3 as follows.
Picture 3: Implementing and Supervisory Functions 
Implementing Function
Provincial KPU Provincial Bawaslu
District/City KPU District/City Panwaslu
Subdistrict Election 
Committee
Subdistrict Election 
Supervisor
Voting Committee Field Election Supervisor
Voting Organizing Group
Supervisory Function
1. Local General Election Commission (KPUD)
The implementing function is carried out by provincial KPU which is 
formed by national KPU through special selection phases. Maluku Provincial 
KPU takes the role in developing local regulations and coordinating the col-
lection of votes starting from distribution, voting to vote counting. Provincial 
KPU is now located in Jl. Sultan Hasanuddin, Tantui, Ambon (Photo 7).41
Photo 7: Maluku Provincial KPU building
41 http://kpu-malukuprov.go.id/
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However, Maluku Provincial KPU has limitation in the aspect of field 
execution because field execution is under the authority of district/city KPU. 
One of the unique things in Maluku Provincial KPU is the balanced number 
of Moslem and Christian commissionaires. Besides that, Maluku Provincial 
KPU also carries out political education program. However, limited budget 
makes the program implementation less maximal.42
The problem is also located in the election institution at the district/city 
level downward.43 The causal factor is limited conceptual and technical un-
derstanding on the post-conflict local election implementation based on the 
prevailing rules. Their understanding on the internalization of democratic 
values is still considered very low. These problems are getting visible in ad-
hoc committee at the low level, such as KPPS. Maluku Provincial KPU as 
organizer also has limitation in conducting technical guidance training due 
to limited budget even though this training activity is important to increase 
the capacity of committee’s knowledge at the low level. 
Central Maluku Panwaslu saw that a problem lies in the awareness of low 
level committee on the values and concept of democracy even though many 
of them are experienced and used to be committee members in previous elec-
tions. The condition makes them really understand spaces for frauds. Central 
Maluku Panwaslu also added low educational background and main job of 
the committee at the low level to be tempted to conduct frauds for the sake 
of getting various repayments.
People who used to experience general elections in the previous years. This 
has made it complicated. Since they are so experienced and get used to it, 
they are already expert in the post and become indication of violations…..
so we want to accommodate human resources from the common people, 
but they have difficulty in writing and reading. The people who live in 
insular areas and insular sub-districts.44
The next problem is related to the distribution of general election logistics 
such as ballots, ballot boxes, etc. Limited distribution is caused by inadequate 
sea transportation. Sea transportation that is used is still dependent on com-
mercial vessels whose sailing schedule is often not in accordance with KPU 
schedule. This often triggers delays because sea transportation is very impor-
tant given the fact that Maluku mainly consists of sea and islands.
But the problem is that Maluku has a uniqueness that is insular, so that 
it needs organizers, special strategy to complete the phase process so that 
it can run properly, according to the planned agenda, or the set phases. 
42 Interview with Maluku Provincial KPU Chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
43 Interview with Maluku Provincial KPU Chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
44 Interview with Central Maluku Panwaslu Commissionaire, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
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There needs to be intensive communications as election organizers to the 
government. Communications is related to the challenges such as trans-
portation. Therefore, in terms of logistics distribution, it requires vessels 
that can meet KPU targets to distribute logistics.45
Besides that, KPU has not so far gotten full trust from the people related 
to neutral organizing yet. Some cases form the perception for instance the 
governor post-conflict local election implementation case in Eastern Seram 
(SBT) in 2013. SBT district KPU is regarded as biased in favor of the inter-
est of a candidate who was still the regent of the district. The partiality was 
observed from the omission by organizers of violations that were intended 
to win a candidate, for instance by falsifying votes in which the number of 
legitimate votes exceeded the number of voters in DPT. The problem was 
followed up and taken to legal domain and eventually SBT district KPU was 
declared to be guilty. 
Eastern Seram district KPU at DKPP (Election Organizers Ethics Coun-
cil) and based on the decision with the team, they were wrong, and all 
dismissed. Since the regent himself was the governor candidate. So, there 
was partiality from the district KPU colleagues there. So, actually it is not 
partiality, but omission. Yes it is also partiality, since they are not partial, 
why they did not do improvements.46
Bias in religious group identity still seems to adhere to organizers. Even 
though the existing system is designed to press sensitivity related to religious 
issues, there are still organizing committees that still have considerations of 
values based on their group identity. Bawaslu believes that in provincial KPU 
entity there is indication of strong consideration of religion-based identity 
group. But, based on the identified data, this is only at the level of organizers’ 
idea; there is still no indication that the tendency is implemented in actions. 
This only applies issues within the society in general. In its developments, 
the issues may move to ethnicity domain. Primordial values of group identity 
based on ethnicity also starts to develop in some of the organizer body. 
There is still non-neutrality within organizer’s attitude because of adherent 
identity status. Yes, it is bad and I am very much anti the KPU chairperson 
because he said why Moslem cannot be a governor.47
O, it is not that good. The evidence is that KPU chairperson, we think, 
is good, but actually in the first round general election there is indication 
of irregularities. But, on one hand he is the son of the negri, the son of 
45 Interview with Maluku Provincial KPU Chairperson, Maluku, 25 August 2014.
46 Interview with Maluku Province KPU Chairperson, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
47 Interview with one of Maluku Province Bawaslu Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
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the region, the son of tradition. He is the son of tradition, so eventually 
he is incapable.48
2. Provincial Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) 
The balance also exists within the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) 
which is currently located in Jl. Cut Nyak Dien No. 9, Karang Panjang, 
Ambon (Foto 8). The balance between Moslem and Christian in the institu-
tion body is regarded as capable of representing neutrality of the organizer. 
As an example, some previous decades in the Bawaslu election process, there 
were three candidates and all of them were, by accident, Christians. This 
became a debate and eventually another Moslem candidate was looked for as 
representation. One of the Bawaslu commissionaires think that it is not profes-
sionalism that becomes the key recruitment indicator but the representation 
of each identity group.
We at Bawaslu consist of two Christians and one Moslem. There is a case 
for the member of the Indonesian House of Representatives. Based on the 
district recapitulation count results which were manipulated, Moslem got 
the seat. The Christian person had a data that showed that he should be 
qualified. Then this person reported to Bawaslu, and Bawaslu followed up 
the report accordingly. Each report must be followed up. We investigate 
all data that we have from TPS (voting stations) in the city. It turned out 
that he won while the Moslem was wrong as the data was manipulated. 
We recommend Tual City for re-counting. Then occurred movements 
from Moslem colleagues. Two people from Bawaslu influenced. One Mos-
lem could not do anything. So Bawaslu looked for recommendation that 
benefited Christian. Such thought still exists. Party elites still have such 
thinking pattern.”49
In general, the role of election supervisory institution in Maluku both 
at the provincial and city/district levels has run well. Some cases have been 
dealt with well. They give transparent information on SMS reporting status. 
However there are still cases unsuccessfully finished. This is more caused 
by limited authority. Ad hoc status with the short position period causes the 
minimum opportunity for setting up network and developing sustainable 
program in conducting supervision.50 
48 Interview with local people, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
49 Interview with one of the Maluku Province Bawaslu Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 
2014.
50 Interview with Central Maluku Panwaslu Commissionaire, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
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Photo 8: Maluku Province Bawaslu Building
Election supervising institutions only have authority to recommend to 
KPU or the police to investigate violations in the field. Both provincial Ba-
waslu and city/district Panwaslu are unable to act directly take direct actions 
against every violation. Limited time for handling violations even makes the 
follow-up of the violations less maximal. They feel that the very limited as-
pect of authority cannot create fair post-conflict local election. As an ex-
ample in Central Maluku, the local district Panwaslu asked KPU to carry 
out re-counting of votes due to vote mark-up. However, KPU did not carry 
out the recommendation even though procedurally the case was proved and 
the committee at the grass root level that carried out vote mark-up was also 
declared guilty. 
The problem is that when we have made a report and a study, we recom-
mend it to our KPU colleagues, but KPU does not do it. So that is the 
problem. For instance there was this kind of violation, related to the mark-
up. We recommended re-election or re-counting. But, the KPU colleagues 
did not accommodate it. In Law No. 32 the time limit for dealing with 
this violation is only three days. Imagine, here we are in Banda island, 
it takes 3 nights to get to KPU. In wave season, we cannot do anything. 
Only 3 days and it’s already expired. For instance, the mark-up there is 
around 10 thousand. The problem is the time limit.51
From the aspect of human resource capacity, the integrity of the committee 
also becomes a problem in the supervisory institution in Maluku. Like prob-
lems in other election institutions, conceptual and technical understanding 
is still less maximal yet. Low educational background, especially at the low 
level of committee, also gives impacts on it. Then, some frauds are also found 
51 Interview with Maluku Bawaslu, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
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by supervisory committee. One example is the case of supervisory committee 
in SBT district who were caught and proved guilty of intentionally omitting 
frauds done by organizing committee, even though the report was already 
given to them. 
That problem was revealed by the Supervisory Committee (Panwas) itself. 
One of the Panwas members is now dismissed by DKPP. He did not accept 
the processes. Then, he revealed it to the media, then to provincial Bawaslu 
and it was processed. There are cases from within, there are reports but 
they are not processed and ignored just like that.52
Yes, actually it is just slightly different because in many implementations, 
there are many reports that are not followed up. I don’t know whether the 
Bawaslu chairperson is fired or not. He plays his card.53
3. Local Government
The local government mentioned here is a governmental institution beside 
election institution. In general, the role of local government in the post-
conflict local election implementation in Maluku is similar to the role of local 
government in other regions. Maluku Bappeda is tasked with preparing budget 
needed by related institutions. The system used here is a proposal from the 
related institution of budget to Bappeda that will then evaluate and approve 
it. This system is considered to be able to reduce corruption.
From the aspect of implementation preparation, there are some things to 
be conducted by the local government. For instance, through Kesbangpol, the 
government organizes dissemination on political values of democracy. Usually 
such programs are conducted by holding forums attended by political elites, 
NGOs, and community leaders. In the case of the formation of organizing 
committee, the local government very much considers the balance factor when 
selecting candidates. The intended balance is the balance between Moslem 
and Christian committee members. The balance is felt necessary as the sym-
bolic representation showing that organizing committee is neutral, not in favor 
of either Moslem or Christian groups. 
On the other hand, there are also some weaknesses from the local govern-
ment related to the post-conflict local election execution. Some of them are 
limited budget, given the fact that Maluku is insular territory. The limita-
tion was felt by some organizing committees especially in the distribution of 
logistics to areas in other islands, also by the police in mobilizing its person-
nel to guard the post-conflict local election implementation. Besides that, 
local government also faced limited infrastructures, such as less adequate sea 
52 Interview with Central Maluku Panwaslu Commissionaire, Masohi,19 November 2014.
53 Interview with one of NGOs, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
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transportation and inter-insular communication network. This limitation also 
prevents the committees from coordinating and mobilizing. Unique cases 
related to infrastructures occurred in the post-conflict local election imple-
mentation in Central Maluku. In the votes counting, there was electricity 
cut-off by PLN,54 so that they had to count votes at night with minimum 
lights. Of course this has big potential for frauds.
Police is the main actor that carries out the guarding function in the 
post-conflict local election. In general many parties think that the police 
performance is excellent; they are quick and responsive in handling cases. 
In guarding the security, the police coordinate with some institutions and 
mobilize intelligence function to identify vulnerable spots that needs guard-
ing. The main priority of the police is Moslem-Christian relation. Moslem-
Christian relation is more prioritized given the fact that Maluku has a his-
tory of conflicts between both communities. Therefore, if there is a conflict 
between Moslems and Christians, the police is not too worried of it although 
they still try to settle the case. The police cooperate with the people down to 
the community level to get quick information when there is a clash. Another 
security strategy is by managing interaction between the supporting masses. 
For instance, by arranging campaign dates, rally routes and the like. As far 
as possible the police minimize interactions between the supporting masses 
in one event that is related to pemilukada. 
Dissemination related to peaceful general election is also conducted with 
a motto “ready to be elected and not elected”, which is considered to more 
capable of reducing competition tension rather than the motto “ready to win 
and lose”. Then, the effort to maintain independency of personnel is carried 
out by doing general supervisory function and adhering supervisory function, 
in which superiors monitor their subordinates directly. If a subordinate carries 
out non-neutral practices, the superior will also get sanction. This system is 
considered effective because it utilizes the personnel’s hierarchal structure to 
optimize supervision so that it strengthens social control within the security 
personnel.55 
Besides that, security personnel also find some challenges especially in-
frastructure challenge that is considered to influence troops’ mobilization. 
Limited sea transportation and big waves becomes the main obstacle for the 
police to reach some areas separated by the sea. The communication obstacle 
is also felt by the police even though communications is important in carrying 
out monitoring function. Civil infrastructures such as commercial provider 
signal, cannot be used due to limited number of signal towers.
54 Interview with Central Maluku Panwaslu Commissionaire, Masohi, 19 November 2014.
55 Interview with Maluku Province Local Police’s Subdivision of Operations, Ambon, 26 August 
2014.
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From Bula in SBT to Werinama we have to take a boat, Boss, for 12 
hours Geser, Gorom, because no other way. Here communications is a 
problem too. If we send our personnel to Wetar, there is no communi-
cation here, they have to go to Timor Timur for telephone to Dili and 
the telephone provider is only Telkomsel. It’s sad, right. Who is wrong 
in this case? Why does the government not set up tower there? well, I 
talked about it yesterday that the provincial government should provide 
communications media for quick communications. Our region is very 
vast including the sea.56
Limitations in the security issue have implication on the post-conflict local 
election implementation stability. One of this is the execution of the 2013 
governor post-conflict local election in SBT district. Less maximal guard-
ing caused some ballot boxes to be opened before the election period.57 This 
caused clashes between supporting masses.
In the local bureaucracy/government, issue of identity is still there. There 
is indication of prioritizing the interest of a particular identity. In some cases, 
primordial issues apply, for instance in SBT. The incumbent regent by chance 
registered as governor candidate in the governor election. There is indication 
that post-conflict local election implementation in SBT is intervened by local 
government for the interest of the candidate. 
4. Political Parties
Political parties in Maluku in general educate their cadres based on the 
existing local wisdom, namely through balanced representation. The balanced 
representation is taken as symbolization of political party’s neutrality. This 
applies to political parties that have secular ideologies. Political parties with 
religious basis continue to maintain their religious identity. According to some 
people, religion-based parties still get support but not much. For Maluku 
people, parties that bring representation ideology are considered better. This 
is because the people think that those parties take part in fighting for peace 
in Maluku. This situation can be used by political parties to collect the force 
of supporting masses in general election. Some parties that are identical to 
particular religions start to open themselves to cadre candidates of another 
religion. The National Awakening Party (PKB), for instance, also has Chris-
tian cadres. They claim that even though the party was established by Moslem 
people the ideology they bring is nationalistic. 
56 Interview with Maluku Province Local Police’s Subdivision of Operations, Ambon, 26 August 
2014.
57 Interview with one of the Maluku Province Bawaslu Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
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Our main [Basis] is clear, Moslems ad NU in Maluku. But we also open 
opportunities to our brothers and sisters from Christian community. There 
are around 8 Christian community fellows. It can be explained to the 
Christian community that the PKB committee especially in Maluku come 
from two existing communities.58
Besides that, political parties in Maluku also have some problems. One of 
the problems can be seen from the SNPK data in Graph 11 below.
Graph 11: Actors Found Committing Violence Related to Elections of Provincial, City 
and District Official Positions in Maluku Province in 2005-201459
Civilians
Government
Political Party
Police
Student
The above data shows that most of the violent conflicts related to the elec-
tions of provincial and city/district official positions in Maluku are conducted 
by actors that have affiliation to political parties. This indicates that political 
parties are less maximal in conducting their function of mediating existing 
conflicts. The use of violent methods is still found to deal with problems in 
the competition of political position elections.
The personal capacity of party’s cadres also becomes a problem. Low politi-
cal education to the people who want to join political sphere makes parties 
difficult to find quality cadres. Sometimes parties recruit outsiders to become 
legislator candidates when election period approaches. They do this because 
they haven’t gotten good cadres despite training process. As a result, they are 
forced to recruit external people to represent them in the government.60
b .  Po l i t i c a l  D y n a m i c s  a n d  F r i c t i o n /
C o n f l i c t  G e n e r a t i o n 
Socially the Maluku people are divided into two big groups namely 
Moslem and Christian groups. This religious identity indirectly sets up the 
58 Interview with one of the PKB elites, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
59 National Violence Monitoring System - Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com.
60 Interview with one of the PKB elites, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
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main awareness of Maluku people on perceiving and identifying themselves. 
After the conflict, the religious identity boundary becomes stronger. Issue 
of balance growing in the community in which both groups must have 
equal access to everything indirectly emphasizes the boundaries between 
both groups. This also applies in the political domain because the balance 
in political domain is felt much necessary to stifle frictions between Moslem 
and Christian groups. For instance, if a local leader is Moslem, the deputy 
should be Christian, and vice versa. However, recently this issue has shifted 
to ethnicity. 
Political constellation and map in Maluku tends to be oriented to the gen-
eration of issues in order to get massive support. Inter-elite political competi-
tions are attached to the issue of balance between Moslems and Christians. 
The traumatic condition of the Maluku people about the old-time conflicts 
has made them prefer secular political parties to religion-based political par-
ties. Secular parties are considered to more accommodate the interests of 
Moslems and Christians. However, some people perceive nationalistic par-
ties as Christian parties, but they are not many. Sometimes, this is made a 
strategy by political parties to sell their images, as seen in Graphs 12 and 
13 below:
Graph 12: Gained Seats in Maluku Province DPRD in 2009  
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Graph 13: Gained Seats in Maluku Province DPRD in 2014  
Legislative General Election62
Demo-
cratic party
PANGerindra Golkar Hanura PDIP PKB PKPI PKS PPPNasdem
The above data shows the number of seats in Maluku Province DPRD 
gained by each political party. Both in 2009 and 2014, nationalistic parties 
with the ideology of balanced representation have strong political influence 
61 National Violence Monitoring System - Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com
62 National Violence Monitoring System - Indonesia, www.snpk-indonesia.com
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amidst the society. In this case, PDIP and Golkar dominated the gained 
seats in DPRD (Local Legislative Council) in 2009 and 2014. Some of the 
religion-based parties like PKS had fairly high number of seats in 2009 and 
2014. However, if seen from the entire number of seats in DPRD, the majority 
of parties that got seats were secular parties or the ones regarded by Maluku 
people as nationalistic parties. Especially in 2014, PKB as a party with NU 
Islamic image got seats in DPRD. However, this is closely related to the 
party’s strategy in emphasizing their ideology, that although being established 
by Moslem leaders, PKB is a pluralistic party, open to Christians to join and 
become its cadres and even to get seats in DPRD. Various things show how 
strongly the issue of balance plays in the political domain.
Religious issues are used by elites to gather people’s support. Through this 
religious identity, elites set up images to draw sympathy from the public. Mos-
lem candidates often show their Christian perspective to get sympathy from 
Christian communities, and vice versa. The strategy is useful to strengthen 
symbolization that the candidates are not the representation of one group only 
but representation of both religious groups.
So, I say in Maluku it is still thick in religion. As a Moslem, if I was a 
governor candidate or regent candidate, I also know by heart Bible verses 
when I visit Christian community and talk about God’s words…. They 
will be very happy. Also in Christian community, even though someone is 
Christian, but the person knows Al Fatihah, then Moslems will be happy 
or for instance if he visits Moslem community. That’s the experience in 
my village, he talked and entered with Al Fatihah. People were happy and 
came to the voting D-Day; the person also got many votes.63
Sometimes, there are still elite supporters that use the space of balance to 
mobilize masses. For an example, issue is mobilized towards governor’s iden-
tity. They state that the next governor should be from Moslem community, 
because so far the governor position has been assumed by Christians. Besides 
that, formation of negative issues related to radical group movement occurs. 
Sometimes, this type of issue targets the governor or vice governor candidacy 
personally, that he is part of the radical group movement that can break and 
ruin peace in Maluku. This kind of issue widely spread through SMS sent 
in random. For the Maluku people this issue is very dangerous because it 
can break post-conflict peace, which potentially generates new conflicts or 
frictions.64
63 Interview with one of the Maluku local journalists, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
64 Interview with one of the local Maluku people, Ambon, 23 August 2014
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... It has been two periods that Christian have become governors. Now it’s 
Moslems’ time. How come Moslems cannot become the governor? There 
is such issue like that. And still. Primordialism is even strong now... Fairly 
strong, we must be honest, it’s very strong. It is then made as a trendy is-
sue. It is engineered to get masses and cut supporters…. The people will 
be provoked. They are still provoked by identity, religion.65
Based on the history, the Christian community initially was a group that 
had more access to the government. The impact of the Dutch colonization 
made Christian group have more access to quality life including education. 
Therefore, the competitions for governmental positions were often won by 
Christians. This pattern changed after the Indonesian independence. Mos-
lem community started to develop especially in the educational quality. But, 
limited network in the government made Moslem group more blocked rather 
than Christian group.
Another issue recently used is ethnical issue which is often used by po-
litical elites to gather force at the district or city level. Ethnical issue is also 
sometimes used by elites in the areas with the majority of people embracing 
the same religion. The shift to ethnicity issue to get support is closely related 
to the fading issue of religion in setting up people’s fanaticism. The formed 
issue is when the local leadership has been assumed by the people of a certain 
ethnicity, another ethnic should have the position in the next period. One of 
the implications is seen from the tendency of particular ethnical groups to 
forbid supporters of candidates from another ethnicity from doing campaigns 
in their area.
No, they only want to protect their territory. I mean, the territory of the 
Regent; so…. Team from other candidates are not allowed to enter the 
territory. It is not because of dissatisfaction to the organizers, but sentiment 
to the candidate that they support. The regents have been from Werinama 
for two periods, and now it’s Bula’s time. Bula is vigorously preparing it. 
Symbolism is now broken again. The time is over now. The time to sup-
port Werinama is over. Bula people are developing force. Werinama people 
cannot become regent any longer. It also applies in district.66
Friction generation that uses this ethnicity issue spreads with the associa-
tion of some ethnicities that have kinship with other ethnicities in competi-
tion. For instance, if culturally ethnic A has kinship with ethnic B, when a 
local leader candidate from ethnic B mobilizes ethic A, ethnic A will also join 
to support ethnic B masses. The kinship relation is related to local wisdom 
65 Interview with one of the Maluku Province Bawaslu Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
66 Interview with one of the Maluku Province Bawaslu Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
135I N S T I T U T I O N A L  I N F R A S T R U C T U R E  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  D Y N A M I C S 
called pela gandong. Each negri has its own pela. If one group bound in one 
pela has problem or is in war, the pela’s group member must help the group. 
The condition also applies in post-conflict local election in Maluku.
Ethnicity is thigh here actually because there is a candidate from South-
east Maluku, a Kei person, then in SBT. I remember, in SBT he has Teo 
sub-district, which is closer to Southeast Maluku. So, the people culturally 
have relation with Southeast Maluku district. One of the strong candidates 
forms PDIP, coming from Southeast Maluku. So in Teo sub-district, in 
which the people have cultural relation with Southeast Maluku people, 
with this candidate on stage, there occurred a tension but no physical 
clashes happened. But there is tension between Kei and Seram commu-
nities.67
c .  R o l e  o f  C i v i l  S o c i e t y  i n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
Maluku Kesbangpol thinks that the role of CSO participation in Maluku is 
very high, especially in the pemilukada implementation.68 Looking at the good 
participation of CSOs, the local government gives priority to allocate budget 
to CSOs in order to conduct monitoring under coordination of Panwaslu. 
They conduct monitoring of technical implementation until the TPS (voting 
stations) level. The role is regarded as very much helpful to the government 
in maintaining post-conflict local election implementation so that it can run 
accordingly. Besides that, they actively give socializations and political educa-
tion to the wider society, including things related to pemilukada.69
Talking about civil society in Maluku, religious institutions also can be 
categorized as CSOs. There are three major religious institutions in Maluku 
namely Moslem, Christian and Catholic. The three religious institutions al-
ways organize communications forums to foster good relations among them.70 
The strategy is taken to educate their followers that upholding peace is one 
thing to consider. In their sermons, they actively call for the followers not to 
get provoked and always prioritize peace. In the post-conflict local election 
process, religious institutions also participate in clarifying negative issues of 
religion spread through SMS in order to discredit a particular candidate. The 
clarification is usually done by organizing press conference with the hope that 
the people are not provoked and do not raise enmity.
67 Interview with one of the Maluku Province Bawaslu Commissionaires, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
68 Interview with Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
69 Interview with one of the NGOs, Ambon, 22 August 2014; Maluku Kesbangpol, Ambon, 26 
August 2014; one of the PKB elites, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
70 Interview with Ambonia Diocese, Ambon, 17 November 2014; Maluku Interfaith Institute 
(LAIM), Ambon, 22, August 2014; Maluku MUI, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
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Formal Inter-faith forum is OK but our cooperation and sharing of in-
formation and mutual visit and meeting among religious leaders have run 
very well. So that, for instance if there is a case, the chief pastor will call 
the bishop and ask him to negotiate. Although it is GP case. The case that 
we are handling is from a particular territory, so the bishop will also ask 
the related person to talk first.71
Traditional institution is one of the civil society organizations that have 
important influence to Maluku people. Even though a structurally tradi-
tional institution is not included in post-conflict local election implementa-
tion, traditional institutions have important roles in calling for the people 
to maintain stability during the post-conflict local election implementation 
process. Traditional institutions still get legitimacy from most of the people 
to settle conflicts. Their negri identity still adheres the traditional institu-
tion is described according to negri led by kings. Some kings in Maluku are 
gathered in one vehicle called Latupati Assembly. Functionally, traditional 
institution is the first actor expected to be able to settle problems when there 
are inter-group conflicts. 
I think local democracy development and the role of governmental institu-
tions in consolidating democracy is still transitional because contributions 
from many parties with all the pluses and minuses make people’s role 
strong. People’s institution is good because de facto beside the government 
in guiding the people, religious institutions, religious leaders, traditional 
institutions are very strong.72 
However, in the developments, traditional institutions become target of 
criticisms, especially related to post-conflict local election implementation. 
There are some indications showing that kings are not neutral. Sometimes 
some kings are constitutionally suspected of having tendency to side with 
candidates coming from their regions. Growing issues of inter-village conflicts 
also trigger criticisms against the role of traditional institutions. The condi-
tion has made some parties to question the effectiveness of traditional role in 
setting conflicts. 
Now it has shifted to inter-negri (village), inter-Moslem negri or inter-
Christian negri conflicts occur and are still going on and never stops; 
so, sometimes I question the authority of traditional institution because 
it involves traditional negris. The government cannot get involved. We 
71 Interview with Amboina Diocese, Ambon, 17 November 2014.
72 Interview with Unpatti academician, Ambon, 20 November 2014.
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don’t want to see any invisible hand which tries to generate small-scale 
disturbances.73
Related to the capacity of traditional institutions, Latupati Assembly 
chairperson explained that they have limited financial resources. This makes 
traditional institution cannot carry out sustainable programs, including pro-
grams to maintain peace.74 So far the financial resources of the traditional 
institutions are dependent on the people’s voluntary fees. The government 
sometimes provides assistance, but often the activities are not sustainable. 
In the post-conflict local election implementation, traditional institutions 
are asked to attend and coordinate with the government and get financial 
support, but the funding value is deemed limited to maximize the program.
I I I .  P O S T- C O N F L I C T  I N S T I T U T I O N A L 
I N F R A S T R U C T U R E S  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  D Y N A M I C S 
I N  A C E H  A N D  M A L U K U :  C O M P A R A T I V E  A N A L Y S I S
Establishment of post-conflict local election implementing institution in-
frastructures in Aceh and Maluku is much influenced by characteristics of 
conflicts in both regions. In general, the characteristics of implementation can 
be seen from some dimensions related to the condition, problems, and chal-
lenges faced by post-conflict local election implementing institutions. Besides 
that, political dynamics in the post-conflict local election implementation is 
also reflected in the characteristics of both regions. More detailed explanation 
can be seen in Table 16 below.
Aceh KIP and Maluku Province KPUD have similar problems related to 
the capacity and integrity of human resources at the grass-root level. Both 
have limited funds, most of them are allocated only for technical implemen-
tation but not enough for technical guidance to committees at the grass-root 
level and political education for the society. This condition causes minimum 
capacity and integrity of committees at the grass root level and pubic political 
awareness. Another problem is related to neutrality of organizers. However, 
Maluku is considered better in responding this problem. Balance between 
Moslems and Christians in the implementing committee is considered to 
contribute to creating conduciveness. The problem in the Aceh case is related 
to the KIP selection mechanism by DPRA. The absence of transparency in 
handling violation cases growingly strengthens public distrust. 
Panwaslih and Bawaslu also face similar problem, namely organizers’ non-
neutrality. The problem is often related to the mechanism of KIP commis-
sionaires through DPRA dominated by Aceh Party. Lack of transparency in 
73 Interview with Pattimural University academician, Ambon, 25 August 2014.
74 Interview with Latupati Assembly Chairperson, Ambon, 18 November 2014.
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handling violation cases strengthens the issue. Besides that, there is an issue of 
effectiveness of the role of supervisory institutions related to policy condition. 
Institutions in both regions feel that limitation of authority has implication 
on the less maximal performance in handling violation cases. Limited work 
period, namely three months, is considered to be not enough to develop sus-
tainable programs such as technical guidance training at the grass-root level. 
This also has impact on the lack of human resources capacity at the grass-root 
level. The absence of security personnel within the supervisory body structure 
also becomes a problem in the effort to take action against cases quickly. So 
far, supervisory institution only serves as investigator. To follow up the viola-
tion, they have to coordinate with the police and attorney office.
Table 16: Condition, Problems and Challenges of Post-Conflict Local Election 
Implementation in Aceh dan Maluku
Prov-
ince
Comparative 
Dimension
Condition Problem and Challenge
Aceh Role of 
election in-
stitution for 
Implement-
ing Function 
(KIP/KPUD)
•	Commissionaire members are 
elected through DPRA
•	Most of the budget is allocated 
to technical interest; fund for 
sustainable program is still 
lacking
•	 Issue of non-neutral organizers
•	Capacity, integrity of com-
mittee human resources at the 
grass root level are low
•	Low public political awareness
Local govern-
ment
•	DPRA’s seats are dominated by 
local parties and authority to 
select commissionaires in elec-
tion institution 
•	Role of security personnel is less 
effective
•	 Issue of systematic not-neutral 
post-conflict local election 
implementation 
•	Local government tends to 
be dominated by local parties 
which establishes a system to 
maintain status quo
Role of 
election 
institution 
for Supervi-
sory Function 
(Panwaslih/ 
Bawaslu)
•	Commissionaire members are 
elected through DPRA
•	Ad hoc status for 3 months
•	Limited authority in taking 
actions against violations
•	 Issue of not-neutral post-
conflict local election imple-
mentation 
•	Lack of capacity among super-
visory committee at the grass 
root level
•	Less capable in taking action 
against violation cases quickly, 
efficiently and effectively
Role of politi-
cal parties
•	Lack of program capacity for 
political education program in 
sustainable cadre formation
•	Local party dominated by 
former GAM elite combatants 
who can access ex-conflict 
weapons
•	 Ideology of political parties on 
the old-time struggle which is 
still implanted as a new form of 
struggle.
•	Failure in mediating conflicts 
and internalizing democratic 
values 
•	High primodialism values in 
the local parties to control gov-
ernmental positions.
•	Use of intimidating methods
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Maluku Role of 
election in-
stitution for 
Implement-
ing Function 
(KIP/KPUD)
•	Awareness of religious identity 
of a commissionaire and is real-
ized in the balance
•	Most of the budget is allocated 
to technical interest; fund for 
sustainable program is still 
lacking
•	Region’s limited physical infra-
structures
•	 Issue of non-neutral organizers
•	Capacity, integrity of com-
mittee human resources at the 
grass root level are low
•	Low public political awareness 
•	Difficulty in mobilizing re-
sources and communications
Local Gov-
ernment 
•	Limitation in the provision 
of adequate infrastructures 
according to the regional char-
acteristics
•	Role of security personnel is ad-
equate in taking actions against 
violation cases
•	Less able to support the perfor-
mance of formal implementing 
institutions in order to be able 
to carry out effective and ef-
ficient mobilization and com-
munications
•	Open spaces for frauds 
Role of 
election 
institution 
for Supervi-
sory Function 
(Panwaslih/ 
Bawaslu)
•	Awareness of religious identity 
of a commissionaire and is real-
ized in the balance
•	Ad hoc status for 3 months
•	Limited authority in taking 
actions against violations 
•	Region’s limited physical infra-
structures
•	 Issue of non-neutral organizers
•	Lack of capacity among super-
visory committee at the grass 
root level
•	Less capable in taking action 
against violation cases quickly, 
efficiently and effectively 
•	Difficulty in mobilizing re-
sources and communications
Role of politi-
cal parties
•	Awareness of religious identity 
of individuals in cadre forma-
tion
•	Lack of program capacity for 
political education program in 
sustainable cadre formation
•	Failure in mediating conflicts 
and internalizing democratic 
values
•	 Indirect affirmation of group 
boundaries
Especially for Maluku, limited physical infrastructures become significant 
obstacle that must be dealt with by post-conflict local election implementing 
institutions. The condition of Maluku region which is insular makes KPUD 
and Bawaslu difficult to do mobilization due to limited sea transport. The 
limitation becomes an obstacle in the distribution of ballot boxes. Less ad-
equate communications infrastructures become another obstacle in doing 
inter-area coordination. Difficulty in the mobilization and communication 
is also felt by the police given their important role in the guarding. 
Related to the role of political parties, Aceh and Maluku have similar 
problems. There are three functions of parties that must be improved, namely 
less sustainable cadre formation capacity, internalization of democratic values 
in getting power, and capacity to deal with conflicts. Most of the violent con-
flicts in the post-conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku are conducted 
by actors with affiliation to political parties. In the Aceh case, the problem 
is very apparent from the involvement of local parties dominated by former 
GAM combatants namely Aceh Party. Old-time GAM struggle values are 
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internalized into the party’s ideology. Many party’s cadres then feel that they 
are entitled to get and enjoy the power. If compared, the condition of political 
parties in Maluku is apparently more conducive. 
In general, CSOs (civil society organizations) have very significant roles to 
protect democracy and stability in the post-conflict local election implementa-
tion in Aceh and Maluku. The obstacles faced by CSOs are generally related 
to the funding. The role of CSOs in Aceh is relatively fluctuating. The chal-
lenge is not only related to funding, but also to threats and intimidation. In 
Maluku, traditional institutions are considered to contribute less maximally 
to the post-conflict local election implementation and tend only to be ”fire 
extinguishers” and tend to side with particular groups. The condition is more 
caused by limited funds. (See Table 17). 
In the context of post-conflict local election’s political dynamics, competi-
tion in Aceh tends to refer to two forces of the main local parties namely PA 
and PNA. In Maluku, political competition is more directed to the methods 
taken by political elites to gather votes through balanced representation be-
tween both religious groups. In term of challenges, PA domination in the 
government becomes the special attention in the political condition in Aceh. 
This condition triggers absence of significant balancing aspect which is actu-
ally needed in the development of democracy. Potential conflicts/frictions in 
Aceh can be seen from the disunity of former GAM combatants within PA 
and PNA. This less conducive situation namely tendency to be dominated 
by PA growingly increases tension of completion among them. In Maluku, 
potential conflicts are more seen from the aspect of group segregation as seen 
from the issue of balance. On one hand, balance can create stability. On the 
other hand, balance can give impact on the increasingly strict boundaries 
between the groups. Besides that, the emergence of provocateurs that spread 
negative issues related to group identity both religion, ethnicity can also trig-
ger people’s rage at the grass root level (Table 18).
Table 17: Role, Dynamics and Challenges of CSOs in Aceh and Maluku
Comparative 
Dimension
Aceh Maluku
Role •	Mostly conducted by CSOs in 
the democracy and peace fields.
•	Very much contributing, but 
fluctuating 
•	Mostly done by democracy 
and peace CSOs and religious 
institutions (Moslem, Catholic, 
Christian)
•	Traditional institutions 
substantially are quite required, 
but the role is less
Dynamics and 
Challenges
•	Dependency and limited fund
•	 Intimidating threats from local 
elites
•	Dependency and limited fund
•	Neutrality of traditional 
institutions
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Table 18: Post-Conflict Political Constellation and Dynamics in Aceh and Maluku
Comparative 
Dimension
Aceh Maluku
Political Con-
stellation 
•	Competition among former 
GAM combatant elites in local 
parties to get political seats
•	The use of identity symboliza-
tion in the form of religious and 
ethnical balance by the elites in 
order to gather votes for getting 
power
Dynamics and 
challenges
•	Power dominated by one of the 
political parties (Aceh Party) in 
the government
•	 Intimidating threats
•	Balance that increasingly af-
firms group boundaries 
Potensi konflik/
friksi
•	Primordialism of local party 
(Aceh Party) that causes non 
democratic competition and 
disunity within former GAM 
combatant elites
•	Less inclusive condition
•	Negative issues on group iden-
tity (religion/ethnicity) brought 
by elites to discredit political 
competitors; but the current 
condition tends to be ethnical
•	Group segregation

C H A P T E R  V I
Conflict and Violence in Post-
Conflict Local Election 
I .  A C E H
a .  V i o l e n c e  i n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
Long experiences on conflicts and violence (1976-2005) have made vio-
lence inseparable from the life of Acehnese people. It is of course not easy 
to change it. One of the academicians that focus on conflict studies in Aceh 
said,”violence has become part of the culture, culture of our habit, if we don’t 
have any other ways, so be it.”1 As mentioned by an informant from security 
personnel, the long history of violence in Aceh has become deeply rooted and 
cannot immediately be removed, “because the cultural habit last for 32 years; 
it will not be easy just to remove it.”2
Aceh’s new era was marked by a peace agreement between the Govern-
ment of Indonesia and Aceh Free Movement (GAM) through Helsinki Peace 
Agreement on August 15, 2005. Nevertheless, this does not automatically 
make Aceh zero-violence. After the peace agreement, new era of violence 
does occur in Aceh and it is still related to the old-time violence. An Aceh 
Bawaslu member stated, “even though Aceh conflicts have been said to be 
over, ‘it is over on paper’, from the MoU agreement between the Govern-
ment of Indonesia and GAM in Helsinki, things below it is not finished 
yet.”3 There are still problems of socialization on peace agreement and in-
ternal consolidation at GAM level, in which sometimes different opinions 
between GAM elites and their members in the field occurred. One of the 
obvious examples is that in the meeting between GAM elites and field 
commanders to determine the candidates for local leaders from GAM in 
2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections, there were different opinions 
between GAM elites and field commanders. The difference in opinions 
eventually triggered tension and violence when former GAM competed in 
political domain, especially in the elections of local leaders at the provincial 
and city/district levels. 
1 Interview with academician of conflict studies, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
2 Interview with Aceh Local Police intelligence member, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014.
3 Interview with one of Aceh Bawaslu members, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
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Borrowing Jhon Galtung’s terminology, post-Helsinki agreement situation 
shows that peace in Aceh is still at the level of negative peace or weak peace, and 
still far from the meaning of positive peace.4 However, if the on-going process 
is seen from the international lens, compared to other regions or states, the 
post-conflict peace process in Aceh can be said to run very well, which means 
that for the last 10 years Aceh has not returned to the cycle of violence as 
taking place in Moro, the Philippines. There, after the peace between Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippines government on the 
autonomy devolution, situation flared up and a new violence circle was created 
by the emergence of fights from some parties such as Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) that did not agree to the agreement. Successful Post-conflict 
process in Aceh is admitted by former GAM combatant. 
If we use the international lens, it is very good. In post-conflict era, it is 
usually full with violence, murders…. So if we look at the statistics, in 
Aceh there are few cases of violence from the international context after 
30 year of conflict.”5
In Aceh, violence that is still clear is the one related to post-conflict local 
election that ends to increase from the two election executions in 2006 and 
2012. The increasing number of violence related to 2012 post-conflict local 
election is also admitted by one of the NGO activist in Aceh, “in 2012, the 
number of violence is far higher.”6 SNPK Data shows that pemilukada vio-
lence in Aceh in 2012 increased 13 times compared to 2006. As seen clearly 
in Graph 14 as follows.
Increased violence is not only seen in the aspect of quantity, but also in 
the aspects of forms and impacts. Aceh local police intelligence said, “... from 
2012 post-conflict local election, approximately 10 people died.”7 The above 
graph also demonstrated that the increased impacts of violence are mostly 
the injuries, whose number rose 8 times. The impact of violence in the form 
of damaged buildings also increased in significant number between 2006 
and 2012 post-conflict local elections, namely an increase up to 23 times. 
The increased violence intensity was also admitted by former Aceh Governor 
Irwandi Yusuf, who said, “compared with the intimidation in 2012, in 2006 
it was small and petty.”8 
4 According to Jhon Galtung in his article (1969), negative peace is a condition in which there is 
no war in a particular region, but there are still violence, widespread injustice, inequality, and 
dissatisfaction. Positive peace or true peace is peaceful condition in which equity, equality and 
freedom grow and there is relatively violence. 
5 Interview with former GAM elites, Banda Aceh, 23 June 2014.
6 Interview with NGO activists, Bireuen, 26 June 2014.
7 Interview with one of the Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 
2014.
8 Interview with former Aceh Governor, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
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Graph 14: Violence Related to 2006 and 2012 Aceh Post-Conflict Local Election
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b .  C a u s e  o f  E m e r g i n g  V i o l e n c e  i n  Po s t -
C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n 
1. Conflict Among Former GAM Members
Various violent cases related to 2006 and 2012 Aceh post-conflict lo-
cal election, the actors are relatively the same, dominated by former GAM 
members polarized into different groups. Aceh Local Police intelligence said, 
“Yes, most of the actors are former combatants and especially in in red areas.”9 
This shows factionalism among former GAM members in post-conflict local 
elections, even since 2006 one. 
The internal disunity within GAM is caused by different opinions between 
GAM elite leadership and GAM leaders in region and grass-roots. This is one 
of the main factors that forms the background of post-conflict local election’s 
violence in Aceh. In 2006 post-conflict local election, GAM leadership elites 
supported the pair of Humam Hamid–Hasbi Abdullah (Humam–Hasbi). 
The decision received challenges from GAM grass-roots because Humam is 
not considered GAM personnel. Furthermore, Humam is one of the Aceh 
leaders who signed request letter to the central government in order to make 
Aceh the Military Operation Region (DOM) in 1990’s. 
GAM grassroot struggles were expressed by the support for the pair of 
Irwandi Yusuf–Muhammad Nazar (Irwandi–Nazar) through independent 
path as the pair for governor and vice governor candidates. The difference in 
opinions was then realized in the form of competition between post-conflict 
local election participants. Some violent actions in 2006 post-conflict local 
9 Interview with one of the Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 
2014.
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election were conducted by supporters of both pairs, Irwandi–Nazar and Hu-
mam–Hasbi who shared the basis of former GAM members and supporters. 
Nevertheless, the difference in opinions within internal GAM in 2006 was 
not so critical yet. This was seen from the number of violence recorded in 
SNPK data, namely 11 incidents. The low number of incidents was influenced 
by the mystic atmosphere and new hope of the Acehnese people, given the 
fact that they just entered transitional period of peace after Helsinki agree-
ment. Another factor that made 2006 post-conflict local election violence 
relatively low is absence of organization that becomes a common vehicle of 
former GAM members and high attention from the international commu-
nity in the transitional process of peace in Aceh, in which many monitoring 
institutions, both local, national and international, carry out the monitoring 
of post-conflict local election in Aceh. 
However, as time went by, it turned out that such difference in opinions 
does not disappear completely. In 2012 post-conflict local election, difference 
in opinions between GAM leadership elites and some regional and grass-
root GAM leaders still occurred. This is also related to the determination 
of candidates of governor from GAM. In 2012 post-conflict local election, 
Aceh Party becomes the only vehicle of the aspirations of GAM members. In 
order to collect aspiration to determine candidates, on February 5-6, 2011, 
PA held a meeting. In the meeting PA leadership elites proposed the names of 
Zaini Abdullah- Muzakir Manaf as governor and vice governor candidates. 
It turned out that in the meeting different aspirations occurred. The meet-
ing’s participant proposed the names of Irwandi Yusuf. This is admitted by 
Irwandi saying that,
The point of the story, when the second nomination occurred, democ-
racy was severely harmed because from the meeting conducted internally 
(GAM), 17 commanders attended. At first only three commanders agreed 
with the candidates supported by leadership, just like before. Then one 
more person joined. So, 4 people supported the leadership and 13 sup-
ported me.10
Difference in opinions between GAM leadership elites and regional GAM 
leaders in the 2012 post-conflict local election was followed by threatened 
dismissal from PA or KPA membership by the leadership elites. Some violence 
occurred against those who were opposed with the proposal of Aceh Party. For 
instance, a shooting incident killed Cage Bireuen, who in the party meeting 
did not agree with the proposal of the PA leadership elites. This was admitted 
by Irwandi who said, “not long after the meeting there was a murder of Cage 
Bireuen.” PA’s firm actions can be taken because as a single vehicle for former 
10 Interview with former Aceh Governor, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
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GAM members, PA is relatively more structured organisatorily. This is differ-
ent from the candidacy selection process for 2006 post-conflict local election, 
in which there was no well-organized single vehicle yet. Therefore, difference 
in opinions between GAM leadership elites and regional and grass-root GAM 
leaders in 2006 did not allow GAM leaders to take firm actions. Some of the 
frictions among factions are expressed in the form of violent actions which are 
sometimes responded by retaliatory actions by other factions. This difference 
in opinions which can be see as internal conflict of former GAM forms the 
background of the emergence of violence in Aceh post-conflict local elections 
both in 2006 and 2012, in which the intensity growingly increased. This is 
in line with the statement of one of the former Aceh KIP members, “in 2012 
the conflict became fierce because of their internal (GAM) conflicts.”11 
2. The Political Sphere and GAM’s Mindset of War
The internal conflict among former GAM members in the Aceh post-
conflict local elections show their unreadiness for entering competition in the 
political sphere. Former GAM members are used to “command” culture or 
militaristic culture. The GAM structure is also set up just like the military 
one in which there is the highest and regional commanders. In such culture, 
leadership authority to the lower structure is very strong. When former GAM 
members enter a political sphere, the condition they have to face is different 
because in the political sphere all individuals are in the equal position and 
have the rights to be elected and to elect in general elections. All people are 
entitled to nominate other people or nominate themselves as candidates in 
general elections. The unreadiness of the former GAM members was also 
expressed by one of the NGO leaders in Aceh, saying, “Transition from guer-
rillas into politicials which they are not ready for.” This is also revealed by the 
Aceh Local Military Commander:
So this may be the reason why they cannot apply democracy well yet. They 
do not have political awareness yet. This indeed needs time. It requires 
process. We cannot immediately expect it to happen just in one night. I 
predict it needs two periods of governor’s changes.12
Polarization of factions between former GAM members in Aceh post-
conflict local elections especially at the provincial level between Irwandi Yusuf 
and Zaini Abdullah–Muzakir Manaf groups is equally dependent on the 
former GAM networks. Each party has their own success teams that mostly 
consist of former GAM members who equally have networks at the grass-root 
levels down to the village level (Clark & Palmer 2008). They all try to get 
11 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
12 Interview with Aceh Local Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014. 
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support from former members and GAM supporters. This has created fric-
tions which sometimes triggered tension and violence. They all know their 
competitor’s power and strategy usually applied in the old days. The use of 
similar network structures to get the same target of support has made the 
competition between candidates increasingly hard, as revealed by one of the 
NGO leaders in Aceh who is active in the monitoring of post-conflict local 
elections, “There is disunity, then competition occurs, and these competitions 
have impacts on the increased escalation of violence.”13
Using former GAM network structure indirectly establishes the old culture 
during the rebellion era. Choice of actions to be taken become limited, and 
these limited choices make them resort to old patterns in handling problems, 
as revealed by former Aceh KIP member, “They have no choice; what would 
be their choice beside violence? That’s all they have. They still practice such 
mindset. ‘Well, this is different from mine; always disturbing, get rid of it!’”14
3. Supporting Factors of Emerging Post-Conflict Violence
Violence related to post-conflict local election occurs almost in every local 
election (pemilukada) in various regions in Indonesia, but the number and 
intensity of the impacts of the violence is relatively low. This is different from 
Aceh, in which the number of violence related to post-conflict local election is 
the highest in Indonesia. Potential for violence may happen in all regions, but 
such potential gets different in the Aceh situation. There are some contextual 
conditions that make post-conflict local election-related violence in Aceh more 
intense compared to other regions in Indonesia. 
4. Uncompletely Dissappearing Former GAM Members’ Experiences of Violence 
Aceh’s long history of violence, especially the experiences in the GAM 
rebellion era has made violence as if a part inseparable from the Acehnese 
people, especially former GAM members. Hard life during the GAM rebel-
lion era has made them wage wars, use arms, live in jungles to escape the 
security personnel, as well as always deal with security dilemma of “being 
attacked or attacking”. When former GAM and the supporters enter the po-
litical domain, unconsciously violence still sometimes becomes the expression 
of actions in order to reach goals. They have been tens of years used to using 
violence and needs much time to transform into non-violent actions. This is 
admitted by one of the Aceh Bawaslu Commissionaires.:
... The people are used to violence. This habit is taken to the current 
democratic party… so they do one thing (violence) to show their interest.15
13 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 July 2014.
14 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
15 Interview with Aceh Bawaslu member, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014. 
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5. The Old Spirit and Moments of Retaliation 
Besides the habit of using violence that has not disappeared yet, vari-
ous violent cases related to post-conflict local election in Aceh are more or 
less inspired by the spirit to continue the old-time struggle. Violent actions 
taken are not only a method to reach the goals, but also inspired by a belief 
that these actions are legitimate and there needs to be a form of struggle. As 
admitted by one of former Aceh KIP members, some of the violent actions 
in the post-conflict local elections are still supported by motive for struggle, 
“because some of them think it is still their struggle.”16 One of the PA cadres 
also admitted that particular violent actions done by former GAM mem-
bers is supported by the struggle spirit, “the person feels that he is warrior, 
we struggle for Aceh.” post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh 
also becomes a moment of retaliation. Difference in opinions, opposition, 
unpaid old retaliation, and grudge among former GAM members, with this 
post-conflict local election moment, have a space for the realization through 
actions; moreover, if they are in the group that supports different governor 
candidate. This is stated by Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel:
But mostly retaliation factor. Because of not liking somebody or another 
group, the person just shoot them. That happened a lot and they use op-
portunities or moments like the general election. There are many kinds 
of patterns.17
6. Remaining Arms 
The existence of illegal firearms still circulating in Aceh also stimulates 
post-conflict local election-related violence. Even though there was a demoli-
tion of firearms which was done as a follow-up of Helsinki Peace Agreement, 
it was recorded that only 830 GAM weapons were demolished. Until today 
there is no clear information on the number of illegal former GAM arms that 
still circulate in Aceh. According to a former Aceh KIP member, both Irwandi 
Yusuf and Zaini Abudullah groups still have arms. 
The SNPK data shows that most of the violence in Aceh during post-
conflict local elections was committed by arms. This is also admitted by the 
Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel saying, “In 2012 there were many 
shootings.”18 This shows that the existence of violent devices in the form of 
arms is still quite many. The existence of arms circulating in Aceh is also 
admitted by the Aceh Military Commander who continues to withdraw arms 
from former combatants. Circulation of long-barrel weapons, short barrel 
16 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
17 Interview with Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014. 
18 Interview with Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014. 
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arms, hand-made ones, including ammunitions, grenades and others is still 
quite many. Efforts to withdraw weapons circulating to Aceh have been done 
so far by the Indonesian Military with a silent and under expose strategy.19 
Therefore, there is no clarity on how many weapons circulate in the society. 
7. Reduced National and International Supervision 
Reduced national and international attention to the post-conflict local 
election implementation in Aceh has also an influence to the violence of 
post-conflict local elections. In the 2006 post-conflict local election, one of 
the factors that make the level of violence not so high was world’s high atten-
tion to the general election processes in Aceh with many election supervisors 
coming from international institutions, national and local NGOs. 
In the 2012 post-conflict local election, attention from the international 
community relatively decreased. This can be seen by decreasing number of 
international election supervising institutions that conducted supervision (ICG 
Report, February 2012). This becomes the significant differentiator between 
the 2006 and 2012 post-conflict local elections. The difference also impacts 
the number of emerging violence, in which the number of pemilukada-related 
violence in Aceh in 2012 was higher than that in 2006.
c .  Pa t t e r n s  o f  E m e r g i n g  V i o l e n c e  i n  Po s t -
C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
1. Violence against Voters
One of the forms of actions categorized as violence of Aceh post-conflict 
local election is verbal intimidation of voters, as stated by an academician.
Verbal intimidation is already sufficient (as violence). That has made them 
feel scared. This intimidation is sometimes conducted indirectly to voters. 
This example of intimidation is a question raised with less words but clear 
message, namely to vote for a particular pair. Fuad Bastami exemplified an 
indirect question: “Do you already now who you should vote?”20
A former Aceh KIP member stated that intimidation of voters is also found 
in some TPS (polling stations). Examples of the forms of intimidation by 
words: “If you don’t vote for PA, see what will happen! If you want to go to 
the paddy field safely, no more fights, no more conflicts, you must vote for 
PA.”21 Female group is very vulnerable to intimidation. This was admitted by 
Women Solidarity NGO activist, who said:
19 Interview with Aceh Military Commander, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014.
20 Interview with Aceh academician, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
21 Interview with former Aceh KIP member, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014. 
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Intimidation exists and it’s much. However, women tend to be reluctant 
to report officially…. Intimidation is widely heard in the society; if they 
don’t vote for persons from a particular group, they will be threatened to 
be expelled from the communities. Despite not all, but the majority of our 
assisted villages, the intimidation issue like that occurs.22
Intimidation and threat are also directed against post-conflict local elec-
tion organizers, as experienced by Ilham, a former Aceh KIP member. To 
carry out his tasks as KIP member, he had to be guarded by some guards 
with heavy arms at any time. He feels it disturbing because he loses his pri-
vacy space.
2. Violence against Supporters and Success Teams of Candidates
The intensity of the forms of violence against the supporters of post-
conflict local election’s opposite candidate pairs is relatively higher than 
the violence against voters. Even, the forms of violence are more varied 
than the light forms such as intimidation and destruction of goods until 
the deadly acts such as shooting, torture, and abduction. As mentioned 
earlier, intensity of violence in 2012 post-conflict local election was higher 
than in 2006 one, including violence against supporters of candidate pairs. 
Irwandi Yusuf admitted that, “Intimidation is heavier this time. Abduction 
of witnesses, burning of my house, f lag lowering.”23 One of the examples 
of violence against supporters and success teams of candidate pairs is the 
shooting that caused the death of Cage Bireuen, a supporter of Irwandi 
in the 2012 post-conflict local election. Another example is the shooting 
of Faizal from PNA, who was the supporter of Irwandi in the 2012 post-
conflict local election. 
Violence against candidate pairs supporters has different characteristics 
from the violence against voters. One of the violence characteristics against 
pair supporters is “targeted”, namely the violence is since the beginning tar-
geted specifically to certain victims. Another characteristic is the use of violent 
devices in the form of firearms like the example of violence against Cage 
Bireuen and Faizal. The victims were the targets of violence due to their 
political activity and affiliation to a particular candidate pair. The targeted 
violence that uses violent devices like firearms requires adequate planning. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that violence against the supporters of 
candidate pairs is a planned violence. 
22 Interview with women’s activist, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014. 
23 Interview with former Aceh Governor, Banda Aceh, 24 June 2014. 
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3. Hot Spots of Violence
Post-conflict local election-related violence does not happen in all re-
gions of Aceh. In some regions, relatively there is no violence, while in 
other regions, violence intensifies. The high rate of violence related to 
post-conf lict local elections in certain regions shows the level of fierce 
competition among candidate pairs in the region. One of the NGO activ-
ists in Aceh gave remarks on the region where violence takes place, “... 
especially in the eastern coastal areas, but escalated violence occurred more 
in Bireuen.” The police classify the regions in Aceh to determine the level 
of guarding. Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel stated, “Red regions, 
which mean vulnerable ones, are Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, Piddie, Bi-
reuen, North Aceh, East Aceh, and Central Aceh. So, the medium-level 
guarding is for Aceh Besar, Bener Meriah, and South Aceh.” Then, the 
informant also stated that the determination of the vulnerability of a region 
in the post-conflict local election implementation is also combined with 
the rate of crime, “we also look at the case of violence and also the factor 
of the rate of crime.”24
Graph 15: Comparison of Violent Incidents of 2006 and 2012 Aceh Post-Conflict 
Local Election By District and City
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d .  I m p a c t s  o f  E m e r g i n g  V i o l e n c e  o n  D e m o c r a c y 
D e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g
Both violent actions directed against voters and supporters of candidate 
pairs eventually have similar goal that is to influence both directly and indi-
rectly voters in order to support a particular candidate pair or not to choose 
24 Interview with Aceh Local Police Intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014. 
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a particular candidate pair. One of the NGO activists stated “Every time vio-
lence occurs it must be connected to the political condition. And it becomes 
a signal which will influence voters.”25
Violence directed directly against voters clearly tries to get voters to 
choose a particular candidate pairs, while violence directed against sup-
porters of a candidate pair is a terror to supporters, sympathizers, and 
success team of candidate pair opponents. The violence indirectly spread 
fear to the people and voters, as said by one of the media’s editors in Aceh, 
“Acehnese people even do not dare to get out at night. That’s on the eve 
of post-conflict local election.”26 Violence against candidate pairs is then 
interpreted by the people who look at the victims and perpetrators of the 
violence. People’s fear to fear eventually influences the voters’ tendency to 
their preference.
The spread fear influences the people so that they cannot explore more 
programs offered by both candidate pairs. Varied violence has influenced the 
psychology of voters so that the people do not have a sufficient freedom space 
to determine their political preferences. Moreover, the occurrence of varied 
violence also brings concerns. Such concerns do not only deal with the safety 
of life but also economic disturbance and their livelihoods. One of the NGO 
activists in Aceh admitted that violence during the elections has mad the 
people prefer peace to expressing their democratic right. 
It is normal if the people are very worried about their lives. Also, the post-
conflict local election process is very far from the public interest. It means, 
anyone who wins will never take care of the people. The important thing 
is a peaceful condition, comfortable condition; they can look for anything, 
livelihoods, than to return to the previous era.27
This shows that the Acehnese peole put the values of peace higher than 
the value of democracy in dealing with varied violence of post-conflict 
local election. The violence eventually brings the people to the pragmatic 
democracy options which do not bring huge risks to them. As mentioned 
by an NGO activist active in the monitoring of Aceh post-conflict local 
election, “Compromise from the people to choose who is stronger, is part 
of a true compromise. Rather than uproar, the elected may not side with 
the people yet.”28
25 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014. 
26 Interview with media editor in Aceh, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014.
27 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014. 
28. Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014. 
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e .  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  Pe o p l e ’s  E f f o r t s  t o  D e a l  w i t h 
V i o l e n c e  i n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
1. Government’s efforts 
The Aceh post-conflict local election agenda always becomes an important 
moment for the local government and central government including secu-
rity personnel (policy and military), even becomes the world’s attention. The 
emergence of violence related to post-conflict local election in Aceh makes 
the government willy-nilly carries out handling initiatives. The government’s 
effort to handle violence in Aceh can be divided into two, which will be 
explained in this section. 
2. Government’s Efforts Through Law Enforcement and Security Paths
Efforts to anticipate for the emergence of violence have been conducted 
by security personnel before post-conflict local election process. One of the 
efforts from the security personnel is conducted through the role of police 
intelligence division. The police have mapped potentials for violence in the 
regions of Aceh by the vulnerability level. They call the violence-vulnerable 
regions as “red regions” such Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, Piddie, Bireuen, 
North Aceh, East Aceh, and Central Aceh. These regions are the pouches of 
GAM supporters in the past. The regions that require medium-level supervi-
sion are Aceh Besar, Bener Meriah, and South Aceh. The determination of 
regions based on the level of potential violence becomes the basis for the police 
in carrying out the guarding. 
Law enforcement efforts against violent actions are conducted by the po-
lice by various ways depending on various factors such as availability of forms 
of evidence and the level of case difficulties. One of the emerging difficulties 
is that not all violence occurring in the post-conflict local election periods 
can be classified as election’s criminal actions, but genuine criminal actions 
so that the handling follows the procedure for genuine crime handling in 
general. This was admitted by one of the Aceh Bawaslu Commissionaires, 
“There are violence cases in general elections, but they do not definitely 
violate election’s rules yet… Intimidation by shooting is not included in the 
rules of election’s criminal actions and we cannot enter the domain. That’s 
a genuine crime.”29 
Every violent action during the post-conflict local election implementation 
process is closely related to the on-going political context. Maybe the general 
public can see that violence is intended to influence post-conflict local election 
process, and regard that the violence must immediately be handled in order 
not to really influence the process and results of post-conflict local elections. 
29 Interview with Bawaslu member, Banda Aceh, 21 June 2014. 
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But, different legal rules that handle election’s criminal actions and criminal 
actions generate discrepancy between public expectation and post-conflict 
local election participants as well as the police. Therefore, develops an assump-
tion that law enforcement process against varied violence occurring in Aceh 
post-conflict local election, especially in 2012, did not run well. One of the 
NGO activists in Aceh clearly expressed the opinion on law enforcement, “I 
think that law enforcement factor is a big problem. Yes, because there is no 
law enforcement process.”30
The police also admitted that there were some obstacles in the handling 
of violence cases related to post-conflict local elections in Aceh. One of the 
challenges faced here is difference in opinions between police leadership and 
the police personnel in the field regarding violence handling management. 
For instance, the police in the field has identified the perpetrator of violent 
action and collected various information or evidences, but their leaders saw 
there was not enough strong evidence to file the case. A police personnel 
revealed,
Regarding the case of Ayahbanta31 we from intelligence have know it, sir, 
the information, but it is all back to our chief. We don’t know what our 
chief means. But for that case, we have reported the information to the 
chief. And we in the field know the players there. In 2012…like I said, 
it depends on the leadership. In the field, we do know it. But again, the 
leader has other considerations for the completeness of witnesses and forms 
of evidence.32
Another challenge faced by the police in handling violence related to post-
conflict local elections in Aceh is the absence of evidences and witnesses. 
Many people know violent actions, but very few of them are willing to become 
witnesses, both at the police investigation level and in the sessions at court 
level. This obstacle quite bothers the police in accelerating the handling of 
violence cases. This is clearly revealed by one of the police personnel in Aceh, 
“Besides that, there are still many obstacles like absence of evidences, nobody 
willing to be witnesses. So, that will hamper our work process, Sir.”33
Another challenge related to the issue of coordination between the police 
and post-conflict local election organizers. Efforts to prevent violence cases 
can be done not only through law enforcement, but also intense communi-
cations between participants and organizers of post-conflict local elections 
and the police. For example, mediation efforts to prevent the spreading of 
30 Interview with NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014. 
31 Ayahbanta is the actor of shooting of one of the supporters of candidate pair of pemilukada 
in Aceh. At present he has been sentenced for 18-year imprisonment based on the court verdict.
32 Interview with Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014. 
33 Interview with Aceh Local Police intelligence personnel, Banda Aceh, 29 October 2014. 
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violence can be done if there is good communications among all parties. 
However, the challenges of communications and coordination are still faced 
by the police in Aceh. The challenges of communications and coordination 
are getting more difficult because the role of police does not exist in Bawaslu 
any longer. According to the old legal regulations, the police was one of 
the elements in Bawaslu, but now it is not any longer. This has made com-
munications between Bawaslu and the police unable to run quickly. A real 
example is that in the handling of election-related criminal action, the police 
will only take an action after receiving a report from Bawaslu. Previously, 
since the police became one of the Bawaslu’s elements, the handling process 
of election’s criminal action and genuine criminal action in the post-conflict 
local election period was faster. 
3. Government’s Efforts Through Policy Path 
Another effort of the government to deal with post-conflict local elec-
tion-related violence in Aceh is carried out by using out-of-handling policy 
through security personnel. Competition dynamics between the incumbent 
governor Irwandi Yusuf, who wanted to go again for the 2012 post-conflict 
local election, and a candidate from Aceh Party was clear. Besides that, it is 
believed that the competition between them generated varied violence. PA 
even protested strongly and threatened to boycott the second post-conflict 
local election implementation in Aceh. 
Responding to the situation in Aceh, the central government through the 
Ministry of Home Affairs eventually proposed a request to the Constitutional 
Court to postpone the post-conflict local election implementation in Aceh. 
The Government through the Ministry of Home Affairs, especially the Di-
rectorate General for Regional Autonomy, carried out negotiation with PA to 
attempt postponement of the implementation together. The postponement 
became a condition for PA to revoke its boycott and joined the competition 
in post-conflict local election (Puteh & Fahmi, 2012). The effort of the post-
conflict local election implementation postponement is believed by many par-
ties to prevent and reduce violence in Aceh because most of the violence was 
carried out by the supporters and sympathizers of PA. With the implementa-
tion postponement and boycott revocation by PA, the Aceh post-conflict local 
election was eventually held on April 9, 2012.
4. People’s Efforts to Handle Violence in Post-Conflict Local Election
People’s role in handling post-conflict local election-related violence in 
Aceh is relatively not much. However, there are some actions by the people 
and civil societies which can be regarded as efforts to deal with the violence. 
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5. Monitoring
Even though not directly regarded as an effort to deal with post-conflict lo-
cal election-related violence, monitoring done by the people, especially NGOs 
more or less plays a role in dealing with this problem. In 2006 post-conflict 
local election, the existence of quite many international election monitoring 
institutions such as European Union Election Observation Mission (EUE-
OM), Internasional Republican Institute (IRI), Asian Networking for Free 
Election (ANFREL), National Democratic Intitute (NDI), U.S. Government, 
and Local Government Support Program (LGSP). Domestic monitoring in-
stitutions also participated. They were Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Rakyat/
People Voters Education Network (JPPR) and Komite Independen Pemantau 
Pemilihan/Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP). Local moni-
toring institutions that participated were Forum Lembaga Swadaya Masyara-
kat/Aceh NGO Forum, Aceh Internasional Recovery Program, and I-Card.34
In the 2012 Aceh post-conflict local election, there were some international 
institutions that carried out monitoring such as Asian Network for Free Elec-
tion (ANFREL), European Union, and U.S. Embassy while 15 Indonesian 
monitoring institutions were Aceh Future, Aceh NGO Forum, Aceh Institute, 
and other institutions.35
6. Establishment of Stakeholders’ Forum and Appeal
People and civil society’s moving space for the handling of post-conflict 
local election related-violence in Aceh looks narrow due to security risk factor, 
given the fact that every action that does not side with one of the post-conflict 
local election participant can be interpreted differently, as stated by one of the 
NGO activists in Aceh, “... because parties will consider black and white; If 
supporting them, it means their group; if not, it means their enemy.”36 One 
of the breakthroughs done by civil societies in Aceh when responding to the 
narrow moving space is by initiating the establishment of multi-stakeholders 
forum in the 2006 post-conflict local election implementation. Through 
the forum civil societies try to communicate to parties the findings of post-
conflict local election violations in the field. Also through the forum shared 
solutions are looked for. Many cases were eventually resolved in this forum.37 
Besides the establishment of multi-stakeholders forum, civil societies in Aceh 
also carry out efforts to prevent violence from occurring and promote safe 
post-conflict local election through statements in media, as well as appeals 
through banners. The appeal to prevent violence from happening is also con-
34 http://www.antaranews.com/berita/47979/sebelas-lembaga-pantau-Pemilukada-aceh
35 http://politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/302556-tiga-lembaga-asing-pantau-Pemilukada-aceh
36 Interview with Aceh NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014. 
37 Interview with Aceh NGO activist, Bireuen, 26 June 2014. 
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ducted by religious leaders by making statements that spreading violence with 
the goal of getting power is legally wrong (haram).38
I I .  M A L U K U
a .  V i o l e n c e  i n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
Maluku in 1999-2002 was once a region of violence and conflicts with 
religious nuance. The conflict initially occurred on Ambon island, which 
can be called as the epicenter of the conflict, then spread to various areas 
in Maluku, like Seram Island, Laese Islands (Haruku and Saparua), and 
Southeast Maluku, even to Ternate and Halmahera islands which used to 
be part of Maluku province, before they were proliferated into a separate 
province (North Maluku Province) in 1999. Based on the number of deaths 
resulting from it, the conflict in Maluku can be said as the biggest conflict 
with identity nuance in Indonesia. There is no exact number of the deaths, 
but based on the UNDP data, in the period 1999-2002 5,000 lost their lives 
in the Maluku conflict (Brown et al. 2005). The field fact indicates that the 
number of deaths many be higher than the number stated by UNDP. Vari-
ous writings on Maluku conflict record that this conflict was triggered by 
fights between young people of different religions (Moslems and Christians) 
which then spread in Ambon City, and then stretched out to other regions 
(van Klinken 1999; ICG 2000).
On February 12, 2002, due to facilitation effort from the central govern-
ment through the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare Jusuf Kalla 
and Coordinating Minister for Politics, Justice and Security Susilo Bambang 
Yudoyono, a peace negotiation between Moslem and Christian representatives 
was held in Poso City, South Sulawesi. From the negotiation, a peace agree-
ment called Malino II Peace Agreement was born. Despite series of violence 
after the peace agreement signing, in general the conditions of Ambon and 
Maluku generally and gradually were getting better. With the Malino II, 
Maluku entered the post-conflict period. Reconstruction and rehabilitation 
efforts were carried out massively. The central government also issued a presi-
dential instruction No. 6 Year 2003 on the Accelerated Building Rehabilita-
tion in Maluku Province and North Maluku Province after the Conflict.
When the Maluku people entered the post-conflict phase, the democrat-
ic process in the form of governor’s election was held through the election 
mechanism in Provincial Legislative Council (DPRD) in 2003 for the period 
2003-2008. The Maluku Governor election for the next period was carried 
out directly. So, until 2015 Maluku has organized three post-conflict governor 
38 Result of interview with Serambi Indonesia journalist, Banda Aceh, 20 June 2014. 
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elections; one election through DPRD (2003-2008) and two direct elections 
(2008-2013 and 2013-2017). 
The NVMS data recorded that in the post-conflict local election con-
ducted through the Maluku Province DPRD on August 16, 2003 there were 
no violent actions related to the election process. The election in the Provin-
cial DPRD had two rounds. The first round was followed by four pairs of 
governor and vice governor candidates. The two pairs with the most votes 
in the first round joined the second round. The result was the pair Brig.Gen 
(Ret.) Karel Albert Ralahalu and Drs. Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina was 
elected as Governor and Vice Governor of Maluku Province for the period 
2003-2008. Even though the election had two rounds, the overall process 
ran securely.
In the direct post-conflict local elections in 2008 and 2013, some post-
conflict local election-related violence occurred, but in general the intensity 
was not too significant. In the 2008 post-conflict local election, the NVMS 
data recorded only three violent incidents that caused 6 people injured; while 
in the 2013 post-conflict local election there were 9 violent incidents that had 
three injured people and three damaged buildings (see Graph 16). 
Graph 16: Violence Related to Governor’s Direct Post-Conflict Local Election in 
Maluku (2008 and 2013)
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Meanwhile, in the post-conflict period there were some pemilukadas at 
the district/city levels in some areas that used to be the centers of conflicts 
such as Ambon City, Central Maluku district, Western Seram (SBB), Eastern 
Seram (SBT) (both districts are proliferation from Central Maluku district), 
Southeast Maluku, and Kota Tual (proliferation from Southeast Maluku dis-
trict). Related to the implementation of district/city level post-conflict local 
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elections, NVMS data record violence cases in the post-conflict local election 
of Central Maluku district, Eastern Seram, Western Seram, Southeast Maluku 
and Tual city with varied number and intensity. (see Graph 17).
Graph 17: Violence Related to District/City-Level Post-Conflict  
Local Election in Maluku
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Most of violence happened in Eastern Seram district, 12 incidents from 
three post-conflict local election implementations in 2005, 2009, and 2010. 
From the entire violent actions related to the post-conflict local elections, 
some were torture and destruction which injured 16 people and damaged 
14 buildings. In Ambon city, which was the epicenter of Maluku conflict in 
1999-2002, during the post-conflict period there were three mayor elections 
but there was no post-conflict local election-related violence. 
b .  C a u s e s  o f  E m e r g i n g  V i o l e n c e  E m e r g e n c e 
i n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
As post-conflict region, Maluku in general has potential for violence, es-
pecially if there is competition that involves many people, including post-
conflict local election. Some factors influence the potential. First, there is 
still a segregation of region based on religions, Islam and Christianity. This 
segregation is a real impact that can still be seen as the result of the 1999-2002 
conflict. Actually the segregation in Maluku, especially on Ambon Island is 
not a new thing but has a long history (Ansori et al. 2014). Negri or village 
in Maluku is formed based on religious similarity of the people, in which 
a negri is often called “Moslem negri” or “Christian negri” according to the 
religions the people embrace. 
In some areas especially in Ambon city, before the conflict, it was inhab-
ited by mixed populations, Moslems and Christians. The conflict with reli-
gious issue has made segregation in Maluku become clearer. There are regions 
where after the conflict the populations are still mixed, between Moslems 
and Christians such as Wayame and Waringin. But in general, most of the 
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post-conflict areas in Maluku are currently segregated based on religion. The 
segregation strengthens group fanaticism so that it hampers inter-community 
interaction processes and becomes the potential for the emergence of violence. 
This is admitted by one of the Maluku Bawaslu members. 
Never let someone misuse it, for instance, by provocation. That will be 
fatal. Why? Because we are still segregated. And the segregation becomes 
a land for fanaticism and primordialism. The Moslems get stronger with 
their Islam, the other stronger with Christianity. So, with a little touch, 
it will be broken.39
Besides different religions, Maluku people also consist of various tribes and 
ethnicities. In some particular areas such as Eastern Seram district, the major-
ity of the people are Moslems, but the people’s sentiment established there is 
based on ethnicity. On the eve of post-conflict local elections, the ongoing 
issue is about ethnicity. This is related to the competition of the candidates 
who are Moslems, but come from different tribes. At last, the ethnic senti-
ment gets stronger. And inter-ethnicity frictions potentially occur if there is 
strong exploitation to the ethnic sentiment for the sake of winning votes in 
post-conflict local elections, as stated by an informant.
In SBT district there will be a regent election. There are candidates from 
Werinama tribe and candidate from Bula. This may trigger inter-ethnicity 
clashes. There Moslmes are dominant. There, ethnical sentiments are built. 
Now it has started, Bula has developed its force; Werinama has too and 
Geser has already started. And the post-conflict local election will be 
certainly hot because their candidates are equally strong.40
Secondly, threats that potentially generate violence related to post-conflict 
local elections include many inter-village conflicts in Maluku that are still 
unfinished until now. These inter-village conflicts always rise and sink. It 
means, the conflicts can occur everytime there is a trigger even though it is a 
small trigger. It can be said that inter-village conflicts has been handed down 
and inherited from one generation to the next generations. The operational 
chief of the Maluku Local Police stated some inter-village conflicts kept going 
on: conflict between Porto village and Haria over spring issue, inter-village 
conflict between Seith village and Lima Negri, conflict between Mamala and 
Morela and conflict between Larika and Wakasiu villages.
One of the reasons that cause inter-village conflicts inherited through 
generations is high sentiment from the village people to defend their villages. 
As stated by the Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police, there is a saying 
39 Interview with Maluku Bawaslu member, Ambon, 23 August 2014.
40 Interview with Maluku Bawaslu member, Ambon 23 August 2014. 
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“I am the son of negri, I remember my mom’s advice, protect the negri until 
the last drop of your blood.” This saying has made the inter-village conflicts 
difficult to settle. Besides that, inter-negri alliance relation can also make 
inter-village conflicts get bigger. In Maluku there is a pela culture between 
two or more villages.41 The inter-negri pela relation is established for a noble 
goal, namely mutual help. But the relation also has a potential for creating 
problems, as stated by Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police, “So, pela 
gandong that is adored as the local wisdom, can also potentially create prob-
lems. ‘It is obligatory for you to help me.’”42 
Thirdly, another potential that can push the emergence of post-conflict 
local election related-violence is the experience of Maluku people on the past 
conflicts. The 1999 conflict is over indeed and the promotion of sustainale 
peace is continuously carried out by various components of the people and the 
government, but the experience on the bitterness of the conflict still remains 
and does not fully disappear. One of the informants that is active in the peace-
building in Maluku gives a remark on “... child soldier who said that they are 
always ready whenever there is conflict.” What is referred to as child soldiers 
here are those in the 1999-2002 conflicts were still in child-age and involved 
in the conflicts. Now they are teenagers but their memory on the conflicts is 
still strong. According to the informant, former child soldier is very brave and 
does not have any fear due to past conflict experience. They also have high 
conflict capacity because they can use any weapons; even they have the capac-
ity to make bombs by themselves. Then, the informant revealed its research 
result on child soldiers that “85%, 90% from 35 child soldiers admitted to 
be ready at any time. It means they still keep their rage.”43
In addition to various factors that potentially stimulate post-conflict local 
election-related violence above, based on the data and evaluation by Ma-
luku Local Police, in the Maluku province overall there are 129 conflict-
prone spots.44 Many conflict-prone spots show that Maluku still has fairly 
big conflict potential. However, some implementations of post-conflict local 
elections both at the provincial and district/city levels show that potentials 
for violence do not realized into massive violence that involve many people. 
In other words, there are factors that can stifle the occurence of violence in 
post-conflict local election.
One of the factors is the level of public awareness on conflict prevention 
and creation of peaceful atmosphere in Maluku. With the high awareness, 
41 Pela is alliance relation between Moslem and Christian negri/villages that consist of two or 
more negris. The alliance relation can be caused due to family relation or from one father or often 
called pela gandong, and relation due to past history, like two negris that used to be involved in a 
war but then were reconciled by making pela. 
42 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
43 Interview with inter-faith dialog activist, Ambon, 22 August 2014. 
44 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
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the people are not easy to be provoked. This is admitted by the Operational 
Chief of Maluku Local Police:
Threats based on the prediction of our intelligence, existed, but they did 
not happen. This did not just come but it is cooperation. So not only the 
police and soldiers, the people are already aware, and this is the most im-
portant thing. With public awareness, this has a high value. “Well, I don’t 
wanna conflicts anymore. Even though I am provoked, I don’t want to be 
provoked.” That is quite high. If we see in other areas, there are burnings, 
KPU was burned, and all was burned. There are no such things in here.45
Maluku people’s awareness is also supported by the strong belief that the 
1999 conflict is not caused by the Maluku people, but because of the elites 
who were provoked from outside Maluku. Therefore, Maluku people have 
awareness on not wanting to be divided. As stated by an informant who was 
former kind “Many Maluku people say that don’t disturb us. We are already 
safe and secure.” One of the former refugees in Christian community said,
The riot has made use stronger. Last time riot was caused by the interest 
of powerful men that used religious issue for reciprocal destruction. It was 
felt by us as Maluku people. Now, if something happens, we do not bother 
it, both Moslems and Christians.46
People’s awareness to move forward and forget the past conflict is described 
in the statement from an informant who is a private TV reporter in Ambon:
We here may have blessings. We used to analyze that conflicts in Maluku 
claimed people’s lives. In my mind and all of my friends’ minds that in 
Ambon, in Maluku, it is not safe any more for the next seventh genera-
tion. We thought about that. Some people lost their fathers or mothers or 
brothers. There were many. So in our mind, Maluku is not safe anymore 
until the next seventh generation, but what we assumed turned out dif-
ferent. Now we have forgotten what happened. We think all of them are 
normal. It is the Will of God.47
The fairly high level of public awareness makes provocation to the people 
for potential conflicts and violence become hard. An academician of Pat-
timura University said, “… because here the general public are not provoked; 
then the security personnel is one the alert 1 level.”48 
45 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
46 Interview with former Maluku conflict refugee, Ambon, 24 August 2014. 
47 Interview with reporter, Ambon, 22 August 2014. 
48 Interview with Unpatti academician, Ambon, 25 August 2014. 
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Implementation of post-conflict local elections was initially feared by the 
Maluku people to generate conflicts or violence. But it turned out after the 
implementation of several times of post-conflict local election at the provincial 
and district/city levels, such fear was not proved. The post-conflict Maluku 
people are more careful, as stated by an informant. 
Post-conflict local election in Maluku in the post-conflict era, we felt 
scared but it was only an issue. In fact when we had two pemilukadas, 
nothing happened. Why? When we had the post-conflict local elections, 
two groups mingled in one interest. So, in the post-conflict local election, 
for me the Maluku people turned to be very careful. For instance, in East-
ern Seram, even though there was one group, there were still small ripples 
but there was significant difference before the conflicts. In Ambon, for 
instance, once there was a little friction, they got angry. But now, small 
friction will not make them angry. It is normal. We don’t know about it 
after conflict, because all people are mutually careful and we respect each 
other. So, but if it is not designed well by the government, conflict may 
explode again. But in the context of previous post-conflict local elections 
we think it normal, but people thing that it would be dangerous, but it 
was not.49
Another factor, related to the people composition based on religion, both 
Moslem and Christian communities, is there is no domination between the 
two in terms of quantity. Moreover various post-conflict local elections im-
plementation both at the provincial and district/city levels, more than two 
candidate pairs joined. If one candidate pair only uses particular religious 
issue, either Moslem or Christian, it will be hard to get the majority of votes. 
Therefore, in order to win post-conflict local elections, many candidate pairs 
consist of combination of two religious groups. If the candidate for the local 
leader is Moslem, the deputy is Christian; on the contrary, if the candidate for 
the local leader is Christian, the deputy is Moslem. Such combination seems 
to be a necessity, as stated by the Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police, 
“Yes always like that. It is a must here. It is obligatory in order to maintain 
the balance.”50
The combination of candidate pair can have two meanings. First, the com-
bination is intended to accommodate the values of balance between Moslems 
and Christians. Issue of balance increases more. Even though not admitted 
in a firm fashion, the fact of that thing is like a law. Secondly, the combina-
tion is a political language to get vote supports from both groups. The use of 
the pair’s combination ris related to the high primordialism and patron-clien 
49 Interview with private TV reporter, Ambon, 22 August 2014. 
50 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
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in the politics in Maluku, as stated by an informant, “Primordialism is still 
strong now. Quite strong, we must be honest. That’s very strong. That is then 
used as an issue because it is engineered. It is made an issue of cutting and 
taking masses, cutting supporters.” 51
Combination of candidate pair is also intended to facilitate communi-
cations wth Moslem and Christian voter candidates. Segregation based on 
religious line in Maluku, for candidate pairs, can hamper communications 
with voters if the pairs only consist of one religious group. Combination of 
candidate pairs enables communications with each community groups to run 
well. They can share roles, in which Christian candidates will be easier to 
communicate with Christian society, while Moslem candidates will be easier 
to communicate with Moslem society.
Potential for the emergence of violence and presence of factors that can 
stifle potential violence in Maluku has made the intensity of violence related 
to post-conflict local elections at the provincial and district/city levels not 
high, as stated by an informant from Maluku Bawaslu, “According to me 
(violence) is small; small because violence occurs in the villages, or in sub-
district which does not involve masses of people.”52 Another informant from 
NGO also shared the opinion, saying: “No, nothing was striking. If there 
is violence, it is only in that location. For instance, in this complex violence 
happens here only, then is finished and other places are not disturbed. It is 
different from the past violence in the conflict era from 1999 to 2004, it was 
pretty difficult. If there is a conflict in one place, it can trigger conflicts in 
other areas.”53
c .  Pa t t e r n s  o f  E m e r g i n g  V i o l e n c e  i n  
Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
Despite the factor of Maluku people’s high awareness on not repeating 
violence or conflicts in Maluku, some violence related to post-conflict local 
election still continue to occur. From the data recorded in SNPK, during the 
implementation of post-conflict local elections in Maluku, both at the pro-
vincial and district/city levels, the most dominant forms of violence related 
to post-conflict local elections are torture (14) and destruction (12), then 
demonstration (7). Torture is usually conducted by the supporting team or 
sympathizers of candidate pairs to supporters or sympathizers of opposing 
candidates. For instance, on May 1, 2013 in Sehati village, Amahai sub-
district, Central Maluku district, YN, a functionary of Democratic Party’s 
Branch Leadership Body was strangled and his face was spat by MW, a local 
51 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
52 Interview with Maluku Bawaslu member, Ambon 23 August 2014. 
53 Interview with NGO activist, Ambon, 22 August 2014. 
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village authority. WM came to YN’s house and forbade him to put Democrat-
ic Party’s attributes or campaign instruments of the pair “Bob–Arif” (Jacobis 
Puttileihalat–Arifin Tapi Oyihoe) in every corner of Sehati village because 
the village is the area of the pair “Beta Tulus” (Abdullah Tuasikal–Hendrik 
Lewerissa). After threatening YN, WM came to the command post of the 
pair Bob–Arif and took out the flag of Democratic Party there. The incident 
is related to the competition in the 2013 election of Maluku governor and 
vice-governor.54 
One of the interesting findings on the violence related to post-conflict 
local elections in Maluku is that the violence is localized in particular areas. 
The violence does not trigger violence or spread to other areas. More violence 
occurs in post-conflict local elections at the district/city levels compared to 
post-conflict local elections at the provincial level. Also violence only occurs in 
particular regions such as Eastern Seram (SBT) and Central Maluku districts. 
Even though, in general, violence of post-conflict local elections in Maluku 
is relatively low, various tensions occur. These tensions are more caused by 
competition between supporters and sympathizer of candidate pair that tend 
more to use ethnic issues than religious one. In a particular region, such as 
SBT district whose majority of the people are Moslem; the growing issue is 
more on ethnical issue. One of the Maluku Bawaslu stated,
... Ethnicity is quite strong here, actually because there is candidate from 
Southeast Maluku’s Kei person, and then in SBT there is Teo subdstrict 
which closer to Southeast Maluku. So people with cultural relations with 
Southeast Maluku district. There was once a tension, but no physical 
clashes occurred. But there was tension between Kei people and Seram.55
Ethnic and religious issues continue to be played by the success team of 
candidate pairs to get support and votes. Religious issues are played especially 
through private spaces (dialog between two or three people), not through 
open forums that involve many people. The use of religious issues is not ac-
companied by mobilization of the masses. Therefore, there is no violence that 
has background on religious issues in the pemilukadas in Maluku. One of the 
informants admitted,
No, there isn’t anything like that. This method is the way in which the 
success team uses to influence a mass of supporters at the grass root. So, 
there is no massive physical mobilization. It is the issue and it is played 
beautifully by the success teams.56
54 Case example is taken from SNPK data.
55 Interview with Maluku Bawaslu member, Ambon 23 August 2014. 
56 Interview with Maluku Bawaslu member, Ambon 23 August 2014. 
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One of the issues that grows and spreads in the 2013 Maluku Province 
post-conflict local election is the turn of a local leader from a particular reli-
gion because people from the other religion has assumed the position twice, as 
stated by one of the Maluku Bawaslu members, “... that Christians has been 
governor for two periods, now it’s time for Moslems. How come Moslems 
cannot be the governor?”57 The use of ethnic and religious issues actually has 
the potential for provoking the people who have experiences of the conflict 
in the past. However, the provocation does not push and generate violence. 
Provocation is used by the success team of candidate pairs as a strategy to 
beat opponent’s votes. The Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police said,
There are provoking ways. That’s general election. Even in the presidential 
election, some people said, for instance, Jokowi was like this. This also 
happened in the current governor election. When he is still a candidate, 
people say he is Moslem fanatic. There were leaflets from the supporters 
as a reaction. This did not create conflict directly. This effort only tried 
to spread issues and to reduce opponent’s votes.58
Even though Maluku people with high awareness cannot be provoked any 
longer by religious issues, but the use of the issue is still regarded as potentially 
negative. So it needs to be kept on guard, as stated by an informant:
Maluku, yes. Violence does not exist in the group and religious group. But 
it still exists especially in the areas that have potential for conflicts, even 
though it is not massive and does not influence Maluku security signifi-
cantly, but it is still potential conflict.59
Eventually the people’s awareness becomes important to prevent violence 
from happening in pemilukada in Maluku. The religious issues will eventually 
be left behind and shifts to a system that sides more with social and economic 
programs. One of the informants firmly said,
So whether he is Moslem or Christian, when he assumes the position and 
is wrong, the Christian will go amok, and Moslems go amok. Sometimes 
they use various ways to confirm that, but I am convinced in the future. 
I told to my colleagues in politics “You cannot fight the trend era. This 
issue will be greatly sold well. We will enter a glocal space in which it will 
really be determined by merit system”60
57 Interview with Bawaslu member, Ambon 23 August 2014. 
58 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
59 Interview with Unpatti academician, Ambon, 25 August 2014. 
60 Interview with inter-faith dialog activities, Ambon, 22 August 2014. 
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d .  M o r e  P r i o r i t i z i n g  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g 
t h a n  D e m o c r a c y  D e v e l o p m e n t
Major conflicts in Maluku have more than one decade ended. In the 
post-conflict period, some post-conflict local elections were organized both 
at the provincial and district/city levels. However, past time conflict experi-
ences and public awareness on not repeating conflict have become a spirit in 
dealing with post-conflict local election. This makes Maluku people more 
prioritize the aspect of peace in handling various post-conflict local elections 
in Maluku. 
Option for prioritizing peace is also based on the real need for peaceful 
situation. Since there is such need, Malino II Peace Agreement has run natu-
rally. This was stated by a Bawaslu member:
Well, our peace is built by itself naturally. The people feel the need for 
peaceful atmosphere; can find food, to market, can access this or that, this 
will be built by itself. Malino is the formality, in my opinion. So, let’s see 
how people can provoke the society currently? I am optimistic, nothing 
will happen here. Peace is a need. Peace is a need, so the peace must be 
continuously implemented, against provocation, or many other things.”61
e .  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  Pe o p l e ’s  E f f o r t s  t o  D e a l  W i t h 
V i o l e n c e  i n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
1. Government’s Effort 
The Maluku people’s awareness on not getting involved in conflict must be 
recognized as a spirit that has influence in the low number of violence related 
to post-conflict local election in Maluku. On the other hand, such aware-
ness must be supported and balanced by the government’s role in defending 
the post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku so that it can run 
smoothly and securely. The government takes the role in dealing with vio-
lence related to post-conflict local election in Maluku, one of which through 
security personnel/police. The position of police is very important. The people 
are fairly dependent on the police to guard peaceful situation and secure post-
conflict local election. Since the huge expectation to the police to maintain 
peaceful atmosphere, professionalism and neutrality of the police become the 
important prerequisite, as stated by one of the former refugee informants:
The personnel must really not side with anyone, but side with the truth, 
in order not to trigger it. That’s what happened. So last time the security 
61 Interview with Maluku Bawaslu member, Ambon, 23 August 2014. 
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personnel had a strict attitude so that it helped to support post-conflict 
local election condition so that post-conflict local election can run.62
The importance of the police’s neutrality is also realized by Maluku Local 
Police. Every police action in the effort of prevention and handling of vio-
lence related to general election can have negative impacts if in the duty the 
police are regarded non-neutral by the people. This can trigger the problem 
and other violence. The Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police said, “It 
was emphasized by the Local Police Chief that no police officer siding with 
candidate, and if this happen, it will create chaos/trouble.”63
The condition of Maluku region is unique. The region’s width is 720,000 
km2, but 93.6% of the width is sea. It means the Maluku inland region is only 
6.4% from the total width and spread in hundreds of islands. The natural 
condition becomes a particular challenge for police personnel in handling 
violence related post-conflict local elections in Maluku. The solution taken 
by the police in order to handle violence related to post-conflict local elec-
tions in Maluku. The solution taken by the police in dealing the challenge is 
by conducting coordination with various parties including the government, 
TNI and post-conflict local election organizers. In the coordination meet-
ing, phases of post-conflict local elections and potential for influence were 
discussed. Operational Chief of Maluku Local Police revealed:
We conduct a coordination meeting with three institutions, namely KPU, 
local government and the police. TNI backs up from behind. Then, KPU 
explains the phases (of pemilukada). The police also make presentation of 
the security levels along with budget requirements, so that KPU and the 
police become inseparable partners.64
In the coordination phase, the police and KPU anticipate for the poten-
tial problems or violence, even the smallest potential. The police guard all 
the phases of post-conflict local elections from the shipment of ballot boxes 
through the installation of the elected local leaders. The Operational Chief 
of the Maluku Local Police gave an example of the guarding process by the 
police in the governor’s post-conflict local election.
On the eve of post-conflict local election, we have agreed the phases with 
KPU/organizers and identified which crucial phases we need to (conduct 
the guarding) for instance, the shipment of ballot boxes and voting. So 
there is even no smallest space for not conducting the guarding. So, we 
must secure every of the smallest things of each phase by taking techni-
62 Interview with former Maluku conflict refugee, Ambon, 24 August 2014. 
63 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
64 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
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cal and tactical actions because the potential still exists. Therefore, by 
looking at the potential, based on the intelligence prediction, we need 
to prepare the guarding plan for every phase, starting from the start like 
shipment of ballot boxes, then to the next phase to the recent instal-
lation.65
Another effort done by the police in order to prevent violence is the se-
curity engineering. The plice tries to minimize gatherings of sympathizers 
or supporters of different candidate pairs in particular spots. Technical ef-
forts that are conducted include coordination with KPU to arrange campaign 
schedules. The police also design campaign paths or routes which will not 
collide or be conducted at the same time. With such field arrangements, the 
meeting of the different supporters which potentially creates violence does not 
develop into a real security disturbance.66 Besides that, to support the police’s 
quick movements in handling potential violence, the police also accumulate 
the number of personnel in strategic spots. The strategic spots are those clos-
est to the areas which have potential for post-conflict local election-related 
violence. Therefore, if there is violence, the plice will immediately go to the 
places and do guarding efforts.
Efforts to prevent violence from occurring are also taken by the police, 
KPU and various parties through “peaceful election” agreement among can-
didate pairs and success teams. The joint declaration of “peaceful election” 
is also conducted to convey a message and example to the sympathizers that 
candidate pairs prioritize peaceful post-conflict local election processes. 
Therefore, sympathizers are expected to follow their leaders. Of course all of 
the efforts done by the police cannot run well without the support from the 
local government. One of the supports given is the budget support. The TNI 
(Indonesian Military) provides support by backing up police’s efforts in the 
guarding process. Besides that, the support and cooperation in carrying out 
guarding are also given by the post-conflict local election organizers (KPU 
and Panwaslu) both at the provincial and district/city levels. The Operational 
Chief of Maluku Local Police described the importance of the support and 
cooperation of all parties as the key of post-conflict local election guarding 
in Maluku. 
“In Ambon, it can run peacefully and smoothly thanks to all of us. The 
local government gives support, TNI/the police give support, the people 
give support to create security.”67
65 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014. 
66 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
67 Interview with Maluku Local Police, Ambon, 26 August 2014.
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2. People’s Efforts
Low number and intensity of violence related to post-conflict local elec-
tions in Maluku, not only due to the role of the government, but also due to 
people’s participation. As discussed earlier, the real role of the Maluku people 
includes the building of high awareness that they do not want to be provoked 
any longer. The awareness has even placed the peaceful atmosphere as the 
need of the Maluku people. 
The role in handling potential violence is also conducted by some NGOs 
in Ambon, especially NGOs that carry out post-conflict local election su-
pervision. Support from donor agencies for NGOs in Maluku in conducting 
supervision of post-conflict local election is said to be very small, if we don’t 
want to regard it as none. With minimal support, NGOs still play their 
role in guarding the smooth implementation of post-conflict local election 
through supervision. The supervision conducted by NGOs has more or less 
stifle potential for violence since their presence makes the campaign teams 
and sympathizers feel being watched over and eventually they try to perform 
according to the rules.
At the community level, efforts to prevent violence from occurring are 
conducted through various methods. One of them is through pulpits bot in 
churches and mosques. Religious leaders in each region give enlightenment 
and advice on how to choose good leaders, namely those who fear God. 
Eventually either the elected leaders are from Moslems or Christians, this 
will not be a problem because the people believe that the elected leaders 
fear God.68
The roles of traditional leaders, in this case the kings, are also very 
influential in dealing with the potential for post-conflict local election-
related violence. Traditionally, in Maluku there are 351 kings from various 
traditional villages and 582 village heads (of non-traditional villages). They 
are the ones who directly lead the people at the grass-root level. Therefore, 
they can understand in details the potential for any violence in their areas 
so that preventive efforts can be done earlier. Kings and village heads co-
ordinated under Latupati Assembly if potential violence occurs. Then they 
gather and invite journalists from printed and electronic media to imme-
diately hold press conference. In the press conference, they will explain the 
ongoing condition to all parties, especially the society to guard the secure 
situation. Nevertheless, the actions taken by the kings do not end up merely 
in press releases; they will also immediately go to the incidents’ places to 
calm down the people.69 
68 Interview with former Maluku conflict refugee, Ambon, 24 August 2014. 
69 Interview with former Maluku Latupati Assembly chairperson, Ambon, 23 August 2014. 
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I I I .  P O S T- C O N F L I C T  L O C A L  E L E C T I O N  A N D  V I O L E N C E 
I N  A C E H  A N D  M A L U K U :  C O M P A R A T I V E  A N A L Y S I S
Aceh has its particular uniqueness as a post-conflict region. 30-year long 
armed conflicts in the region has the nuance of vertical conflicts in which 
GAM wanting to release itself from Indonesia must face the Government 
of Indonesia, even though in the developments, in some areas in Aceh oc-
curred the nuance of horizontal conflicts between the Acehnese people and 
Javanese migrants. This is different from the Maluku conflicts which have 
more nuance of horizontal conflicts between religious groups, even though 
we cannot deny the fact that initially in the conflict, ethnic issues once rose 
such as eviction of Bugis, Butonese and Makasarese migrants. 
However, both conflicts in the region can be settled through the same 
path, namely peace negotiation between the conflict parties. In the Aceh 
conflicts, agreement between GAM representatives and the Government of 
Indonesia was facilitated by Martti Ahtisaari from Crisis Management Initia-
tive (CMI) in Helsinki on August 15, 2005. In the Maluku conflict, peace 
agreement was held in Malino, on February 12, 2002 between the Moslem 
and Christian people representatives while the Government of Indonesia 
played a facilitator role. 
The different conflict backgrounds in both regions make the post-conflict 
situation occur differently. Since the Maluku conflict has more horizontal 
nuance, after the peace agreement of the conflicts that used to get involved 
in conflicts remain to be in Maluku; none of the groups leaves the region. 
This causes areas in post-conflict Maluku to be segregated based on religion. 
The condition does not exist in Aceh due to vertical conflict nuance. Post-
conflict Aceh does not experience segregation among the people who used to 
get involved in the conflict.
In post-conflict local election, the goals of each competing candidate pairs 
are to win post-conflict local election by getting the most votes. In this case, 
the competitions occurring in Maluku and Aceh post-conflict local elec-
tions are different one another. In the Maluku post-conflict local elections, 
even though the population is segregated based on religion, one group can-
not ignore the other group if they want to win post-conflict local elections. 
Therefore, candidate pairs try to get support from both previously-conflicting 
groups. In terms of implication, the frequently taken strategy is to combine 
Moslem and Christian figures as one candidate pair of local leader. The use of 
religious issues in the campaign to withdraw public support is not conducted 
in an open fashion because it can have contra-productive impact, namely to 
close opportunity for getting support from another religious group. The use 
of religious issue is used by the success teams of candidate pairs as a campaign 
strategy to attack another candidate pair. Therefore, the violence related to 
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post-conflict local elections in Maluku does not have nuance of or background 
of religious issues. 
In Aceh, it can be said that post-conflict local elections generate inter-
nal competitions among the playing actors. Candidate pairs who are former 
GAM members compete for getting support of votes from former members 
and supporters of GAM. The network that they have built is equally based 
on the GAM network. The target of supports they compete for is the same, 
namely GAM supporters and sympathizers. This situation makes frictions 
even harder given that they are altogether knowledgeable of their respective 
network and strengths. Competition among former GAM people makes the 
violence related to post-conflict local elections in Aceh has higher intensity, 
in terms of quantity and impacts. 
The supporting factor for the emergence of violence makes the character of 
violence related to post-conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku different, 
even though both regions are post-conflict ones. In Aceh, widespread circula-
tion of firearms in the society makes some violence that occur look harder and 
it can be said as “bloody violence”. Shooting, abduction, torture and ambush 
with firearms between success teams and sympathizers of different candidate 
pairs. This is not found in the violence related to post-conflict local elections 
in Maluku. Even though there is no information on the firearms circulation 
in Maluku, violence that uses firearms in post-conflict local election does not 
occur at all. The most incidents are torture and fights between success teams 
and sympathizers of different candidate pairs. 
At the grass-root level, there are similarities in the implementation of post-
conflict local elections in Maluku and Aceh. The Maluku and Aceh people 
both have experiences on conflict situations. This experience has encouraged 
them more to prioritize peaceful condition than conflicts. Similarly, in the 
post-conflict local election implementation, the Aceh and Maluku people 
prefer choosing peaceful implementation of post-conflict local election, even 
though the post-conflict local election processes can be said to be still far 
from the consolidation of democratic values. 
Efforts to handle violence related to post-conflict local elections both in 
Aceh and Maluku is closely related to the role of the government. It can be 
denied that the uproars occurred in the implementation of post-conflict local 
elections in Aceh. That has made the role of the government significant, not 
only the provincial but also the central government. In the Aceh post-conflict 
local elections, the role of the central government looks significant as the 
balancer of internal competition between candidate pairs from GAM. Even 
to pacify the tension and uproars the central government actively carries out 
various efforts such as proposing request of postponement of post-conflict 
local election implementation in Aceh to the Constitutional Court, and do-
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ing negotiation between the central government, in this case the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, with PA. Even though the postponement of the post-conflict 
local elections on one hand is regarded as detrimental for another candidate 
pair, but in reality it can stifle sustained violence. 
In the relatively safe Maluku post-conflict local elections, the role of the 
government is mainly realized at the local government level. The role is much 
more manifested in the form of funding support to the police for guard-
ing and to post-conflict local election organizers. The local government also 
actively coordinates with the security personnel and pemilukada organizers 
in order to anticipate for various problems in the post-conflict local election 
implementation. 
The role of government is closely related to the people’s support and con-
tribution, both CSOs and the general public. In the implementation of post-
conflict local elections in Aceh and Maluku, the roles of CSOs are mani-
fested in the form of supervision. There are situational similarities related 
to post-conflict local election supervision by CSOs in Aceh and Maluku. In 
both regions, the post-conflict local election supervision tends to reduce due 
to decreased public attention, both national and international to the imple-
mentation of post-conflict local election. Practically, funding support from 
donors for CSOs in Maluku is not available, although this situation does not 
paralyze the role of CSOs in the post-conflict local election process monitor-
ing. Decreased monitoring and public attention have indirect impacts on the 
emergence of some post-conflict local election violence, especially in Aceh. 
People’s support at the grass-root level is directed in a real fashion through the 
drive for peaceful post-conflict local election implementation. People’s aware-
ness in Maluku has become basic capital in dealing with various provocations. 
The awareness is also supported by the role of religious figures through their 
sermons in Church or Mosque’s pulpits. In the post-conflict local elections in 
Maluku, the role of traditional figures such as kings as well as governments 
and security personnel is able to stifle the emergence of sustained violence 
related to post-conflict local election implementation. 
C H A P T E R  V I I
Conclusion and Recommendation
I .  C O N C L U S I O N
Post-conflict local election in Aceh and Maluku are intended as a form of 
validation for peace-settlement as well as foundation for the democratization 
process in both regions. In general, implementation of two post-conflict local 
elections in Aceh (2006 and 2012) and three in Maluku (2003, 2008, and 
2013) are regarded as non-fully successful despite various unique challenges 
and problems in each of the regions. In this case, being non-fully successful 
means that the implementation of post-conflict local elections in both regions 
has reached proportions of promotion of sustainable peace and democracy 
development. The findings in the research have clearly confirmed various 
propositions of this study, assuming that the post-conflict local elections have 
helped to develop local democracy and promotion of sustainable peace in 
Aceh and Maluku. 
The implementation of post-conflict local elections in both post-conflict 
regions can be believed to have relatively helped to consolidate and build 
peace in both regions. This condition is confirmed by the increasingly solid 
economic and political stability in Aceh and Maluku. However, criticisms are 
also directed to the level of peace in Aceh which is believed to have not much 
touched substantive issues of peace yet such as socio-economic equity and 
equality, especially among different areas and tribes in Aceh. The important 
factors considered to help build peace and maintain stability in Aceh are 
inter-play political and economic opportunity and access factors. The victory 
of former GAM group through Aceh Party (PA) has placed many PA cadres 
in various centers of powers in Aceh, both legislative and executive ones, es-
pecially the position of governor. The condition has provided wider economic 
access and opportunities for former GAM combatants. Jarstad (1998) even 
emphasized that former rebels or particular groups would feel that peace was 
to expensive if they were eliminated in the future government. On the other 
words, it will be one of the serious dilemmas for the post-conflict local elec-
tion implementation if the former combatant group is eliminated (see also 
Brancati & Snyder 2011).
 On the other hand, peace and stability building in Maluku is related to 
power sharing which becomes the local creative initiative. Of course, the power 
sharing does not automatically help to build peace in Maluku. Therefore, the 
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determiner is that to what extent the combination is not simply a symbol of 
representation, but is also implemented in various programs of equal develop-
ment programs and inter-community dialogs. Nevertheless, at least the power-
sharing initiative becomes a symbol of togetherness that unites Maluku people’s 
common sense. Besides that, other factors are a cultural entity called “pela 
gandong” and Maluku people’s post-conflict increasingly-stronger awareness.
In general, post-conflict local election implementation in Maluku is re-
garded as relatively better compared to in Aceh. The condition may become 
a reflection from different conflict characters between the two, namely hori-
zontal conflicts in Maluku and vertical conflicts in Aceh. However, at macro/
international levels, post-conflict local elections in Aceh are still viewed as a 
particular success. Observed from the security and stability dimensions, for 
instance, the post-conflict local elections in Maluku tend to be safer and stable 
compared to those in Aceh which were accompanied by lots of violence and 
intimidations, as well as horizontal conflicts after 2005 Peace Agreement. The 
finding is definitely in line with NVMS data concerning violent incidents in 
post-conflict local elections (2005-2013), in which post-conflict local election-
related violent incidents in the period in Aceh reached the number of some 300 
cases and in Maluku less than 100 cases.1 Even, violence and intimidations in 
Aceh tended to increase and spread evenly, instead of decreasing, in the 2012 
post-conflict local election. In Maluku, sporadic violence was only located in 
particular areas such as South-east Maluku, Tual City, and SBT (Eastern Se-
ram). Lots of dissatisfaction with post-conflict local election results in Maluku 
that ended in the Constitutional Court is regarded as good progress since they 
were not manifested in violent ways.
From the technical-procedural dimension the implementation in both re-
gions runs smoothly according to the general standard of post-conflict local 
election organizing. However, many criticisms are also directed to the post-
conflict local election implementation in Aceh which is much believed to be 
not neutral. The condition is believed to be more caused by the selection of 
Aceh KIP members by DPRA. However, it must be admitted that there are 
still technical-procedural problems in the post-conflict local election imple-
mentation in both regions, especially related to vote-counting fraud. Besides 
that, the development of the substance of democracy in Aceh is considered not 
to be fully achieved such as freedom of expressions, protection of minority, 
equity of social and economic development, respect to different values, views 
and opinions, etc. The Aceh people are considered to still easily use short cuts 
of violence, intimidation and terrors to deal with differences in opinions and 
views. On the other hand, the development of the substance of democracy in 
1 See the SNPK data table in the preface chapter.
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Maluku is still considered to be better in which the people are free to express 
aspirations, opinions and voices without any pressure, intimidation or terrors. 
Various studies on democracy and democratization show that the path to 
democracy is often steep and full of conflicts, even violence. The post-conflict 
local election process can help build peace, but also can become an entry point 
to violence because the competitive character of the elections is dichotomy: win-
lose.2 In this context, threats to instability and violence in the post-conflict local 
election implementation in Aceh tend to take the form of inter-civilians conflicts 
and violence, both PA supporters and non-PA supporters and between supporters 
or PA elites. In the 2006 post-conflict local election, violence and intimidations 
were not so filled as in 2012 and political frictions still occurred between PA 
supporters and non-PA supporters. However, entering the 2012 post-conflict 
local election, the levels of violence, terror and intimidations tended to increase 
and new political friction occurred, between PA and PNA. From the aspect of 
actors, former combatant elites are often regarded as the cause of the emerging 
conflicts and threats to instability in post-conflict local elections and in general 
in the peace-building process. However, the threats to instability and violence are 
considered not to eventually cancel post-conflict local election implementation 
nor even threaten peace-building prospects in Aceh. On the other hand, threats 
to instability and violence in the post-conflict local election implementation and 
peace-building in Maluku is generally considered to come from various types 
of actors, both individuals and particular groups/community organizations, and 
generally takes the form of political provocations by using religious variable both 
through SMS or leaflets. 
Competition among former GAM has made post-conflict local election-
related violence in Aceh relatively high in the intensity both in the aspects of 
quantity and impacts, compared to in Maluku. The key supporting factor for 
the emergence of violence in Aceh is the widespread circulation of firearms 
within the society. This is not found in the post-conflict local election related-
violence in Maluku. Even though there is no information on the circulation 
of firearms in Maluku, violence that uses firearms in the post-conflict local 
elections did not occur at all. The most incidents included torture and fights 
between different success teams and candidate pair sympathizers. 
At the grass-root level, bitter experiences of conflicts that the Aceh and 
Maluku peoples had before have encouraged them to prioritize peaceful situ-
ation and stability rather than conflicts and violence. Besides that, in the 
Aceh post-conflict local elections, the role of the central government looks 
significant as the balancer of internal competition and tension among can-
didate pairs, especially candidates from GAM, for instance by proposing 
postponement of 2012 post-conflict local election. Even though the post-
2 See Jerstad 1998, p. 29; Hoglund 1998; Kuhne 2010; and Korth 2011.
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conflict local election postponement is considered to be detrimental to other 
candidate pairs, but in reality it can stifle sustained violence. Meanwhile in 
Maluku post-conflict local elections that are relatively secure, the role of the 
government is relatively not so significant. The role is more manifested in the 
form of fund support for the police and post-conflict local election organizers 
to guard post-conflict local elections.
Lastly, sustainable peace requires good governance.3 Good governance, 
thus, becomes important indicators of success or failure of democracy develop-
ment and peace-building in post-conflict regions.4 Beside people’s participa-
tion, various dimensions of governance such as accountability, transparency, 
public service and law enforcement are not full yet in both post-conflict 
regions. People’s participation in post-conflict local elections in both regions 
is relatively good, around 70 percent. Unfortunately, the participation tended 
to decline in the last post-conflict local election. Accountability in Maluku 
is considered to be relatively better than in Aceh. Even the public in Aceh 
tends to consider that there is no difference between the leaders coming from 
former GAM or not. Transparency in both post-conflict regions tends to 
be still poor and often becomes the object of public criticisms. Besides that, 
law enforcement against violence occurring in post-conflict local elections in 
Maluku is still regarded as better than in Aceh. The massive and repeated 
violence in Aceh post-conflict local elections is often related to the weak law 
enforcement. The law enforcement in the criminal domain tends to get better 
in both regions. However, law enforcement against corruption in both regions 
tends to remain unmoved.
I I .  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 
Based on the findings in this study, some recommendations can be for-
mulated as follows:
a .  P e m i l u k a d a ,  Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g  a n d  D e m o c r a c y 
D e v e l o p m e n t  I n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  R e g i o n s 
1. Aceh
•	 Level of peace in Aceh is considered by many parties not to have touched 
substantial problems of democracy yet such as socio-economic equal-
ity and equity, especially inter-region and tribe in Aceh. In this case, 
the local government or authorities of Aceh Province elected through 
post-conflict local elections must consider more and prioritize particular 
3 See Jarstad 2008, pages 18-19; Lyons 2002 page 5; Reilly 2008.
4 See Korth 2011
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regions or tribes that are socio-economically regarded as far underdevel-
oped compared to other regions or tribes.
•	 Substantively, democracy development in Aceh is considered not to 
fully touch the democratic values in Aceh such as freedom of expres-
sion, minority protection, respect to differences in values, values and 
opinions, etc. It must be admitted that the development of democratic 
values requires particular time and process. Therefore, various related 
stakeholders including Aceh local government, politicians, political 
parties, NGOs, universities, media, etc., must cooperate and start to 
pay more attention to the condition by providing political education, 
training, and socialization intensively, both in the form of informal 
activities/programs, such as political training and socialization in vari-
ous public and formal spaces such as particular curriculum or subjects.
•	 Threats to instability in the peace-building and democracy develop-
ment, taking the form of violent actions, intimidations, and terrors tend 
to refer to the conflicts among former GAM members namely PA and 
PNA elites. For better peace-building and democracy development, the 
parties’ elites are advised to restrain themselves and not to use violent 
ways and intimidation. Such ways are believed only to victimize the 
people. The use of violent ways is no more than a forceful form and far 
from democratic attitude and system, in which various differences in 
interests should be managed in a peaceful and equal manner.
b .  M a l u k u
•	 The power sharing initiatives are considered to become one of the 
important factors that help build and consolidate peace in Maluku. 
However, various stakeholders of peace-building and democracy de-
velopment are recommended to prioritize competency and profession-
alism as well as real peace programs more, apart from power sharing 
consideration. 
•	 Another factor that is believed to play an important role in maintain-
ing peace and democracy stability so far is the people’s strengthened 
awareness. In this case the Maluku local government and civil society 
elements are recommended to keep on protecting and strengthening 
the awareness by various creative programs and activities.
•	 Potential for instability in peace-building and democracy development 
in Maluku tends to take the form of political provocations in the post-
conflict local election (pemilukadas pasca-konflik) by using religious 
variable, both via SMS or leaflets. To anticipate for it, the Maluku local 
government and various related stakeholders especially the security ele-
ments, are expected to work together to strengthen people’s awareness 
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and give diverse understanding and knowledge on various forms of 
provocation consistently. The mechanism can be used in various ways 
such as SMS, counter-leaflets, sermons in mosques or Churches, public 
hearing or particular socialization and training.
c .  G o v e r n a n c e  i n  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  R e g i o n s
1. Aceh
•	 The Aceh Local Government’s accountability is considered to tend 
to be poor. Even the general public emphasizes there is no difference 
between the leaders from former GAM and not GAM. To improve the 
accountability, the Aceh local government, bureaucracy or leaders must 
be honest and keep their promises, prioritize people’s prosperity more 
than enrich themselves, and willing to and capable of listening to and 
absorb people’s aspirations, not use violent ways, as well as leave behind 
and put an end to various types of KKN. 
•	 Transparency related to the recruitment of public officials and project 
tenders and financial affairs of the Aceh local government becomes 
a particular problem, which makes transparency in Aceh tend to be 
poor. To improve the transparency the Aceh local government must 
make the mechanisms for development project tenders and recruitment 
of public officials more transparent. In the Irwandi Yusuf ’s leadership 
(2006-2011), the fit and proper test mechanism was once applied de-
spite various defects. Unfortunately such mechanism was then deleted 
in the current Aceh government.
•	 The people consider that public service in Aceh does not still meet 
their expectations. In order to improve public service, the Aceh local 
government must strengthen the capacity and knowledge of public 
officials, strengthen the political will of the public officials to deliver 
public services, to improve public service facilities especially outside 
Banda Aceh, and in general reduce public service gaps between Banda 
Aceh city and outside Banda Aceh.
•	 There is a decline in post-conflict local election participation rate. To 
increase the participation again, the Aceh local government and other 
Aceh leaders/bureaucrats must enhance the level of public trust to them 
along with better performance and behaviors that are far from corrup-
tion. 
•	 Law enforcement in Aceh is considered not to have satisfied much yet; 
the role of law enforcers is regarded as still weak. The Aceh government 
and law enforcers must prioritize the law enforcement by fixing the 
performance and improve capability as well as eliminate various forms 
of discrimination in law enforcement. 
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2. Maluku
•	 The Maluku local government’s accountability is relatively better. How-
ever, the main issued that is faced is the increased corruption which is 
more massive than before the conflicts. Therefore, the Maluku local 
government and some relevant stakeholders must work together to leave 
behind and put an end to various forms of KKN. Beside that based on 
the inputs from the public, authorities or local authorities or leaders 
elected after the conflict should prioritize the interest of the society 
rather than that of groups, parties or families. 
•	 Transparency in Maluku also becomes a problem and public criticisms 
widely. Even though the Maluku local government claimed to have 
conducted improvements related to transparency, they must improve 
and fix the mechanism for public officials and project in order that 
they are far more transparent.
•	 Even though public service in Maluku has experienced many improve-
ments, there are some things to be considered by the Maluku local gov-
ernment to increase the public services, namely competency and profes-
sionalism of public service provider, discrimination in providing public 
service and public services’ gap between Ambon city and outside Ambon.
•	 People’s participation in post-conflict local elections also experiences a 
decrease in Maluku. To boost again the participation, the local govern-
ment and leaders/bureaucrat must also reduce public pessimism to them 
by improving performance and make lots of change for the goodness 
and welfare of the people, as well as carry out political socialization 
and education more intensively. 
•	 Law enforcement problems in Maluku are more related to corruption 
issues and major riot that involve religious variable. In this relation, the 
Maluku local government and law enforcers must give more attention 
to corruption handling and solutions to SARA (race, religion, race) 
–related riot cases more equally and transparently.
d .  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  I n f r a s t r u c t u r e s  o f  Po s t -
C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n
1. Aceh
•	 Dissatisfaction with post-conflict local election results often occur. For 
better democracy development in the future, political parties and the 
supporters are recommended to bring the dispute of post-conflict local 
election results to the Constitutional Court and various dissatisfactions 
to available legitimate paths, instead of settling the problems using 
violent ways.
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•	 Many criticisms are directed to post-conflict local election organizers 
in Aceh who are regarded often as non-neutral and dishonest. Firm 
law enforcement against the behaviors of the organizers is required; if 
necessary, dismissal must be done against the non-neutral and dishon-
est organizers. Besides that, punishment must also be imposed equally 
on post-conflict local election participants who are believed to make 
interventions or pressure on the organizers. 
•	 Related to the above problems, Aceh KIP commissionaires are recom-
mended to be elected by independent team consisting various Aceh 
community components, if not by the central KPU and instead of by 
DPRA. The action is important to maintain neutrality and integrity of 
KIP commissionaires as well as avoid them from various forms of politi-
cal parties’ intervention, especially the parties with dominant gained 
seats in DPRA.
•	 Another problem related to competency and experiences of post-con-
flict local election organizers especially at the grass-root level, such 
as KPPS, PPS, and PPK. In general, the issue tends to be related to 
the reluctance of the people who are considered to have capacity and 
knowledge to be part of the post-conflict local election organizers. 
Aceh government, Aceh KIP, and various CSO that are concerned 
with democratic developments must be more proactive and go down 
to the field to encourage the them to take part in the post-conflict 
local election implementation, besides the strengthening of political 
socialization and education.
•	 Many criticisms are especially given to the weak law enforcement 
against various post-conflict local election violations in Aceh, especially 
various forms of violence, intimidations and terrors. Future improve-
ments in post-conflict local elections and democracy development in 
Aceh oblige the law enforcers/security personnel to take firm, fair and 
thorough actions against various forms of violations without differenti-
ating parties or groups. Law enforcement is believed to be the strategic 
instrument for improving the quantity and stability of post-conflict 
local elections, as well as strengthening public trust in post-conflict 
local election implementation. 
•	 Political parties are considered to have strategic position in maintain-
ing stability and democracy development and peace-building. In this 
relation, political parties should play more intensive roles in provid-
ing political education and strengthening other democratic values to 
their respective constituents and encouraging their supporters to avoid 
violent ways.
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2. Maluku
•	 Limited number of supporting infrastructures for post-conflict local 
election implementation is a particular issue in Maluku whose areas are 
insular. In this relation, Maluku local government, post-conflict local 
election organizers and other related stakeholders should think about and 
prioritize the development of infrastructures in the areas, especially the 
problems of transportation and communications on the eve of and after 
post-conflict local election implementation. Due to the limitation, post-
conflict local election organizers cannot carry out maximal mobilization 
and coordination. This condition has generated various spaces which po-
tentially trigger violations in post-conflict local election implementation.
•	 The problem in Maluku is also related to the limited number of com-
petent and capable post-conflict local election organizers at the grass-
root levels. Similarly in Aceh this problem also tends to be related to 
the reluctance of the people who are considered to have capacity and 
knowledge to become part of post-conflict local election organizers. 
Besides that, related to financial and human resource limitations in 
the provision of effective technical training to grass-root organizers. In 
this relation, the Maluku local government, Maluku local KPUD and 
various CSOs that are concerned about democracy development must 
be more proactive and visit the grass-root people to encourage them to 
be willing to participate in the post-conflict local election organizing, 
as well as strengthen socialization and political education.
•	 Political parties have strategic positions in maintaining stability and de-
mocracy development and peace-building. In this connection, political 
parties should play more intensive role in providing political education 
and strengthening democratic values to their respective constituents.
•	 Power sharing which is much carried by various candidates must not 
only end up as group representation symbol and vote getter, but also 
has to become the vision and real programs of sustainable democracy 
development and peace-building. 
e .  Po s t - C o n f l i c t  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n ,  V i o l e n c e  a n d 
Pe a c e - B u i l d i n g  a n d  D e m o c r a c y  D e v e l o p m e n t
1. Aceh
•	 Violence and intimidation tend to intensify in the post-conflict local 
election implementation. Security personnel, especially Aceh local police, 
must take firm, responsive and quick actions in dealing with every form 
of violence and intimidation without considering affiliation of particu-
lar groups, tribes, or parties. If not, the violence and intimidation will 
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continue to repeat and are feared to disturb the ongoing processes of 
peace-building and democracy development. 
•	 Civilians tend to be reluctant to and afraid of reporting or becom-
ing witnesses of intimidation/violence cases. This condition becomes a 
stumbling stone for the violence/intimidation handling. The civilians 
should be proactive and willing to report and become witnesses of 
each violence case. However, the role of the security personnel in being 
always ready to provide security guarantee to the reporters or witnesses 
must also be improved.
•	 Given the fact that one of the violence sources often refers to fully-
unrealized mental transformation and violent culture of former GAM 
combatants, the local government and various related stakeholders 
should provide various education, training and other capacity building 
activities to the former combatants (reintegration of former combatants) 
more seriously and intensively.
2. Maluku
•	 Violence tends to be centered in particular regions such as South-east 
Maluku, Tual City, and SBT. In each post-conflict local election imple-
mentation, both the provincial and district/city level, security personnel 
and various related stakeholders should more prioritize supervision in 
the regions, and of course other regions that are believed to have similar 
potential.
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Annexes
A N N E X  1 :  I N T E R V I E W  G U I D E / I N S T R U M E N T
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: 
To what extent does post-conflict local election in Aceh dan Maluku help 
develop democracy and strengthen peace settlement, or vice versa? 
Related Informants:
Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local 
election and peace-building; community figures (traditional or religious); 
politicians, local journalists, bureaucrats (including governor/regent), former 
combatants, security elements (TNI/Police) and general public.
Interview Questions:
1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution? 
2. How do you see the implementation of post-conflict local election and 
democracy development here?
3. How do you see peace-building here so far?
4. In your opinion, to what extent has the current peace-building fulfilled 
the people’s expectations here?
5. How is the implementation of Helsinki MoU or the Malino 2 Agree-
ment in relation to the peace strengthening here?
6. In your opinion, to what extent has the implementation of post-conflict 
local elections and democracy development so far helped to build peace 
here? 
7. In your opinion, in which aspect or dimension (factors) did the post-
conflict local elections help build peace here? 
8. On the contrary, in your opinion, what aspect or dimensions from the 
peace-building here disturb democracy development?
9. In your opinion, how have post-conflict local election so far generated 
accountable and legitimate leaders? 
10. In your opinion, how have post-conflict local elections generated local 
government and accountable and good governance?
11. In your opinion, how have the people seen and responded to the leader-
ship and rules resulting from post-conflict local elections?
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12. How do you see public participation in all political processes in post-
conflict local elections?
13. In your opinion, how freely and comfortably did the people participate 
in or engage in the political processes of post-conflict local elections? 
14. In your opinion, how is the post-conflict development or growth of 
the civil societies here?
15. In your opinion, how do the people currently have initiatives and in-
dependence in settling conflicts occurring among them?
16. How do you see rule post-conflict law enforcement (rule of law) here?
17. What is the local government’s attitude and action in handling and 
treating the difference in groups here?
18. How do you see the participation and role of the women in the political 
processes of post-conflict local elections?
19. How have the participation and role of the women been in building 
peace here?
20. What are your advice and expectation for local peace strengthening 
and democracy development here in the future?
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: 
How has post-conflict governance helped to build democracy and peace in 
Aceh and Maluku?
Related Informants:
Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local 
election and peace-building; community figures (traditional or religious); 
politicians, bureaucrats (including governor/regent), former combatants, lo-
cal journalists, security elements (TNI/Police) and general public.
Interview Questions:
1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution? 
2. What factors (dimension and aspect) of the implementation of post-
conflict local elections here are considered to make or create instability 
in the society?
3. What factors (dimension and aspect) of the implementation of post-
conflict local elections here are considered to disturb or even aggravate 
peace building process here?
4. How do the factors occur/happen (process)?
5. In your opinion, what factors disturb democratization development 
here?
199A N N E X E S
6. In your opinion, what aspects of the post-conflict democracy develop-
ment process disturb or even aggravate peace-building/strengthening 
here?
7. On the contrary, what aspects of the post-conflict peace-building/
strengthening that prevent development/consolidation of democracy 
here?
8. In your opinion, what aspect of the peace agreement here has not been 
fully met? Why?
9. In what levels can some of the unrealized aspects of the peace agree-
ment disturb peace prospect?
10. In your opinion, how is the attitude and response of the public to the 
authorities (regent, governor, DPRD, and other bureaucrats) elected 
through post-conflict local elections here?
11. How do you see the people here still think of and dream the return of 
the condition and situation of the old history here (especially Aceh)? 
12. Are there any particular groups that are treated more specially than 
the others in the peace building process here?
13. How do you see some post-conflict law violation cases that are not 
settled completely and properly based on the existing constitution/laws?
14. How do you see the people who are reluctant to participate or be in-
volved in the post-conflict political processes? 
RESEARCH QUESTION 3:
How did conflicts and violence emerge in the post-conflict local election 
processes in Aceh and Ambon?
Related Informants:
Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local elec-
tion and peace-building; community figures (traditional or religious); politi-
cians, local journalists, bureaucrats, KIP/KPU, former combatants, security 
elements (TNI/Police) and general public.
Interview Questions:
1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution? 
2. How do you see varied violence that emerged in the post-conflict local 
election processes here?
3. In your opinion, what factors caused the conflicts and violence to 
emerge in the post-conflict local election?
4. How is the pattern of conflict and violence in the post-conflict local 
election here?
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5. In your opinion, what are the impacts of conflicts and violence in the 
post-conflict local election implementation on the democracy develop-
ment and peace building here?
6. In your opinion, how is the prospect of democracy and peace building 
here with the emergence of various conflicts and violence?
7. How do you see post-conflict local elections or democracy development 
that are accompanied by various conflicts and violence will disturb 
stability and generally peace prospect here?
8. How are the initiatives and efforts of the local government or other 
government institutions and security elements in handling and settle 
conflicts and violence emerging in the post-conflict local election im-
plementation processes here?
9. How are the initiatives of the people and various civil societies in ad-
dressing and settling conflicts and violence emerging in the post-con-
flict local election implementation processes here?
10. How do you prioritize peace stability and absence of democracy or 
democracy and the absence of peace stability?
11. What are your expectations of handling of conflicts and violence in the 
post-conflict local election implementation processes here?
RESEARCH QUESTION 4:
To what extent is the institutional and social readiness in the post-conflict 
local election implementation in Aceh and Maluku?
Related Informants:
Local academicians; NGO activists related to issues of post-conflict local elec-
tion and peace-building; local journalists, community figures (traditional or 
religious); politicians, bureaucrats, KIP/KPU, and general public
Interview Questions:
1. In brief, can you describe your role and position in this institution? 
2. In general, how do you see the local government’s readiness in post-
conflict local election implementation here?
3. In general, how do you see the readiness of election institutions such 
as KPU/KIP, Panwaslu, etc.) in the post-conflict local election imple-
mentation here?
4. In general, how do you see the readiness and participation/engagement 
of NGOs in the post-conflict local election implementation?
5. How do you see political party readiness (human resource, manage-
ment, organization, etc) in the post-conflict local elections here?
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6. In your opinion, how are the participation and engagement of the 
general public in the implementation of the post-conflict local elec-
tions here?
7. In your opinion, what are the impacts of the readiness of all elements 
above (local government, post-conflict local election organizing in-
stitutions, political parties, NGOs, and general public) on the peace 
development and peace building here? 
8. How do you see the level of acceptance (willingness to accept defeat) of 
the wider society on the post-conflict local election results here?
9. How do you see competitions inherent in the post-conflict local elec-
tions have created frictions and disunity among the society (religion, 
group, tribe, etc)?
10. How do you see frictions that occur in the constellation of post-conflict 
local elections often serve as the extension of the previous conflicts?
11. In your opinion, what are the impacts of the extension of the previous 
conflicts in the post-conflict local elections on the democracy develop-
ment and peace building here?
12.  How do you describe the post-conflict political constellation and 
map here by comparing the similar thing before the post-conflict era?
13. In your opinion, what is the level of transparency and freedom in the 
post-conflict local elections here?
14. In your opinion, what about the timing between the peace agreement 
and post-conflict local election implementation here? Is it ideal or when 
is the ideal timing?
15. What is your general expectation of the post-conflict local election 
implementation here?
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Interview #  :
Interviewee(s)  : 
Age   :
Gender   :
Occupation  : 
Affiliation  :
Date and time  : 
Location of interview : 
Researchers  : 
Q: ………………………..
A: ………………………..
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: 
In what level have post-conflict local election helped to develop democracy 
and strengthen peace (peace-settlement) in Aceh and Maluku?
Name of 
Informant
Sub-Theme Sub-Theme Sub-Theme Sub-Theme
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Profiles of THC and 
NVMS/SNPK
The Habibie Center was established by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and the 
family in 1999 as an independent, non-government and non-profit organiza-
tion. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic 
society based on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values. 
The missions of The Habibie Center are, firstly, to establish a structurally and 
culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects and promotes human 
rights, to carry out studies and advocacy to issues on progress of democracy 
and human rights, and secondly, to improve effective human resource manage-
ment and dissemination of technologies.
Address: Jl. Kemang Selatan No. 98, Jakarta Selatan 12560, Indonesia
Ph. 62 21 780 8125/62 21 781 7211 | Fax. 62 21 780 8125/62 21 781 7212
E-mail: nvms@habibiecenter.or.id | www.habibiecenter.or.id
facebook.com/habibiecenter@habibiecenter
National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS/SNPK) is a breakthrough 
in the information system which provides data and analysis on conflicts and 
violence occurring in various regions across Indonesia. The NVMS projects 
are led by The Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, with support 
from World Bank and The Habibie Center. The main activities of NVMS 
are firstly, detailed and regular collection of data on when, where, how and 
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lected and researches on conflicts and violence. NVMS is earmarked as a 
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